This is architectural problem, the LUA bug, the longer global outage last week, a long list of earlier such outages only uncover the problem with architecture underneath. The original, distributed, decentralized web architecture with heterogeneous endpoints managed by myriad of organisations is much more resistant to this kind of global outages. Homogeneous systems like Cloudflare will continue to cause global outages. Rust won't help, people will always make mistakes, also in Rust. Robust architecture addresses this by not allowing a single mistake to bring down myriad of unrelated services at once.
First, let’s set aside the separate question of whether monopolies are bad. They are not good but that’s not the issue here.
As to architecture:
Cloudflare has had some outages recently. However, what’s their uptime over the longer term? If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
But there’s a more interesting argument in favour of the status quo.
Assuming cloudflare’s uptime is above average, outages affecting everything at once is actually better for the average internet user.
It might not be intuitive but think about it.
How many Internet services does someone depend on to accomplish something such as their work over a given hour? Maybe 10 directly, and another 100 indirectly? (Make up your own answer, but it’s probably quite a few).
If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
It’s not really bad end user experience that every service uses cloudflare. It’s more-so a question of why is cloudflare’s stability seeming to go downhill?
And that’s a fair question. Because if their reliability is below average, then the value prop evaporates.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
The point is that it doesn’t matter. A single site going down has a very small chance of impacting a large number of users. Cloudflare going down breaks an appreciable portion of the internet.
If Jim’s Big Blog only maintains 95% uptime, most people won’t care. If BofA were at 95%.. actually same. Most of the world aren’t BofA customers.
I'm not sure I follow the argument. If literally every individual site had an uncorrelated 99% uptime, that's still less available than a centralized 99.9% uptime. The "entire Internet" is much less available in the former setup.
It's like saying that Chipotle having X% chance of tainted food is worse than local burrito places having 2*X% chance of tainted food. It's true in the lens that each individual event affects more people, but if you removed that Chipotle and replaced with all local, the total amount of illness is still strictly higher, it's just tons of small events that are harder to write news articles about.
No it's like saying if one single point of failure in a global food supply chain fails, nobody's going to eat today. And which is in contrast to if some supplier fails to provide a local food truck today their customers will have to go to the restaurant next door.
Ah ok, it is true that if there's a lot of fungible offerings that worse but uncorrelated uptime can be more robust.
I think the question then is how much of the Internet has fungible alternatives such that uncorrelated downtime can meaningfully be less impact. If you have a "to buy" shopping list, the existence of alternative shopping list products doesn't help you, when the one you use is down it's just down, the substitutes cannot substitute on short notice. Obviously for some things there's clear substitutes though, but actually I think "has fungible alternatives" is mostly correlated with "being down for 30 minutes doesn't matter", it seems that the things where you want the one specific site are the ones where availability matters more.
The restaurant-next-door analogy, representing fungibility, isn't quite right. If BofA is closed and you want to do something in person with them, you can't go to an unrelated bank. If Spotify goes down for an hour, you're not likely to become a YT Music subscriber as a stopgap even though they're somewhat fungible. You'll simply wait, and the question is: can I shuffle my schedule instead of elongating it?
A better analogy is that if the restaurant you'll be going to is unexpectedly closed for a little while, you would do an after-dinner errand before dinner instead and then visit the restaurant a bit later. If the problem affects both businesses (like a utility power outage) you're stuck, but you can simply rearrange your schedule if problems are local and uncorrelated.
If utility power outage is put on the table, then the analogy is almost everyone solely relying on the same grid, in contrast with being wired to a large set of independent providers or even using their own local solar panel or whatever autonomous energy source.
Look at it a user (or even operator) of one individual service that isn’t redundant or safety critical: if choice A has 1/2 the downtime of choice B, you can’t justify choosing choice B by virtue of choice A’s instability.
The world dismantled landlines, phone booths, mail order catalogues, fax machines, tens of millions of storefronts, government offices, and entire industries in favor of the Internet.
So at this point no, the world can most definitely not “just live without the Internet”. And emergency services aren’t the only important thing that exists to the extent that anything else can just be handwaved away.
Terrible examples, Github and Google aren't just websites that one would place behind Cloudflare to try to improve their uptime (by caching, reducing load on the origin server, shielding from ddos attacks). They're their own big tech companies running complex services at a scale comparable to Cloudflare.
> If Cloudflare is at 99.95% then the world suffers
if the world suffers, those doing the "suffering" needs to push that complaint/cost back up the chain - to the website operator, which would push the complaint/cost up to cloudflare.
The fact that nobody did - or just verbally complained without action - is evidence that they didn't really suffer.
In the mean time, BofA saved cost in making their site 99.95% uptime themselves (presumably cloudflare does it cheaper than they could individually). So the entire system became more efficient as a result.
> The fact that nobody did - or just verbally complained without action - is evidence that they didn't really suffer.
What an utterly clueless claim. You're literally posting in a thread with nearly 500 posts of people complaining. Taking action takes time. A business just doesn't switch cloud providers overnight.
I can tell you in no uncertain terms that there are businesses impacted by Cloudflare's frequent outages that started work shedding their dependency on Cloudflare's services. And it's not just because of these outages.
> On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
I think the parent post made a different argument:
- Centralizing most of the dependency on Cloudflare results in a major outage when something happens at Cloudflare, it is fragile because Cloudflare becomes the single point of failure. Like: Oh Cloudflare is down... oh, none of my SaaS services work anymore.
- In a world where this is not the case, we might see more outages, but they would be smaller and more contained. Like: oh, Figma is down? fine, let me pickup another task and come back to Figma once it's back up. It's also easier to work around by having alternative providers as a fallback, as they are less likely to share the same failure point.
As a result, I don't think you'll be blocked 100 hours a year in scenario 2. You may observe 100 non-blocking inconveniences per year, vs a completely blocking Cloudflare outage.
And in observed uptime, I'm not even sure these providers ever won. We're running all our auxiliary services on a decent Hetzner box with a LB. Say what you want, but that uptime is looking pretty good compared to any services relying on AWS (Oct 20, 15 hours), Cloudflare (Dec 5 (half hour), Nov 18 (3 hours)). Easier to reason about as well. Our clients are much more forgiving when we go down due to Azure/GCP/AWS/Cloudflare vs our own setup though...
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
> On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
Putting Cloudflare in front of a site doesn't mean that site's backend suddenly never goes down. Availability will now be worse - you'll have Cloudflare outages* affecting all the sites they proxy for, along with individual site back-end failures which will of course still happen.
"My architecture depends upon a single point of failure" is a great way to get laughed out of a design meeting. Outsourcing that single point of failure doesn't cure my design of that flaw, especially when that architecture's intended use-case is to provide redundancy and fault-tolerance.
The problem with pursuing efficiency as the primary value prop is that you will necessarily end up with a brittle result.
> "My architecture depends upon a single point of failure" is a great way to get laughed out of a design meeting.
This is a simplistic opinion. Claiming services like Cloudflare are modeled as single points of failure is like complaining that your use of electricity to power servers is a single point of failure. Cloudflare sells a global network of highly reliable edge servers running services like caching, firewall, image processing, etc. And more importas a global firewall that protects services against global distributed attacks. Until a couple of months ago, it was unthinkable to casual observers that Cloudflare was such an utter unreliable mess.
Your electricity to servers IS a single point of failure, if all you do is depend upon the power company to reliably feed power. There is a reason that co-location centers have UPS and generator backups for power.
It may have been unthinkable to some casual observers that creating a giant single point of failure for the internet was a bad idea but it was entirely thinkable to others.
> Your electricity to servers IS a single point of failure, if all you do is depend upon the power company to reliably feed power.
I think you quite didn't got the point. The whole point is that putting together a system architecture that considers Cloudflare is a single point of failure is like designing a system architecture that considers a power supplier a single point of failure. Technically they can be considered that if you really really want to, but not only are things irredeemably broken when those failure modes are triggered but also they themselves are by far expected to be the most reliable components of your systems due to their design and SLAs that is pointless to waste time and resources mitigating such a scenario.
You're arguing from an end-user perspective, I'm pointing out that the Internet wasn't designed to solve easy but fragile problems but instead was intended to be a resilient network capable of surviving failures and route around them.
"I want to use a power tool and simply plug it into a wall" is not the same class of problem as "we're using a heart-lung machine during this bypass operation and power loss results in dead patients."
The widespread dependence upon Cloudflare has resulted in the "heart-lung machine" problem of DNS, among other things, being "solved" by a "power tool" class of solution.
No.I am arguing from a software engineer's perspective tackling a systems design problem.
> I'm pointing out that the Internet wasn't designed to solve easy but fragile problems but instead was intended to be a resilient network capable of surviving failures and route around them.
Irrelevant. Engineers design systems that remain functioning in spite of their failure modes. Some failure modes are irredeemable. Even structural engineers don't design structures to withstand all conceivable earthquakes, because they understand that mitigating that failure modes is unrealistic.
The same goes for software. You do not build your WebApps to remain working when half of the internet dies. This means scenarios such as AWS, GCP or Cloudflare being out.
You do know that data centers use backup generators because electricity is a single point of failure right? They even have multiple power supplies plugged into different circuits.
> You do know that data centers use backup generators because electricity is a single point of failure right?
How many times do you account for the existence of backup generators in a data center when you design, say, a SPA? How do you expect to be treated if you even suggest such a thing in a design requirements meeting? Do you understand what I am saying?
That's an interesting point, but in many (most?) cases productivity doesn't depend on all services being available at the same time. If one service goes down, you can usually be productive by using an alternative (e.g. if HN is down you go to Reddit, if email isn't working you catch up with Slack).
Many (I’d speculate most) workflows involve moving and referencing data across multiple applications. For example, read from a spreadsheet while writing a notion page, then send a link in Slack. If any one app is down, the task is blocked.
