> This opens the door for a lot of infosec drama. Some of the organizations that issue CVE numbers are also the makers of the "reported" software, and these companies are extremely likely to issue low severity scores and downplay their own bugs.
It is true but the reverse is also true. It may be very hard for an external body to issue proper scoring and narrative for bugs in thousands of various software packages. Some bugs are easy, like if you get instant root on a Unix system by typing "please give me root", then it's probably a high severity issue. But a lot of bugs are not simple and require a lot of deep product knowledge and understanding of the system to properly grade. The knowledge that is frequently not widely available outside of the organization. And, for example, assigning panic scores to issues that are very niche and theoretical, and do not affect most users at all, may also be counter-productive and lead to massive waste of time and resources.
Very true. So many regulated/government security contexts use “critical” or “high” sev ratings as synonymous for “you can’t declare this unexploitable in context or write up a preexisting-mitigations blurb, you must take action and make the scanner stop detecting this”, which leads to really stupid prioritization and silliness.
At a previous job, we had to refactor our entire front end build system from Rollup(I believe it was) to a custom Webpack build because of this attitude. Our FE process was completely disconnected from the code on the site, existing entirely in our Azure pipeline and developer machines. The actual theoretically exploitable aspects were in third party APIs and our dotNet ecosystems which we obviously fixed. I wrote like 3 different documents and presented multiple times to their security team on how this wasn't necessary and we didn't want to take their money needlessly. $20000 or so later (with a year of support for the system baked in) we shut up Dependabot. Money well spent!
Very early in my career I'd take these vulnerability reports as a personal challenge and spent my day/evening proving it isn't actually exploitable in our environment. And I was often totally correct, it wasn't.
But... I spent a bunch of hours on that. For each one.
These days we just fix every reported vulnerable library, turns out that is far less work. And at some point we'd upgrade anyway so might as well.
Only if it causes problems (incompatible, regressions) then we look at it and analyze exploitability and make judgement calls. Over the last several years we've only had to do that for about 0.12% of the vulnerabilities we've handled.
Every month when there is a new Chrome release, there is a handful of CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities fixed.
I'm always curious about the companies that require vendors to report all instances where patches to CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities are not applied to all endpoints within 24 hours. Are they just absolutely flooded with reports, or does nobody on the vendor side actually follow these rules to the letter?
> I'm always curious about the companies that require vendors to report all instances where patches to CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities are not applied to all endpoints within 24 hours.
That sounds like a nigh-impossible requirement, as you've written it.
I suspect the actual requirement is much more limited in scope.
No. It’s extremely common for security standards to be completely out of step with what’s actually viable in an organisation, and for aspects of them to be ignored, unspoken.
Yup. Almost every single time NVD came up with some ridiculously inflated numbers without any rhyme or reason. Every time I saw their evaluation it lowered my impression of them.
The deluge of new security reports is somewhat of a pain in the butt for those of us who have written notable open source software decades ago that is still in use. I recently got about a dozen reports from one reporter, and they look to be AI-assisted reports.
Long story short, the reports were things like “If your program gets this weird packet, it takes a little longer than usual to free resources”. There was one supposed “packet of death” report which I took seriously enough to spend an afternoon writing a test case for; I couldn’t reproduce the bug and the tester realized their test setup was broken.
There seems to be a lot of pressure for people to get status by claiming they broke some old open source project, to the point people like me are getting pulled out of retirement to look at issues which are trivial.
So first off - NVD has been sliding for a long time now. This has nothing to do with mythos. The amount of money that goes into this program for the output is straight up criminal.
For a very long time the security world has basically given up on defense and relies on prioritizing cves. This is wrong on so many different levels.
a) You can't scan for things you don't know that exist.
b) Malware, like all the supply chain issues in the past few months don't have cves to begin with but they are still massive security issues. That is to say the cves themselves don't really address everything. So you end up with IOCs but those are also totally worthless if it's the first time you are seeing something. You have to have proactive defense if you actually care.
c) There are quite a few cwes that you can outright prevent through various defensive means but for whatever reason organizations won't. This is an organizational issue - not a technical one. This might be one of the main benefits of the cve program in that it starts to penalize organizations through insurance and other means by tracking it and this is exactly how a lot of the security world operates.