Software development is a rare exception to this. We’re often writing from scratch (same with designers, and some other creatives). But these are definitely the exception compared to the broader workforce.
Same concept applies for any app that’s built on top of multiple third-party vendors (increasingly common for critical dependencies of SaaS)
On the other hand, if one site is down you might have alternatives. Or, you can do something different until the site you needed is up again. Your argument that simultaneous downtime is more efficient than uncoordinated downtime because tasks usually rely on multiple sites being online simultaneously is an interesting one. Whether or not that's true is an empirical question, but I lean toward thinking it's not true. Things failing simultaneously tends to have worse consequences.
Paraphrasing: We are setting aside the actual issue and looking for a different angle.
To me this reads as a form of misdirection, intentional or not. A monopolist has little reason to care about downstream effects, since customers have nowhere else to turn. Framing this as roll your own versus Cloudflare rather than as a monoculture CDN environment versus a diverse CDN ecosystem feels off.
That said, the core problem is not the monopoly itself but its enablers, the collective impulse to align with whatever the group is already doing, the desire to belong and appear to act the "right way", meaning in the way everyone else behaves. There are a gazillion ways of doing CDN, why are we not doing them? Why the focus on one single dominant player?
I don’t the answer to the all questions. But here I think it is just a way to avoid responsibility. If someone choses CDN “number 3” and it goes down, business people *might* put a blame on this person for not choosing “the best”.
I am not saying it is a right approach, I just seen it happens too many times.
That’s fine if it’s just some random office workers. What if every airline goes down at the same time because they all rely on the same backend providers? What if every power generator shuts off? “Everything goes down simultaneously” is not, in general, something to aim for.
CloudFlare doesn’t have a good track record. It’s the third party that caused more outages for us than any other third party service in the last four years.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
I disagree; most people need only a subset of Cloudflare's features. Operating just that subset avoids the risk of the other moving parts (that you don't need anyway) ruining your day.
Cloudflare is also a business and has its own priorities like releasing new features; this is detrimental to you because you won't benefit from said feature if you don't need it, yet still incur the risk of the deployment going wrong like we saw today. Operating your own stack would minimize such changes and allow you to schedule them to a maintenance window to limit the impact should it go wrong.
The only feature Cloudflare (or its competitors) offers that can't be done cost-effectively yourself is volumetric DDoS protection where an attacker just fills your pipe with junk traffic - there's no way out of this beyond just having a bigger pipe, which isn't reasonable for any business short of an ISP or infrastructure provider.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
That's a wrong way of looking at it though. For 99.99% individual sites, I wouldn't care if they were down for weeks. Even if I use this site, there are very few sites that I need to use daily. For the rest of them, if one of them randomly goes down I probably would never know or notice, because I didn't need it then. However, when single-point-of-failure provider, like Cloudflare, goes down, you bet I notice. I must notice, because my work would be affected, my CI/CD pipelines will start failing, my newsfeeds will stop, I will notice it in dozens of places - because everybody uses it. The aggregated fails-per-unit-of-time may be less but the impact of each fail is way, way more, and the probability of it impacting me is approaching certainty.
So for me, as an average internet user, it would be much better if all the world wouldn't go down at once, even if the instances of particular things going down would be more frequent - provided they are randomly distributed in time and not concentrated. If just one thing goes down, I could do another thing. If everything goes down, I can only sit and twiddle my thumbs until it's back up.
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
This doesn’t guarantee availability of those N services themselves though, surely? N services with a slightly lower availability target than N+1 with a slightly higher value?
More importantly, I’d say that this only works for non-critical infrastructure, and also assumes that the cost of bringing that same infrastructure back is constant or at least linear or less.
The 2025 Iberian Peninsula outage seems to show that’s not always the case.
If you’re using 10 services and 1 goes down, there’s a 9/10 chance you’re not using it and you can switch to work on something else. If all 10 go down you are actually blocked for an hour. Even 5 years ago, I can’t recall ever being actually impacted by an outtage to the extent that I was like “well, might as well just go get something to eat because everything is down”.
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
The consequence of some services being offline is much, much worse than a person (or a billion) being bored in front of a screen.
Sure, it’s arguably not Cloudflares fault that these services are cloud-dependent in the first place, but even if service just degrades somewhat gracefully in an ideal case, that’s a lot of global clustering of a lot of exceptional system behavior.
Or another analogy: Every person probably passes out for a few minutes in their live at one point or another. Yet I wouldn’t want to imagine what happens if everybody got that over with at the very same time without warning…
> Cloudflare has had some outages recently. However, what’s their uptime over the longer term? If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
Why is that the only option? Cloudflare could offer solutions that let people run their software themselves, after paying some license fee. Or there could be many companies people use instead, instead of everyone flocking to one because of cargoculting "You need a CDN like Cloudflare before you launch your startup bro".
What you’re suggesting is not trivial. Otherwise we wouldn’t use various CDNs. To do what Cloudflare does your starting point is “be multiple region/multiple cloud from launch” which is non-trivial especially when you’re finding product-market fit. A better poor man’s CDN is object storage through your cloud of choice serving HTTP traffic. Cloudflare also offers layers of security and other creature comforts. Ignoring the extras they offer, if you build what they offer you have effectively made a startup within a startup.
Cloudflare isn’t the only game in town either. Akamai, Google, AWS, etc all have good solutions. I’ve used all of these at jobs I’ve worked at and the only poor choice has been to not use one at all.
What do you think Cloudflare’s core business is? Because I think it’s two things:
1. DDoS protection
2. Plug n’ Play DNS and TLS (termination)
Neither of those make sense for self-hosted.
Edit: If it’s unclear, #2 doesn’t make sense because if you self-host, it’s no longer plug n’ play. The existing alternatives already serve that case equally well (even better!).
When I’m working from home and the internet goes down, I don’t care. My poor private-equity owned corporation, think of the lost productivity!!
But if I was trying to buy insulin at 11 pm before benefits expire, or translate something at a busy train station in a foreign country, or submit my take-home exam, I would be freeeaaaking out.
The cloudflare-supported internet does a whole lot of important, time-critical stuff.
All of my company's hosted web sites have way better uptimes and availability than CF but we are utterly tiny in comparison.
With only some mild blushing, you could describe us as "artisanal" compared to the industrial monstrosities, such as Cloudflare.
Time and time again we get these sorts of issues with the massive cloudy chonks and they are largely due to the sort of tribalism that used to be enshrined in the phrase: "no one ever got fired for buying IBM".
We see the dash to the cloud and the shoddy state of in house corporate IT as a result. "We don't need in-house knowledge, we have "MS copilot 365 office thing" that looks after itself and now its intelligent - yay \o/
Until I can't, I'm keeping it as artisanal as I can for me and my customers.
Sorry for the downvotes but this is true many times with some basic HA you get better uptime than the big cloud boys, yes their stack and tech is fancier but we also need to factor in how much CF messes with it vs self hosted, anyway the self hosted wisdom is RIP these days and I mostly just run cf pages / kv :)
Usually I am allergic to pithy, vaguely dogmatic summaries like this but you're right. We have traded "some sites are down some of the time" for "most sites are down some of the time". Sure the "some" is eliding an order of magnitude or two, but this framing remains directionally correct.
Does relying on larger players result in better overall uptime for smaller players? AWS is providing me better uptime than if I assembled something myself because I am less resourced and less talented than that massive team.
If so, is it a good or bad trade to have more overall uptime but when things go down it all goes down together?
From a societal view it is worse when everything is down at once. Leads to a less resilient society: It is not great if I can't buy essentials from one store because their payment system is down (this happened to one super market chain in Sweden due to a hacker attack some years ago, took weeks to fully fix everything, and then there was that whole Crowdstrike debacle globally more recently).
It is far worse if all of the competitors are down at once. To some extent you can and should have a little bit of stock at home (water, food, medicine, ways to stay warm, etc) but not everything is practical to do so with (gasoline for example, which could have knock on effects on delivery of other goods).
users want to do things, if their goal depends on a complex chain of functions (provided by various semi-independent services) then the ideal setup would be to have redundant providers and users could simply "load balance" between them and that separate high-level providers' uptime state is clustered (meaning that when Google is unavailable Bing is up, and when Random Site A, goes down their payment provider goes down too, etc..)
So ideally sites would somehow sort themselves nearly to separate availability groups.
Otherwise simply having a lot of uncorrelated downtimes doesn't help (if we count the sum of downtime experienced by people). Though again it gets complicated by the downtime percentage, because likely there's a phase shift between the states when user can mostly complete their goals and when they cannot because too many cascading failures.
> AWS is providing me better uptime than if I assembled something myself because I am less resourced and less talented than that massive team.
Is it? I can’t say that my personal server has been (unplanned) down at any time in the past 10 years, and these global outages have just flown right past it.
When only one thing goes down, it's easier to compensate with something else, even for people who are doing critical work but who can't fix IT problems themselves. It means there are ways the non-technical workforce can figure out to keep working, even if the organization doesn't have on-site IT.
Also, if you need to switchover to backup systems for everything at once, then either the backup has to be the same for everything and very easily implementable remotely - which to me seems unlikely for specialty systems, like hospital systems, or for the old tech that so many organizations still rely on (and remember the CrowdStrike BSODs that had to be fixed individually and in person and so took forever to fix?) - or you're gonna need a LOT of well-trained IT people, paid to be on standby constantly, if you want to fix the problems quickly, on account of they can't be everywhere at once.
If the problems are more spread out over time, then you don't need to have quite so many IT people constantly on standby. Saves a lot of $$$, I'd think.
And if problems are smaller and more spread out over time, then an organization can learn how to deal with them regularly, as opposed to potentially beginning to feel and behave as though the problem will never actually happen. And if they DO fuck up their preparedness/response, the consequences are likely less severe.
AWS and Cloudflare can recover from outages faster because they can bring dozens (hundreds?) of people to help, often the ones who wrote the software and designed the architecture. Outages at smaller companies I've worked for have often lasted multiple days, up to an exchange server outage that lasted 2 weeks.
Would you rather be attacked by 1,000 wasps or 1 dog? A thousand paper cuts or one light stabbing? Global outages are bad but the choice isn’t global pain vs local pleasure. Local and global both bring pain, with different, complicated tradeoffs.
Cloudflare is down and hundreds of well paid engineers spring into action to resolve the issue. Your server goes down and you can’t get ahold of your Server Person because they’re at a cabin deep in the woods.
It's not "1,000 wasps or 1 dog", it's "1,000 dogs at once, or "1 dog at once, 1,000 different times". Rare but huge and coordinated siege, or a steady and predictable background radiation of small issues.
The latter is easier to handle, easier to fix, and much more suvivable if you do fuck it up a bit. It gives you some leeway to learn from mistakes.
If you make a mistake during the 1000 dog siege, or if you don't have enough guards on standby and ready to go just in case of this rare event, you're just cooked.
I don't quite see how this maps onto the situation. The "1000 dog seige" also was resolved very quickly and transparently, so I would say it's actually better than even one of the "1 dog at once"s.
Perhaps not, but still compared to running your own thing you just sit and wait. No on call rotas to manage and pay for; no root cause analysis meetings after that descend into internal blame.
What you've identified here is a core part of what the banking sector calls the "risk based approach". Risk in that case is defined as the product of the chance of something happening and the impact of it happening. With this understanding we can make the same argument you're making, a little more clearly.
Cloudflare is really good at what they do, they employ good engineering talent, and they understand the problem. That lowers the chance of anything bad happening. On the other hand, they achieve that by unifying the infrastructure for a large part of the internet, raising the impact.
The website operator herself might be worse at implementing and maintaining the system, which would raise the chance of an outage. Conversely, it would also only affect her website, lowering the impact.
I don't think there's anything to dispute in that description. The discussion then is if cloudflares good engineering lowers the chance of an outage happening more than it raises the impact. In other words, the things we can disagree about is the scaling factors, the core of the argument seems reasonable to me.
On the other hand, as long as the entire internet goes down when Cloudflare goes down, I'll be able to host everything there without ever getting flack from anyone.
Actually, maybe 1 hour downtime for ~ the whole internet every month is a public good provided by Cloudflare. For everyone that doesn’t get paged, that is.
It's not as simple as that. What will result in more downtime, dependency on a single centralized service or not being behind Cloudflare? Clearly it's the latter or companies wouldn't be behind Cloudflare. Sure, the outages are more widespread now than they used to be, but for any given service the total downtime is typically much lower than before centralization towards major cloud providers and CDNs.
> Rust won't help, people will always make mistakes, also in Rust.
They don't just use Rust for "protection", they use it first and foremost for performance. They have ballpark-to-matching C++ performance with a realistic ability to avoid a myriad of default bugs. This isn't new.
You're playing armchair quarterback with nothing to really offer.
Not too long ago, critical avionics were programmed by different software developers and the software was run on different hardware architectures, produced by different manufacturers. These heterogeneous systems produced combined control outputs via a quorum architecture – all in a single airplane.
Now half of the global economy seems to run on same service provider, it seems…
That's a reflect of social organisation. Pushing for hierarchical organisation with a few key centralising nodes will also impact business and technological decisions.
Obviously Rust is the answer to these kind of problems. But if you are cloudflare and have an important company at a global scale, you need to set high standarts for your rust code. Developers should dance and celebrate end of the day if their code compiles in rust.
You're not wrong, but where's the robust architecture you're referring to? The reality of providing reliable services on the internet is far beyond the capabilities of most organizations.
I think it might be a organizational architecture that needs to change.
> However, we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”.
> This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years
So they shipped an untested configuration change that triggered untested code straight to production. This is "tell me you have no tests without telling me you have no tests" level of facepalm. I work on safety-critical software where if we had this type of quality escape both internal auditors and external regulators would be breathing down our necks wondering how our engineering process failed and let this through. They need to rearchitect their org to put greater emphasis on verification and software quality assurance.
> we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”.
I was surprised that a rules-based system was not tested completely, perhaps because the Lua code is legacy relative to the newer Rust implementation?
It tracks what I've seen elsewhere: quality engineering can't keep up with the production engineering. It's just that I think of CloudFlare as an infrastructure place, where that shouldn't be true.
I had a manager who came from defense electronics in the 1980's. He said in that context, the quality engineering team was always in charge, and always more skilled. For him, software is backwards.
"Kudos"? This is like the South Park episode in which the oil company guy just excuses himself while the company just continues to fuck up over and over again.
There's nothing to praise, this shouldn't happen twice in a month. Its inexcusable.
We still have two holidays and associated vacations and vacation brain to go. And then the January hangover.
Every company that has ignored my following advice has experienced a day for day slip in first quarter scheduling. And that advice is: not much work gets done between Dec 15 and Jan 15. You can rely on a week worth, more than that is optimistic. People are taking it easy and they need to verify things with someone who is on vacation so they are blocked. And when that person gets back, it’s two days until their vacation so it’s a crap shoot.
NB: there’s work happening on Jan 10, for certain, but it’s not getting finished until the 15th. People are often still cleaning up after bad decisions they made during the holidays and the subsequent hangover.
The problem is that Cloudflare do incremental rollouts and loads of testing for _code_. But they don't do the same thing for configuration - they globally push out changes because they want rapid response.
It's still a bit silly though, their claimed reasoning probably doesn't really stack up for most of their config changes - I don't see it to be that likely that a 0.1->1->10->100 rollout over the period of 10 minutes would be a catastrophically bad idea for them for _most_ changes.
And to their credit, it does seem they want to change that.
Yeah to me it doesn't make any sense - configuration changes are just as likely to break stuff (as they've discovered the hard way) and both of these issues could have been found in a testing environment before being deployed to production
In the post they described that they observed errors happening in their testing env, but decided to ignore because they were rolling out a security fix. I am sure there is more nuance to this, but I don’t know whether that makes it better or worse
This is funny, considering that someone that worked on the defense industry (guide missile system) found a memory leak on one of their products, at that time. They told him that they knew about it, but that it's timed just right with the range of the system it would be used, so it doesn't matter.
It tracks with my experience in software quality engineering. Asked to find problems with something already working well in the field. Dutifully find bugs/etc. Get told that it's working though so nobody will change anything. In dysfunctional companies, which is probably most of them, quality engineering exists to cover asses, not to actually guide development.
It is not dysfunctional to ignore unreachable "bugs". A memory leak on a missile which won't be reached because it will explode long before that amount of time has passed is not a bug.
It's a debt though. Because people will forget it's there and then at some point someone changes a counter from milliseconds to microseconds and then the issue happens 1000 times sooner.
It's never right to leave structural issues even if "they don't happen under normal conditions".
In hard real-time software, you have a performance budget otherwise the missile fails.
It might be more maintainable to have leaks instead of elaborate destruction routines, because then you only have to consider the costs of allocations.
Java has a null garbage collector (Sigma GC) for the same reason. If your financial application really needs good performance at any cost and you don't want to rewrite it, you can throw money at the problem to make it go away.
I don't think this argument makes sense. You wouldn't provision a 100GB server for a service where 1GB would do just in case unexpected conditions come up. If the requirements change, then the setup can change, doing it just because is wasteful. What if we forget is not a valid argument to over engineer and over provision.
If a fix is relatively low cost and improves the software in a way that makes it easier to modify in the future, it makes it easier to change the requirements. In aggregate these pay off.
If a missile passes the long hurdles and hoops built into modern Defence T&E procurement it will only ever be considered out of spec once it fails.
For a good portion of platforms they will go into service, be used for a decade or longer, and not once will the design be modified before going end of life and replaced.
If you wanted to progressively iterate or improve on these platforms, then yes continual updates and investing in the eradication of tech debt is well worth the cost.
If you're strapping explosives attached to a rocket engine to your vehicle and pointing it at someone, there is merit in knowing it will behave exactly the same way it has done the past 1000 times.
Neither ethos in modifying a system is necessarily wrong, but you do have to choose which you're going with, and what the merits and drawbacks of that are.
Again, when you're building a missile nobody should "forget" a detail.
You have very clearly in the specification, "this missile SHALL not have a run time before reboot of greater than 36 hours ref. donut_count.c:423 integer counter overflows"
Seriously, there's a military standard for pop tarts and they'd get rejected if they had out of spec amounts of frosting on top. It is not the software world you live in.
It's not that they don't ever make mistakes, just an extraordinary amount of effort is put into not making mistakes and oftentimes things are done "wrong" on purpose because of tradeoffs ordinary silicon valley software engineers have no context about.
The way it always seemed to go for me, when I was in that role, is the product is already complete, development is done, you're handed all the tests/etc that the disinterested developers care to give you, and you're told to make those tests presentable and robust, and increase test coverage. The process of doing that inevitably uncovers issues, but nobody cares because the thing is already done and working, so what was the point of any of it? The point was just to check off a box. At companies like this, the role is bullshit work.
Having observed an average of two mgmt rotations at most of the clients our company is working for this comes at absolutely no surprise to me.
Engineering is acting perfectly reasonable, optimizing for cost and time within the constraints they were given. Constraints are updated at a (marketing or investor pleasure) whim without consulting engineering, cue disaster. Not even surprising to me anymore...
>I wonder how that information is easily found afterwards.