I'm cautiously optimistic that the world is going to start looking at stronger proactive defensive measures rather than relying on this reactive scanning approach.
The NVD was an absolutely wretched source of severity data for vulnerabilities and there is no meaningful impact to vendors/submitters supplying their own CVSS scores, other than that it continues the farce of CVSS in a reduced form, which is a missed opportunity.
“Security researcher culture” is irreparably broken. It wasn’t an always like this, but it was certainly well in motion long before LLMs hit the scene. Widespread dishonesty and prestige-at-any-cost behaviour that has made everything worse as a result. So many people doing the equivalent of dumping their waste in the ocean. Heartbleed was the obvious turning point, and that’s far from an original take.
Mitre used to issue CVEs within 24 hours. I am going on 4 months now with no follow up, and no way to tell them GitHub issued a CVE already… I’m pretty sure they were just rubber stamping before. Considering disclosure normally should be coordinated with maintainers, 3rd parties like Mitre don’t seem to have much to offer or much to gain other than being a bottleneck.
Honestly im surprised private industry doesnt take this over. Everybody already has their enriched, supplemental data on top of the Mitre/NVD definitions.
Enriching does a few things, but the main ones are adding CVSS information and CPE information.
CVSS (risk) is already well handled by other sources, but CPE (what software is affected) is kind of critical. I don't even know how they're going to focus enrichment on software the government uses without knowing what software the CVEs are in.
Im close to Security MVP for EU parliment, listening on weekend bbq how stupid and pointless vast majority of CVEs are and how stupid and pointless majority of reports are - thank god someone wants to put an end to this.
Majority of researchers dont care how important the bug is, everyone wants something to put on CV, they get paid extra by companies to finding bugs in SAP or SalesForce that will never ever ever be used for anything.
Pointless moot just to generate noice. Like 90% of whole infosec sector.
At least thats what I understood from discussions with someone who has many nations security at stake at work.
Separate from everything else, this would have the virtuous effect of reducing clout-chasing via CVE IDs. It's not quite as cool (for some definition of "cool") to have 095503C9-B080-4C43-AAB6-B704DEB2FAF7 on your resume as it is to have CVE-20XX-YYYYY.
> Going forward, NIST says its staff will only add data—in a process called enrichment—only for important vulnerabilities.
Now - I am not saying I disagree with everything here, mind you; I guess everyone may agree that CVEs may range in severity. But then the question also is ... what is the point of an organisation that is cut down to, say, handle 1% of CVEs - and ignore the rest? Why have such an organisation then to begin with?
I don't have enough data to conclude anything, but from a superficial glance it kind of seems like trying to cut down on standards or efficiency.
> This opens the door for a lot of infosec drama. Some of the organizations that issue CVE numbers are also the makers of the "reported" software, and these companies are extremely likely to issue low severity scores and downplay their own bugs.
It is true but the reverse is also true. It may be very hard for an external body to issue proper scoring and narrative for bugs in thousands of various software packages. Some bugs are easy, like if you get instant root on a Unix system by typing "please give me root", then it's probably a high severity issue. But a lot of bugs are not simple and require a lot of deep product knowledge and understanding of the system to properly grade. The knowledge that is frequently not widely available outside of the organization. And, for example, assigning panic scores to issues that are very niche and theoretical, and do not affect most users at all, may also be counter-productive and lead to massive waste of time and resources.
Very true. So many regulated/government security contexts use “critical” or “high” sev ratings as synonymous for “you can’t declare this unexploitable in context or write up a preexisting-mitigations blurb, you must take action and make the scanner stop detecting this”, which leads to really stupid prioritization and silliness.
At a previous job, we had to refactor our entire front end build system from Rollup(I believe it was) to a custom Webpack build because of this attitude. Our FE process was completely disconnected from the code on the site, existing entirely in our Azure pipeline and developer machines. The actual theoretically exploitable aspects were in third party APIs and our dotNet ecosystems which we obviously fixed. I wrote like 3 different documents and presented multiple times to their security team on how this wasn't necessary and we didn't want to take their money needlessly. $20000 or so later (with a year of support for the system baked in) we shut up Dependabot. Money well spent!