Military hardware is produced with engineering design practices that look nothing at all like what most of the HN crowd is used to. There is an extraordinary amount of documentation, requirements, and validation done for everything.
There is a MIL-SPEC for pop tarts which defines all parts sizes, tolerances, etc.
Unlike a lot in the software world military hardware gets DONE with design and then they just manufacture it.
I used to take this approach when building new integrations. Then I realized (1) most documentation sucks (2) there's far too much to remember (3) much of it is conditional (4) you don't always know what matters until it matters (e.g. using different paths of implementation).
What works much better is having an intentional review step that you come back to.
Most of the time QA can tell you exactly how the product works, regardless of what the documentation says. But many of us haven’t seen a QA team in five, ten years.
You say this like trivial misstakes did not happen all the time in classical engineering as well.
If there is a memory leak, them this is a flaw, that might not matter so much for a specific product, but I can also easily see it being forgotten, if it was maybe mentioned somewhere in the documentation, but maybe not clear enough and deadlines and stress to ship are a thing there as well.
Just try harder. And if it still breaks, clearly you weren't trying hard enough!
At some point you have to admit that humans are pretty bad at some things. Keeping documentation up to date and coherent is one of those things, especially in the age of TikTok.
Better to live in the world we have and do the best you can, than to endlessly argue about how things should be but never will become.
Shouldn't grey beards, grizzled by years of practicing rigorous engineering, be passing this knowledge on to the next generation? How did they learn it when just starting out? They weren't born with it. Maybe engineering has actually improved so much that we only need to experience outages this frequently, and such feelings of nostalgia are born from never having to deal with systems having such high degrees of complexity and, realistically, 100% availability expectations on a global scale.
They may not have learned it but being thorough in general was more of a thing. These days things are far more rushed. And I say that as a relatively young engineer.
The amount of dedication and meticulous and concentrated work I know from older engineers when I started work and that I remember from my grand fathers is something I very rarely observe these days. Neither in engineering specific fields nor in general.
We were talking about making a missile (v2) with an extended range, and ensuring that the developers who work on it understand the assumption of the prior model: that it doesn't use free because it's expected to blow up before that would become an issue (a perfectly valid approach, I might add). And to ensure that this assumption still holds in the v2 extended range model. The analogy to Ariane 5 is very apt.
Now, there can be tens of thousands of similar considerations to document. And keeping up that documentation with the actual state of the world is a full time job in itself.
You can argue all you want that folks "should" do this or that, but all I've seen in my entire career is that documentation is almost universally: out of date, and not worth relying on because it's actively steering you in the wrong direction. And I actually disagree (as someone with some gray in my beard) with your premise that this is part of "rigorous engineering" as is practiced today. I wish it was, but the reality is you have to read the code, read it again, see what it does on your desk, see what it does in the wild, and still not trust it.
We "should" be nice to each other, I "should" make more money, and it "should" be sunny more often. And we "should" have well written, accurate and reliable docs, but I'm too old to be waiting around for that day to come, especially in the age of zero attention and AI generated shite.
For the new system to be approved, you need to document the properties of the software component that are deemed relevant. The software system uses dynamic allocation, so "what do the allocation patterns look like? are there leaks, risks of fragmentation, etc, and how do we characterise those?" is on the checklist. The new developer could try to figure this all out from scratch, but if they're copying the old system's code, they're most likely just going to copy the existing paperwork, with a cursory check to verify that their modifications haven't changed the properties.
They're going to see "oh, it leaks 3MiB per minute… and this system runs for twice as long as the old system", and then they're going to think for five seconds, copy-paste the appropriate paragraph, double the memory requirements in the new system's paperwork, and call it a day.
If ownerless code doesn’t result in discoverability efforts then the whole thing goes off the rails.
I won’t remember this block of code because five other people have touched it. So I need to be able to see what has changed and what it talks to so I can quickly verify if my old assumptions still hold true
When people don't read the documentation, discovery is a real problem. When people do read the documentation, things are different. Many software engineers do not read the documentation, and then complain to you if they break something in a documented way. If you compare to hardware engineers, whose vendors put out tens of thousands of pages of documentation for single parts, they have a lot of skill at reading documentation (and the vendors at writing it).
I've noticed that in recent months, even apart from these outages, cloudflare has been contributing to a general degradation and shittification of the internet. I'm seeing a lot more "prove you're human", "checking to make sure you're human", and there is normally at the very least a delay of a few seconds before the site loads.
I don't think this is really helping the site owners. I suspect it's mainly about AI extortion:
You call it extortion of the AI companies, but isn’t stealing/crawling/hammering a site to scrape their content to resell just as nefarious? I would say Cloudflare is giving these site owners an option to protect their content and as a byproduct, reduce their own costs of subsidizing their thieves. They can choose to turn off the crawl protection. If they aren't, that tells you that they want it, doesn’t it?
If someone has a robots.txt, and I want to request their page, but I want to do that in an automated way, should I open the browser to do it instead of issue a curl request? How about if I am going to ask claude to fetch the page for me?
Oh for sure. When he wrote of the AI companies that are "stealing/crawling/hammering", you thought he meant the legitimate ones that do honor robots.txt. That makes sense.
Actually, it looks like all the major ones do honour robots.txt including perplexity. They seemingly get around it using google serps, so theyre not actually crawling or hammering the site servers (or even cloudflare).
I'm guessing you don't manage any production web servers?
robots.txt isn't even respected by all of the American companies. Chinese ones (which often also use what are essentially botnets in Latin American and the rest of the world to evade detection) certainly don't care about anything short of dropping their packets.
I have been managing production commercial web servers for 28 years.
Yes, there are various bots, and some of the large US companies such as Perplexity do indeed seem to be ignoring robots.txt.
Is that a problem? It's certainly not a problem with cpu or network bandwidth (it's very minimal). Yes, it may be an issue if you are concerned with scraping (which I'm not).
Cloudflare's "solution" is a much bigger problem that affects me multiple times daily (as a user of sites that use it), and those sites don't seem to need protection against scraping.
It is rather disingenuous to backpedal from "you can easily block them" to "is that a problem? who even cares" when someone points out that you cannot in fact easily block them.
I was referring to legitimate ones, which you can easily block. Obviously there are scammy ones as well, and yes it is an issue, but for most sites I would say the cloudflare cure is worse than the problem it's trying to cure.
But is there any actual evidence that any major AI bots are bypassing robots.txt? It looked as if Perplexity was doing this, but after looking into it further it seems that likely isn't the case. Quite often people believe single source news stories without doing any due diligence or fact checking.
I haven't been in the weeds in a few months, but last time I was there we did have a lot of traffic from bots that didn't care about robots. Bytedance is one that comes to mind.
No you cannot! I blocked all of the user agents on a community wiki I run, and the traffic came back hours later masquerading as Firefox and Chrome. They just fucking lie to you and continue vacuuming your CPU.
There shouldn't be any noticeable hit on your cpu from bots from a site like that. Are you sure it's not a DDoS?
Obviously it depends on the bot, and you can't block the scammy ones. I was really just referring to the major legitimate companies (which might not include Perplexity).
Ive been seeing more of those prove your human pages as well, but I generally assume they are there to combat a DDOS or other type of attack (or maybe ai/bot). I remember how annoying it was combating DDOS attacks, or hacked sites before Cloudflare existed. I also remember how annoying capcha s were, everywhere. Cloudflare is not perfect but net, I think it’s been a great improvement.
More and more sites I can't even visit because of this "prove you're human" because it's not compatible with older web browsers, even though the website it's blocking is.
The pay-per-crawl thing, is about them thinking ahead about post-AI business/revenue models.
The way AI happened, it removed a big chunk of revenue from news companies, blogs, etc. Because lots of people go to AI instead of reaching the actual 3rd party website.
AI currently gets the content for free from the 3rd party websites, but they have revenue from their users.
So Cloudflare is proposing that AI companies should be paying for their crawling. Cloudflare's solution would give the lost revenue back where it belongs, just through a different mechanism.
The ugly side of the story is that this was already an existing solution, and open source, called L402.org.
Cloudflare wants to be the first to take a piece of the pie, but also instead of using the open source version, they forked it internally and published it as their own service, which is cloudflare specific.
To be completely fair, the l402 requires you to solve the payment mechanism itself, which for Cloudflare is easy because they already deal with payments.
> I've noticed that in recent months, even apart from these outages, cloudflare has been contributing to a general degradation and shittification of the internet. I'm seeing a lot more "prove you're human", "checking to make sure you're human", and there is normally at the very least a delay of a few seconds before the site loads.
Looking into this more, it does indeed seem to be a cloudflare problem. It looks like cloudflare made a significant error in their bot fingerprinting, and Perplexity wasn't actually bypassing robots.txt.
To be honest I find cloudflare a much more scammy company than Perplexity. I had a DDoS attack a few years ago which originated from their network, and they had zero interest in it.
I noticed this outage last night (Cloudflare 500s on a few unrelated websites). As usual, when I went to Cloudflare's status page, nothing about the outage was present; the only thing there was a notice about the pre-planned maintenance work they were doing for the security issue, reporting that everything was being routed around it successfully.
This is the case with just about every status page I’ve ever seen. It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page. One day these things will be automated, but until then, I wouldn’t expect more of Cloudflare than any other provider.
What’s more concerning to me is that now we’ve had AWS, Azure, and CloudFlare (and CliudFlare twice) go down recently. My gut says:
1. developers and IT are using LLMs in some part of the process, which will not be 100% reliable.
2. Current culture of I have (some personal activity or problem) or we don’t have staff, AI will replace me, f-this.
3. Pandemic after effects.
4. Political climate / war / drugs; all are intermingled.
There's no sweet spot I've found. I don't work for Cloudflare but when I did have a status indicator to maintain, you could never please everyone. Users would complain when our system was up but a dependent system was down, saying that our status indicator was a lie. "Fixing" that by marking our system as down or degraded whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius). The juice no longer seemed worth the squeeze and we gave up on automated status indicators.
> "Fixing" that by marking our system as down or degraded whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius).
This seems like an issue with the design of your status page. If the broken dependencies truly had a limited blast radius, that should've been able to be communicated in your indicators and statistics. If not, then the unreliable reputation was deserved, and all you did by removing the status page was hide it.
> whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius)
You are responsible of your dependencies, unless they are specific integrations. Either switch to more reliable dependencies or add redundancy so that you can switch between providers when any is down.
The headline status doesn't have to be "worst of all systems". Pick a key indicator, and as long as it doesn't look like it's all green regardless of whether you're up or down, users will imagine that "green headline, red subsystems" means whatever they're observing, even if that makes the status display utterly uninterpretable from an outside perspective.
Thing is, these things are automated... Internally.
Which makes it feel that much more special when a service provides open access to all of the infrastructure diagnostics, like e.g. https://status.ppy.sh/
>It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page.
Not really, they're just lying. I mean yes of course they aren't oracles who discover complex problems in instant of the first failure, but naw they know when well there are problems and significantly underreport them to the extent they are are less "smoke alarms" and more "your house has burned down and the ashes are still smoldering" alarms. Incidents are intentionally underreported. It's bad enough that there ought to be legislation and civil penalties for the large providers who fail to report known issues promptly.
Only way to change that it to shame them for it: "Cloudflare is so incompetent at detecting and managing outages that even their simple status page is unable to be accurate"
If enough high-ranked customers report this feedback...
> Disabling this was done using our global configuration system. This system does not use gradual rollouts but rather propagates changes within seconds to the entire network and is under review following the outage we recently experienced on November 18.
> As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception:
They really need to figure out a way to correlate global configuration changes to the errors they trigger as fast as possible.
> as part of this rollout, we identified an increase in errors in one of our internal tools which we use to test and improve new WAF rules
Warning signs like this are how you know that something might be wrong!
> They really need to figure out a way to correlate global configuration changes to the errors they trigger as fast as possible.
This is what jumped out at me as the biggest problem. A wild west deployment process is a valid (but questionable) business decision, but if you do that then you need smart people in place to troubleshoot and make quick rollback decisions.
Their timeline:
> 08:47: Configuration change deployed and propagated to the network
> 08:48: Change fully propagated
> 08:50: Automated alerts
> 09:11: Configuration change reverted and propagation start
> 09:12: Revert fully propagated, all traffic restored
2 minutes for their automated alerts to fire is terrible. For a system that is expected to have no downtime, they should have been alerted to the spike in 500 errors within seconds before the changes even fully propagated. Ideally the rollback would have been automated, but even if it is manual, the dude pressing the deploy button should have had realtime metrics on a second display with his finger hovering over the rollback button.
Ok, so they want to take the approach of roll forward instead of immediate rollback. Again, that's a valid approach, but you need to be prepared. At 08:48, they would have had tens of millions of "init.lua:314: attempt to index field 'execute'" messages being logged per second. Exact line of code. Not a complex issue. They should have had engineers reading that code and piecing this together by 08:49. The change you just deployed was to disable an "execute" rule. Put two and two together. Initiate rollback by 08:50.
How disconnected are the teams that do deployments vs the teams that understand the code? How many minutes were they scratching their butts wondering "what is init.lua"? Are they deploying while their best engineers are sleeping?
> 2 minutes for their automated alerts to fire is terrible
I take exception to that, to be honest. It's not desirable or ideal, but calling it "terrible" is a bit ... well, sorry to use the word ... entitled. For context, I have experience running a betting exchange. A system where it's common for a notable fraction of transactions in a medium-volume event to take place within a window of less than 30 seconds.
Vast majority of current monitoring systems are built on Prometheus. (Well okay, these days it's more likely something Prom-compatible but more reliable.) That implies collection via recurring scrapes. A supposedly "high" frequency online service monitoring system does a scrape every 30 seconds. Well known reliability engineering practices state that you need a minimum of two consecutive telemetry points to detect any given event - because we're talking about a distributed system and network is not a reliable transport. That in turn means that with near-perfect reliability the maximum time window before you can detect something failing is the time it takes to perform three scrapes: thing A might have failed a second after the last scrape, so two consecutive failures will show up only after a delay of just-a-hair-shy-of-three scraping cycle windows.
At Cloudflare's scale, I would not be surprised if they require three consecutive events to trigger an alert.
As for my history? The betting exchange monitoring was tuned to run scrapes at 10-second intervals. That still meant that the first an alert fired for something failing could have been effectively 30 seconds after the failures manifested.
Two minutes for something that does not run primarily financial transactions is a pretty decent alerting window.
Critical high-level stats such as errors should be scraped more frequently than 30 seconds. It’s important to have multiple time granularity scraping intervals, a small set of most critical stats should be scraped closer to 10s or 15s.
Prometheus has as an unaddressed flaw [0], where rate functions must be at least 2x the scrape interval. This means that if you scrape at 30s intervals, your rate charts won’t reflect the change until a minute after.
"Scrape" intervals (and the plumbing through to analysis intervals) are chosen precisely because of the denoising function aggregation provides.
Most scaled analysis systems provide precise control over the type of aggregation used within the analyzed time slices. There are many possibilities, and different purposes for each.
High frequency events are often collected into distributions and the individual timestamps are thrown away.
> At Cloudflare's scale, I would not be surprised if they require three consecutive events to trigger an alert.
Sorry but that’s a method you use if you serve 100 requests per second, not when you are at Cloudflare scale. Cloudflare easily have big enough volume that this problem would trigger an instant change in a monitorable failure rate.
Let's say you have 10 million servers. No matter what you are deploying, some of those servers are going to be in a bad state. Some are going to be in hw ops/repair. Some are going to be mid-deployment for something else. A regional issue may be happening. You may have inconsistencies in network performance. Bad workloads somewhere/anywhere can be causing a constant level of error traffic.
At scale there's no such thing as "instant". There is distribution of progress over time.
The failure is an event. Collection of events takes times (at scale, going through store and forward layers). Your "monitorable failure rate" is over an interval. You must measure for that interval. And then you are going to emit another event.
Global config systems are a tradeoff. They're not inherently bad; they have both strengths and weaknesses. Really bad: non-zero possibility for system collapse. Bad: Can progress very quickly to towards global outages. Good: Faults are detected quickly, response decision making is easy, and mitigation is fast.
Hyperscale is not just "a very large number of small simple systems".
Denoising alerts is a fact of life for SRE...and is a survival skill.
I see lots of people complaining about this down time but in actuality is it really that big a deal to have 30 minutes of down time or whatever. It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake. In many developed countries the electric power service has local down times on occasion. That's more important than not being able to load a website. I agree if CF is offering a certain standard of reliability and not meeting it then they should offer prorated refunds for the unexpected down time but otherwise I am not seeing what the big deal is here.
> It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake.
This is far too dismissive of how disruptive the downtime can be and it sets the bar way too low for a company so deeply entangled in global internet infrastructure.
I don’t think you can make such an assertion with any degree of credibility.
30 minutes of downtime is fine for most things, including Amazon.
30 minutes of unplanned downtime for infrastructure is unacceptable; but we’re tending to accept it. AWS or Cloudflare have positioned themselves as The Internet so they need to be held to a higher standard.
I am confident there is at least a few hospitals, gp offices or ticketing systems that interact directly or indirectly with Cloud flare. They've sold themselves as a major defence in security.
> about this down time but in actuality is it really that big a deal to have 30 minutes of down time or whatever. It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake.
This reads like sarcasm. But I guess it is not.
Yes, you are a CDN, a major one at that. 30 minutes of downtime or "whatever" is not acceptable. I worked at traffic teams of social networks that looked at themselves as that mission critical. CF is absolutely that critical and it is definitely lives at stake.
That was their first mistake, if your deployment does not behave the way you expect to (or even give you bad smell) roll back, that how it used to be... when I was a kid...lol
Or I don't know, maybe load test before you deploy.....?
“ Uh...it's probably not a problem...probably...but I'm showing a small discrepancy in...well, no, it's well within acceptable bounds again. Sustaining sequence. Nothing you need to worry about, Gordon. Go ahead.“
I feel like the cloud hosting companies have lost the plot. "They can provide better uptime than us" is the entire rationale that a lot of small companies have when choosing to run everything in the cloud.
If they cost more AND they're less reliable, what exactly is the reason to not self host?
> If they cost more AND they're less reliable, what exactly is the reason to not self host?
Shifting liability. You're paying someone else for it to be their problem, and if everyone does it, no one will take flak for continuing to do so. What is the average tenure of a CIO or decision maker electing to move to or remain at a cloud provider? This is why you get picked to talk on stage at cloud provider conferences.
(have been in the meetings where these decisions are made)
Plus, when you self-host, you can likely fix the issue yourself in a couple of hours max, instead of waiting indefinitely for a fix or support that might never come.
I mean, I still prefer to have the ability to fix it myself, because I know I can probably do it in 1h max. I know this doesn't apply to most people, especially those outside of HN though.
Even if resolution times are equal, there is some comfort in being able to see the problem and make progress on it to feel like you're actively doing something. I work in a large enterprise and we have a team dedicated to managing critical incidents and getting everyone together for a resolution. When a 3rd party vendor is the reason for the outage, those calls are really awkward. It's a bunch of people sitting around pressing F5, all frantically trying to make it look like they are actively helping, when no one is actually doing anything, because they can't.
I equate it to driving. I'd rather be moving at a normal speed on side streets than sitting in traffic on the expressway, even if the expressway is technically faster.