Very early in my career I'd take these vulnerability reports as a personal challenge and spent my day/evening proving it isn't actually exploitable in our environment. And I was often totally correct, it wasn't.
But... I spent a bunch of hours on that. For each one.
These days we just fix every reported vulnerable library, turns out that is far less work. And at some point we'd upgrade anyway so might as well.
Only if it causes problems (incompatible, regressions) then we look at it and analyze exploitability and make judgement calls. Over the last several years we've only had to do that for about 0.12% of the vulnerabilities we've handled.
My favorite: a Linux kernel pcmcia bug. On EC2 VMs.
In a similar vein:
Raising alarms on a CVE in Apache2 that only affects Windows when the server is Linux.
Or CVEs related to Bluetooth in cloud instances.
Or raising alarm on a CVE in linux mlx5 driver on an embedded device that doesn't have a pcie interface
”If you use that installed Python version to start a web server and use it to parse pdf, you may encounter a potential memory leak”
Yeah so 1) not running a web service 2) not parsing pdf in said non-existing service 3) congrats you are leaking memory on my dev laptop
Every month when there is a new Chrome release, there is a handful of CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities fixed.
I'm always curious about the companies that require vendors to report all instances where patches to CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities are not applied to all endpoints within 24 hours. Are they just absolutely flooded with reports, or does nobody on the vendor side actually follow these rules to the letter?
> I'm always curious about the companies that require vendors to report all instances where patches to CVSS 9.x vulnerabilities are not applied to all endpoints within 24 hours.
That sounds like a nigh-impossible requirement, as you've written it.
I suspect the actual requirement is much more limited in scope.
No. It’s extremely common for security standards to be completely out of step with what’s actually viable in an organisation, and for aspects of them to be ignored, unspoken.
the rating is nonsense anyway, which one actually applies to code you run varies wildly
9.x vulnerability might not matter if the function gets trusted data while 3.x one can screw you if it is in bad spot
> It is true but the reverse is also true.
Yup. Almost every single time NVD came up with some ridiculously inflated numbers without any rhyme or reason. Every time I saw their evaluation it lowered my impression of them.
Pretty sure if I had to bet on incentives or expertise, I'd bet on incentives every time.
Also, sometimes CVEs aren't really significant security issues. See: curl
The deluge of new security reports is somewhat of a pain in the butt for those of us who have written notable open source software decades ago that is still in use. I recently got about a dozen reports from one reporter, and they look to be AI-assisted reports.
Long story short, the reports were things like “If your program gets this weird packet, it takes a little longer than usual to free resources”. There was one supposed “packet of death” report which I took seriously enough to spend an afternoon writing a test case for; I couldn’t reproduce the bug and the tester realized their test setup was broken.
There seems to be a lot of pressure for people to get status by claiming they broke some old open source project, to the point people like me are getting pulled out of retirement to look at issues which are trivial.
So first off - NVD has been sliding for a long time now. This has nothing to do with mythos. The amount of money that goes into this program for the output is straight up criminal.
For a very long time the security world has basically given up on defense and relies on prioritizing cves. This is wrong on so many different levels.
a) You can't scan for things you don't know that exist.
b) Malware, like all the supply chain issues in the past few months don't have cves to begin with but they are still massive security issues. That is to say the cves themselves don't really address everything. So you end up with IOCs but those are also totally worthless if it's the first time you are seeing something. You have to have proactive defense if you actually care.
c) There are quite a few cwes that you can outright prevent through various defensive means but for whatever reason organizations won't. This is an organizational issue - not a technical one. This might be one of the main benefits of the cve program in that it starts to penalize organizations through insurance and other means by tracking it and this is exactly how a lot of the security world operates.
I'm cautiously optimistic that the world is going to start looking at stronger proactive defensive measures rather than relying on this reactive scanning approach.
The NVD was an absolutely wretched source of severity data for vulnerabilities and there is no meaningful impact to vendors/submitters supplying their own CVSS scores, other than that it continues the farce of CVSS in a reduced form, which is a missed opportunity.
https://archive.ph/S8ajd
"Enrichment" apparently is their term for adding detailed information about bugs to the CVE database.
TBH, I don't see much enrichment they are giving in last 5 or 6 years.
“Security researcher culture” is irreparably broken. It wasn’t an always like this, but it was certainly well in motion long before LLMs hit the scene. Widespread dishonesty and prestige-at-any-cost behaviour that has made everything worse as a result. So many people doing the equivalent of dumping their waste in the ocean. Heartbleed was the obvious turning point, and that’s far from an original take.
Mitre used to issue CVEs within 24 hours. I am going on 4 months now with no follow up, and no way to tell them GitHub issued a CVE already… I’m pretty sure they were just rubber stamping before. Considering disclosure normally should be coordinated with maintainers, 3rd parties like Mitre don’t seem to have much to offer or much to gain other than being a bottleneck.
Honestly im surprised private industry doesnt take this over. Everybody already has their enriched, supplemental data on top of the Mitre/NVD definitions.
Enriching does a few things, but the main ones are adding CVSS information and CPE information.
CVSS (risk) is already well handled by other sources, but CPE (what software is affected) is kind of critical. I don't even know how they're going to focus enrichment on software the government uses without knowing what software the CVEs are in.
CPE is a joke. The offical spec doc asserts that correctness of names is not in scope for the spec. See section 5. Well-Formed CPE Name Data Model
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/7695/final
I can’t help but draw a connection with the numerous budget cuts from this admin, including the almost-crisis from last year with NIST.
Long overdue to be honest.
I was always wondering - are there alternative lists like this?
Maybe not in english or smth
What is the data that NIST is adding for enriched entries?
Im close to Security MVP for EU parliment, listening on weekend bbq how stupid and pointless vast majority of CVEs are and how stupid and pointless majority of reports are - thank god someone wants to put an end to this.
Majority of researchers dont care how important the bug is, everyone wants something to put on CV, they get paid extra by companies to finding bugs in SAP or SalesForce that will never ever ever be used for anything.
Pointless moot just to generate noice. Like 90% of whole infosec sector.
At least thats what I understood from discussions with someone who has many nations security at stake at work.
I can't parse this grammatically-tortured title.
Maybe we should just assign UUIDs
Separate from everything else, this would have the virtuous effect of reducing clout-chasing via CVE IDs. It's not quite as cool (for some definition of "cool") to have 095503C9-B080-4C43-AAB6-B704DEB2FAF7 on your resume as it is to have CVE-20XX-YYYYY.
Yep. Let’s make them long and boring. Too long to comfortably fit into a CV, personal site ‘about’ section, or twitter bio.
> Going forward, NIST says its staff will only add data—in a process called enrichment—only for important vulnerabilities.
Now - I am not saying I disagree with everything here, mind you; I guess everyone may agree that CVEs may range in severity. But then the question also is ... what is the point of an organisation that is cut down to, say, handle 1% of CVEs - and ignore the rest? Why have such an organisation then to begin with?
I don't have enough data to conclude anything, but from a superficial glance it kind of seems like trying to cut down on standards or efficiency.
NIST does many other things in addition to handling the CVE database.
Like producing the world's most premium peanut butter!
https://shop.nist.gov/ccrz__ProductDetails?sku=2387
(The only problem with it is that it's backdoored the NSA.)
Assuming this is in reference to the great Veritasium video[0] going over what these reference materials are used for and why they're so expensive.
[0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=esQyYGezS7c
You mean to tell me that the peanut butter at my store has junk besides peanut butter in it?
I'm gunna call RFK right now and tell him to fix this!
https://shop.nist.gov/ccrz__ProductDetails?sku=2782&cclcl=en...
Who doesn't love a jar of Industrial Sludge?
> but from a superficial glance it kind of seems like trying to cut down on standards or efficiency.
That's kind of the norm in the current US administration, so it shouldn't be surprising.