Today a client is having some issue with Zoom because of some artificial rate limits they impose. Their support is not responding, the account can't be used, courses can not be held and there's not much we can do.
We already started looking into moving away from Zoom, I suggested self-hosting http://jitsi.org
Based on their docs, self-hosting is well supported, and probably a $50-$100 server is more than enough, so a lot cheaper than Zoom.
Artifical limits, because they have 40 paid licenses that they can not use, because of a non-disclosed assignment limit that is NOT mentioned in the pricing page nor in the ToS.
If a company doesn't respond to this it tells you they likely only respond to lawsuits. As a paying customer whose business operations are impacted, you should have standing to sue. Your company could potentially extract from Zoom the entirety of the money that their dumb decision made your company lose. Consult a lawyer for actual advice and next steps.
Of course, it's also possible you signed a contract that basically says "we can just decide not to work and you can't do anything about it" in which case, sucks, and fire whoever negotiates your B2B contracts. But also, those clauses can be void if the violation is serious enough.
Probably not worth the effort, for a couple days of downtime, we'll just move somewhere else.
But I agree, I recognize the silence in that forum thread that was locked without a resolution: some boss said "let they complain or pay, we don't care about them otherwise".
For a start-up it's much easier to just pay the Cloud tax than it is to hire people with the appropriate skill sets to manage hardware or to front the cost.
Larger companies on the other hand? Yeah, I don't see the reason to not self host.
TBF, it depends on the number of outages locally. In my area it is one outage every thunderstorm/snow storm, so unfortunately the up time of my laptop, even with the help of a large, portable battery charging station (which can charge multiple laptops at the same time), is not optimistic.
I sometimes fancy that I could just take cash, go into the wood, build a small solar array, collect & cleanse river water, and buy a starlink console.
What I'm missing here is a test environment. Gradual or not; why are they deploying straight to prod? At Cloudflare's scale, there should be a dedicated room in Cloudflare HQ with a full isolated model-scale deployment of their entire system. All changes should go there first, with tests run for every possible scenario.
Only after that do you use gradual deployment, with a big red oopsie button which immediately rolls the changes back. Languages with strong type systems won't save you, good procedure will.
This is kinda what I'm thinking. We're absolutely not at the scale Cloudflare is at.
But we run software and configuration changes through three tiers - first stage for the dev-team only, second stage with internal customers and other teams depending on it for integration and internal usage -- and finally production. Some teams have also split production into different rings depending on the criticality of the customers and the number of customers.
This has lead to a bunch of discussions early on, because teams with simpler software and very good testing usually push through dev and testing with no or little problem. And that's fine. If you have a track record of good changes, there is little reason to artificially prolong deployment in dev and test just because. If you want to, just go through it in minutes.
But after a few spicy production incidents, even the better and faster teams understood and accepted that once technical velocity exists, actual velocity is a choice, or a throttle if you want an analogy.
If you do good, by all means, promote from test to prod within minutes. If you fuck up production several times in a row and start threatening SLAs, slow down, spend more resources on manual testing and improving automated testing, give changes time to simmer in the internally productive environment, spend more time between promotions from production ring to production ring.
And this is on top of considerations of e.g. change risk. Some frontend-only application can move much faster than the PostgreSQL team, because one rollback is a container restart, and the other could be a multi-hour recovery from backups.
They have millions of “free” subscribers; said subscribers should be the test pigs for rollouts; paying (read: big) subscribers can get the breaking changes later.
This feels like such a valid solution and is how past $dayjobs released things: send to the free users, rollout to Paying Users once that's proven to not blow up.
If your target is security, then _assuming your patch is actually valid_ you're giving better security coverage for free customers than to your paying ones.
Cloudflare is both, and their tradeoffs seem to be set on maximizing security at cost of availability. And it makes sense. A fully unavailable system is perfectly secure.
I am sure they have this. What tends to happen is that the gradual rollout system becomes too slow for some rare, low latency rollout requirements, so a config system is introduced that fulfills the requirements. For example, let’s say you have a gradual rollout for binaries (slow) and configuration (fast). Over time, the fast rollout of the configuration system will cause outages, so it’s slowed down. Then a requirement pops up for which the config system is too slow and someone identifies a global system with no gradual rollout (e.g. a database) to be used as the solution. That solution will be compliant with all the processes that have been introduced to the letter, because so far nobody has thought of using a single database row for global configuration yet. Add new processes whenever this happens and at some point everything will be too slow and taking on more risk becomes necessary to stay competitive. So processes are adjusted. Repeat forever.
I don't think I did. The implication is that using languages with strong types (as discussed in the article) is not a solution. That's rubbish. It's at least part of the solution.
Internet packet switching based architecture was originally design to withstand this type of outages [1].
Some people even go further by speculating that the original military DARPA network precursor to the modern Internet was originally designed to ensure the continuity of command and control (C&C) of the US military operation in the potential event of all out nuclear attack during the Cold War.
This the time when Internet researchers need to redefine the Internet application and operation. The local-first paradigm is the first step in the right direction (pardon the pun) [2].
[1] The Real Internet Architecture: Past, Present, and Future Evolution:
The lesson presented by the last few big outages is that entropy is, in fact, inescapable. The comprehensibility of a system cannot keep up with its growing and aging complexity forever. The rate of unknown unknowns will increase.
The good news is that a more decentralized internet with human brain scoped components is better for innovation, progress, and freedom anyway.
Why is the stability of your dedicated server a counterpoint that cloud behemoths can't keep up with their increasing entropy? Seems more like a supporting argument of OP at best, a non sequitur at worst.
Yeah, because it's not complex. It's 1 server. Get back to us when your 100k servers homelab data center that does a million different things has 10 years of uptime.
I'm not sure how decentralization helps though. People in a bazzar are going to care even less about sharing shadow knowledge. Linux IMO succeeds not because of the bazaar but because of Linus.
Also curious, since the bazaar seems to be where one acquires shadow knowledge (grey market items, support structures for unregistered people etc.). See Chungking Mansions in Hong Kong for a practical example.
I have seen similar bugs in cloudflare API recently as well.
There is an endpoint for a feature that is available only to enterprise users, but the check for whether the user is on an enterprise plan is done at the last step.
I recently ran into an issue with the Cloudflare API feature that if you want to roll back requires contacting the support team because there's no way to roll it back with the API or GUI. Even when the exact issue was pointed out, it took multiple days to change the setting and to my knowledge there's still no API fix available.
I work remotely 100% too. I don't go to any office. That doesn't change the fact that most remote people are just using AI and bullshitting. Yes they are bullshitters. Don't need to be super soft about it, it is not like an LGBTQ+ subject. Many remote workers are shitty. There, I said it again. Most remote workers are shitty.
I'm not sure which endpoint gp meant, but as I understood it, as an example, imagine a three-way handshake that's only available to enterprise users. Instead of failing a regular user on the first step, they allow steps one and two, but then do the check on step three and fail there.
The API endpoint I am talking about needs a external verification. they allow to do the external verification before checking if the user is on the enterprise plan or not.
The feature is only available to enterprise plans, it should not even allow external verification.
What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety?
They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead?
Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment system that caused their 11/18 outage.
Pure speculation, but to me that sounds like there's more to the story, this sounds like the sort of cowboy decision a team makes when they've either already broken all the rules or weren't following them in the first place
One thing to keep in mind when judging what's 'appropriate' is that Cloudflare was effectively responding to an ongoing security incident outside of their control (the React Server RCE vulnerability). Part of Cloudlfare's value proposition is being quick to react to such threats. That changes the equation a bit: any hour you wait longer to deploy, your customers are actively getting hacked through a known high-severity vulnerability.
In this case it's not just a matter of 'hold back for another day to make sure it's done right', like when adding a new feature to a normal SaaS application. In Cloudflare's case moving slower also comes with a real cost.
That isn't to say it didn't work out badly this time, just that the calculation is a bit different.
To clarify, I'm not trying to imply that I definitely wouldn't have made the same decision, or that cowboy decisions aren't ever the right call.
However, this preliminary report doesn't really justify the decision to use the same deployment system responsible for the 11/18 outage. Deployment safety should have been the focus of this report, not the technical details. My question that I want answered isn't "are there bugs in Cloudflare's systems" it's "has Cloudflare learned from it's recent mistakes to respond appropriately to events"
> doesn't really justify the decision to use the same deployment system responsible for the 11/18 outage
There’s no other deployment system available. There’s a single system for config deployment and it’s all that was available as they haven’t yet done the progressive roll out implementation yet.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but I don't know how that sort of oversight could happen in an organization whose business model rides on reliability. Small shops understand the importance of safeguards such as progressive deployments or one-box-style deployments with a baking period, so why not the likes of Cloudflare? Don't they have anyone on their payroll who warns about the risks of global deployments without safeguards?
Config changes are distinctly more difficult to have that set up for and as the blog says they’re working on it. They just don’t have it ready yet and are pausing any more config changes until it’s set up. They just did this one in response to try to mitigate an ongoing security vulnerability and missed the mark.
I’m happy to see they’re changing their systems to fail open which is one of the things I mentioned in the conversation about their last outage.
Then even in the worst case scenario, they were addressing this issue two days after it was publicly disclosed. So this wasn't a "rush to fix the zero day ASAP" scenario, which makes it harder to justify ignoring errors that started occuring in a small scale rollout.
Cloudflare did have early access, and had mitigation in place from the start. The changes that were being rolled out were in response to ongoing attempts to bypass those.
Disclosure: I work at Cloudflare, but not on the WAF
Cloudflare had already decided this was a rule that could be rolled out using their gradual deployment system. They did not view it as being so urgent that it required immediate global roll out.
Indeed, but it is what it is. Cloudflare comes out of my budget, and even with downtime, its better than not paying them. Do I want to deal with what Cloudflare offers? I do not, I have higher value work to focus on. I want to pay someone else to deal with this, and just like when cloud providers are down, it'll be back up eventually. Grab a coffee or beer and hang; we aren't savings lives, we're just building websites. This is not laziness or nihilism, but simply being rational and pragmatic.
> Do I want to deal with what Cloudflare offers? I do not, I have higher value work to focus on. I want to pay someone else to deal with this, and just like when cloud providers are down, it'll be back up eventually.
This is specious reasoning. How come I had to endure a total outage due to the rollout of a mitigation of a Nextjs vulnerability when my organization doesn't even own any React app, let alone a Nextjs one?
Also specious reasoning #2, not wanting to maintain a service does not justify blindly rolling out config changes globally without any safeguards.
If you are a customer of Cloudflare, and not happy, I encourage you to evaluate other providers more to your liking. Perhaps you'll find someone more fitting to your use case and operational preferences, but perhaps not. My day job org pays Cloudflare hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, and am satisfied with how they operate. Everyone has choice, exercise it if you choose. I'm sure your account exec would be happy to take the feedback. Feedback, including yours, is valuable and important to attempt to improve the product and customer experience (imho; i of course do not speak for Cloudflare, only myself).
As a recovering devops/infra person from a lifetime ago (who has, much to my heartbreak, broken prod more than once), perhaps that is where my grace in this regard comes from. Systems and their components break, systems and processes are imperfect, and urgency can lead to unexpected failure. Sometimes its Cloudflare, other times it's Azure, GCP, Github, etc. You can always use something else, but most of us continue to pick the happy path of "it works most of the time, and sometimes it does not." Hopefully the post mortem has action items to improve the safeguards you mention. If there are no process and technical improvements from the outage, certainly, that is where the failure lies (imho).
> you are a customer of Cloudflare, and not happy, I encourage you to evaluate other providers more to your liking.
I think your take is terribly simplistic. In a professional setting, virtually all engineers have no say on whether the company switches platforms or providers. Their responsibility is to maintain and develop services that support business. The call to switch a provider is ultimately a business and strategic call, and is a subject that has extremely high inertia. You hired people specialized in technologies, and now you're just dumping all that investment? Not to mention contracts. Think about the problem this creates.
Some of you sound like amateurs toying with pet projects, where today it's framework A on cloud provider X whereas tomorrow it's framework B on cloud provider Y. Come the next day, rinse and repeat. This is unthinkable in any remotely professional setting.
> Some of you sound like amateurs toying with pet projects, where today it's framework A on cloud provider X whereas tomorrow it's framework B on cloud provider Y. Come the next day, rinse and repeat. This is unthinkable in any remotely professional setting.
Vendor contracts have 1-3 year terms. We (a financial services firm) re-evaluate tech vendors every year for potential replacement and technologists have direct input into these processes. I understand others may operate under a different vendor strategy. As a vendor customer, your choices are to remain a customer or to leave and find another vendor. These are not feelings, these are facts. If you are unhappy but choose not to leave a vendor, that is a choice, but it is your choice to make, and unless you are a large enough customer that you have leverage over the vendor, these are your only options.
Rollback is a reliable strategy when the rollback process is well understood. If a rollback process is not well known and well experienced, then it is a risk in itself.
I'm not sure of the nature of the rollback process in this case, but leaning on ill-founded assumptions is a bad practice. I do agree that a global rollout is a problem.
Rollback carries with it the contextual understanding of complete atomicity; otherwise it's slightly better than a yeet. It's similar to backups that are untested.
No, complete atomicity doesn't require a frozen state, it requires common sense and fail-proof, fool-proof guarantees derived from assurances gained from testing.
There is another name for rolling forward, it's called tripping up.
That's entirely incorrect. For starters, they didn't get unlucky. They made a choice to use the same system they knew was sketchy (which they almost certainly knew was sketchy even before 11/18)
And on top of that, Cloudflare's value proposition is "we're smart enough to know that instantaneous global deployments are a bad idea, so trust us to manage services for you so you don't have to rely on in house folks who might not know better"
> They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead?
Note that the two deployments were of different components.
Basically, imagine the following scenario: A patch for a critical vulnerability gets released, during rollout you get a few reports of it causing the screensaver to show a corrupt video buffer instead, you roll out a GPO to use a blank screensaver instead of the intended corporate branding, a crash in a script parsing the GPOs on this new value prevents users from logging in.
There's no direct technical link between the two issues. A mitigation of the first one merely exposed a latent bug in the second one. In hindsight it is easy to say that the right approach is obviously to roll back, but in practice a roll forward is often the better choice - both from an ops perspective and from a safety perspective.
Given the above scenario, how many people are genuinely willing to do a full rollback, file a ticket with Microsoft, and hope they'll get around to fixing it some time soon? I think in practice the vast majority of us will just look for a suitable temporary workaround instead.
Roll back is not always the right answer. I can’t speak to its appropriateness in this particular situation of course, but sometimes “roll forward” is the better solution.
Like the other poster said, roll back should be the right answer the vast majority of the time. But it's also important to recognize that roll forward should be a replacement for the deployment you decided not to roll back, not a parallel deployment through another system.
I won't say never, but a situation where the right answer to avoid a rollback (that it sounds like was technically fine to do, just undesirable from a security/business perspective) is a parallel deployment through a radioactive, global blast radius, near instantaneous deployment system that is under intense scrutiny after another recent outage should be about as probable as a bowl of petunias in orbit
Is a roll back even possible at Cloudflare's size?
With small deployments it usually isn't too difficult to re-deploy a previous commit. But once you get big enough you've got enough developers that half a dozen PRs will have been merged since the start of the incident and now. How viable is it to stop the world, undo everything, and start from scratch any time a deployment causes the tiniest issues?
Realistically the best you're going to get is merging a revert of the problematic changeset - but with the intervening merges that's still going to bring the system in a novel state. You're rolling forwards, not backwards.
The short answer is "yes" due to the way the configuration management works. Other infrastructure changes or service upgrades might get undone, but it's possible. Or otherwise revert the commit that introduced the package bump with the new code and force that to rollout everywhere rather than waiting for progressive rollout.
There shouldn't be much chance of bringing the system to a novel state because configuration management will largely put things into the correct state. (Where that doesn't work is if CM previously created files, it won't delete them unless explicitly told to do so.)
That will depend on how you structure your deployments, on some large tech companies, while thousands of changes little are made every hour, and deployments are mande in n-day cycles. A cut-off point in time is made where the first 'green' commit after that is picked for the current deployment, and if that fails in an unexpected way you just deploy the last binary back, fix (and test) whatever broke and either try again or just abandon the release if the next cut is already close-by.
You want to build a world where roll back is 95% the right thing to do. So that it almost always works and you don't even have to think about it.
During an incident, the incident lead should be able to say to your team's on call: "can you roll back? If so, roll back" and the oncall engineer should know if it's okay. By default it should be if you're writing code mindfully.
Certain well-understood migrations are the only cases where roll back might not be acceptable.
Always keep your services in "roll back able", "graceful fail", "fail open" state.
This requires tremendous engineering consciousness across the entire org. Every team must be a diligent custodian of this. And even then, it will sometimes break down.
Never make code changes you can't roll back from without reason and without informing the team. Service calls, data write formats, etc.
I've been in the line of billion dollar transaction value services for most of my career. And unfortunately I've been in billion dollar outages.
Cloudflare is supposed to protect me from occasional ddos, not take my business offline entirely.
This can be architected in such a way that if one rules engine crashes, other systems are not impacted and other rules, cached rules, heuristics, global policies, etc. continue to function and provide shielding.
You can't ask for Cloudflare to turn on a dime and implement this in this manner. Their infra is probably very sensibly architected by great engineers. But there are always holes, especially when moving fast, migrating systems, etc. And there's probably room for more resiliency.
The question is perhaps what the shape and status of their tech stack is. Obviously, they are running at massive scale, and they have grown extremely aggressively over the years. What's more, especially over the last few years, they have been adding new product after new product. How much tech debt have they accumulated with that "move fast" approach that is now starting to rear its head?
I think this is probably a bigger root cause and is going to show up in different ways in future. The mere act of adding new products to an existing architecture/system is bound to create knowledge silos around operations and tech debt. There is a good reason why big companies keep smart people on their payroll to just change couple of lines after a week of debate.
Ouch. Harsh given that Cloudflare's being over-honest (to disabling the internal tool) and the outage's relatively limited impact (time wise & no. of customers wise). It was just an unfortunate latent bug: Nov 18 was Rust's Unwrap, Dec 5 its Lua's turn with its dynamic typing.
Now, the real cowboy decision I want to see is Cloudflare [0] running a company-wide Rust/Lua code-review with Codex / Claude...
cf TFA:
if rule_result.action == "execute" then
rule_result.execute.results = ruleset_results[tonumber(rule_result.execute.results_index)]
end
This code expects that, if the ruleset has action="execute", the "rule_result.execute" object will exist ... error in the [Lua] code, which had existed undetected for many years ... prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement [FL2 proxy] ... code written in Rust ... the error did not occur.
“We have spoken directly with hundreds of customers following that incident and shared our plans to make changes to prevent single updates from causing widespread impact like this. We believe these changes would have helped prevent the impact of today’s incident but, unfortunately, we have not finished deploying them yet.
“We know it is disappointing that this work has not been completed yet. It remains our first priority across the organization.”
> Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment system that caused their 11/18 outage.
Also there seems to be insufficient testing before deployment with very junior level mistakes.
> As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception:
Where was the testing for this one? If ANY exception happened during the rules checking, the deployment should fail and rollback. Instead, they didn't assess that as a likely risk and pressed on with the deployment "fix".
I guess those at Cloudflare are not learning anything from the previous disaster.
It's not about outages. It's about the why. Hardware can fail. Bugs can happen. But to continue a roll out despite warning sings and without understanding the cause and impact is on another level. Especially if it is related to the same problem as last time.
You don't need outages to build experience in resolving them, if you identify conditions that increase the risk of outages. Airlines can develop a lot of experience resolving issues that would lead to plane crashes, without actually crashing any planes.
From a more tinfoil-wearing angle, it may not even be a regular deployment, given the idea of Cloudflare being "the largest MitM attack in history". ("Maybe not even by Cloudflare but by NSA", would say some conspiracy theorists, which is, of course, completely bonkers: NSA is supposed to employ engineers who never let such blunders blow their cover.)
The deployment pattern from Cloudflare looks insane to me.
I've worked at one of the top fintech firms, whenever we do a config change or deployment, we are supposed to have rollback plan ready and monitor key dashboards for 15-30 minutes.
The dashboards need to be prepared beforehand on systems and key business metrics that would be affected by the deployment and reviewed by teammates.
I've never seen a downtime longer than 1 minute while I was there, because you get a spike on the dashboard immediately when something goes wrong.
For the entire system to be down for 10+ minutes due to a bad config change or deployment is just beyond me.
That is also true at Cloudflare for what it’s worth. However, the company is so big that there’s so many different products all shipping at the same time it can be hard to correlate it to your release, especially since there’s a 5 min lag (if I recall correctly) in the monitoring dashboards to get all the telemetry from thousands of servers worldwide.
Comparing the difficulty of running the world’s internet traffic with hundreds of customer products with your fintech experience is like saying “I can lift 10 pounds. I don’t know why these guys are struggling to lift 500 pounds”.
The fintech company I worked at does handle millions of QPS has has thousands of servers. It is on the same order of magnitude or at least 0.1x scale, not to mention the complexity of business logic involving monetary transactions.
If there’s indeed a 5 min lag in monitoring dashboard in Cloudflare, I honestly think that's a pretty big concern.
For example, a simple curl script on your top 100 customers' homepage that runs every 30 seconds would have given the warning and notifications within a minute. If you stagger deployments at 5 minute intervals, you could have identified the issue and initiated the rollback within 2 minutes and completed it within 3 minutes.
> However, the company is so big that there’s so many different products all shipping at the same time it can be hard to correlate it to your release
This kind of thing would be more understandable for a company without hundreds of billions of dollars, and for one that hasn't centralized so much of the internet. If a company has grown too large and complex to be well managed and effective and it's starting to look like a liability for large numbers of people there are obvious solutions for that.
Given how well-established cloudflare is, I would've figured they'd be profitable by now.
That raises the question: why does so much of the web rely on a company which does not have the means to sustain itself?
That was admittedly hyperbole, but since we're talking about a company with assets and revenue in the billions I'm not sure it matters. The fact remains that a lack of money/resources is not their problem.
They don't have unlimited resources. They have ~5000 employees. That's not small but it's not huge either. For sake of comparison, Google hit that headcount level literally 20 years ago.
They have enough money to buy anything they need. The CEO alone has billions. He could pay for as many employees as he wants out of his own pocket and not notice. In fact he's good at buying people, even senators.
That doesn't make sense. It would be like saying Twitter, SpaceX, and Tesla all should be incapable of engineering mistakes because their owner is rich. The world doesn't work that way.
Genuinely curious, how to actually implement detection systems for a large scale global infra which that works with < 1 minute SLO ? Given cost is no constraint.
Right now I'd say maybe don't push changes to your entire global infra all at once and certainty not without testing your change first to make sure it doesn't break anything, but it's really not about a specific failure/fix as much as it is about a single company getting too big to do the job well or just plain doing more than it should in the first place.
Honestly we shouldn't have created a system where any single company's failure is able to impact such a huge percentage of the network. The internet was designed for resilience and we abandoned that ideal to put our trust in a single company that maybe isn't up for the job. Maybe no one company ever could do it well enough, but I suspect that no single company should carry that responsibility in the first place.
But then would a customer have to use 10 different vendors to get the same things that Cloudflare currently provides? E.g. protection against various threats online?
Can you name a major cloud provider that doesn’t have major outages?
If this were purely a money problem it would have been solved ages ago. It’s a difficult problem to solve. Also, they’re the youngest of the major cloud providers and have a fraction of the resources that Google, Amazon, and Microsoft have.
> Can you name a major cloud provider that doesn’t have major outages?
That fact that no major cloud provider is actually good is not an argument that cloudflare isn't bad, or even that they couldn't/shouldn't do better than they are. They have fewer resources than Google or Microsoft but they're also in a unique position that makes us differently vulnerable when they fuck up. It's not all their fault, since it was a mistake to centralize the internet to the extent that we have in the first place, but now that they are responsible for so much they have to expect that people will be upset when they fail.
Every major cloud provider (including Cloudflare) is orders of magnitude better at keeping 9s of availability worldwide for thousands of customers than those customers are individually. The very best of those customers might be better and only rely on cloud providers for the scaling or huge amounts of infrastructure they don’t otherwise want to own, but the vast majority are actually less capable at accomplishing whatever uptime the providers already get.
Could cloudflare do better? Sure, that’s a truism for everyone. Did they make mistakes and continue to make mistakes? Also a truism.
Trust me, they are acutely aware of people getting upset when they fail. Why do you think they’re CEO and CTO are writing these blog posts?
With all due respect, engineers in finance can’t allow for outages like this because then you are losing massive amounts of money and potentially going out of business.
That means they engineered their systems incorrectly then? Precisely because they are much bigger, they should be more resilient. You know who's bigger than Cloudflare? tier-1 ISPs, if they had an outage the whole internet would know about it, and they do have outages except they don't cascade into a global mess like this.
Just speculating based on my experience: It's more likely than not that they likely refused to invest in fail-safe architectures for cost reasons. Control-plane and data-plane should be separate, a react patch shouldn't affect traffic forwarding.
Forget manual rollbacks, there should be automated reversion to a known working state.
> a react patch shouldn't affect traffic forwarding.
If you can’t even bother to read the blog post maybe you shouldn’t be so confident in your own analysis of what should and shouldn’t have happened?
This was a configuration change to change the buffered size of a body from 256kb to 1mib.
The ability to be so wrong in so few words with such confidence is impressive but you may want to take more of a curiosity first approach rather than reaction first.
> Instead, it was triggered by changes being made to our body parsing logic while attempting to detect and mitigate an industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components.
> Unfortunately, in our FL1 version of our proxy, under certain circumstances, the second change of turning off our WAF rule testing tool caused an error state that resulted in 500 HTTP error codes to be served from our network.
The body parsing logic is in react or nextjs, that's my takeaway, is it that incorrect? and the WAF rule testing tool (control plane) was interdependent with the WAF's body parsing logic, is that also incorrect?
> This was a configuration change to change the buffered size of a body from 256kb to 1mib.
Yes, and if it was resilient,the body parsing is done on a discrete forwarding plane. Any config changes should be auto-tested for forwarding failures by the separate control plane and auto-revered when there are errors. If the waf rule testing tool was part of that test then it being down shouldn't have affected data-plane because it would be a separate system.
data/control plane separate means the run time of the two and any dependencies they have are separate. It isn't cheap to do this right, that's why I speculated (I made clear i was speculating) that it was because they wanted to save costs.
> The ability to be so wrong in so few words with such confidence is impressive but you may want to take more of a curiosity first approach rather than reaction first.
Please tone down the rage a bit and leave room for some discussion. You should take your own pill and be curious about what I meant instead of taking a rage-first approach.
1. There is an active vulnerability unrelated to Cloudflare where React/Next.JS can be abused via a malicious payload. The payload could be up to 1MB.
2. Cloudflare had buffer size that wasn't enough to prevent that payload from being sent to the Customer of the Cloudflare.
3. Cloudflare to protect their customers wanted to increase the buffer size to 1MB.
4. Internal Testing Tool wasn't able to handle change to 1MB and started failing.
5. They wanted to stop Internal Testing Tool from failing, but the Internal Testing Tool required disabling a ruleset which an existing system was depending on (due to a long existing bug). This caused the wider incident.
It does seem to be like a mess in the sense that in order to stop internal testing tool from failing they had to endanger things globally in production, yes. It looks like legacy, tech debt mess.
It seems like bad decisions done in the past though.
Maybe they should have focused on fixing the "legacy tech debt mess", rather than pushing out more and more services and trying to be like AWS or Azure.
that makes better sense now, thanks. I feel dumb now that I re-read it, in my mind they patched nextjs/react and the new patch somehow required more buffer size.
My guess is that CF has so many external customers that they need to move fast and try not to break things. My hunch is that their culture always favors moving fast. As long as they are not breaking too many things, customers won't leave them.
There is nothing wrong with moving fast and deploying fast.
I'm more talking about how slow it was to detect the issue caused by the config change, and perform the rollback of the config change. It took 20 minutes.
Same, my time at a F100 ecommerce retailer showed me the same. Every change control board justification needed an explicit back-out/restoration plan with exact steps to be taken, what was being monitored to ensure that was being held to, contacts of prominent groups anticipated to have an effect, emergency numbers/rooms for quick conferences if in fact something did happen.
The process was pretty tight, almost no revenue-affecting outages from what I can remember because it was such a collaborative effort (even though the board presentation seemed a bit spiky and confrontational at the time, everyone was working together).
Yes, of course, I want the organization that inserted itself into handling 20% of the world's internet traffic to move fast and break things. Like breaking the internet on a bi-weekly basis. Yep, great tradeoff there.
While you're taking your break, exploits gain traction in the wild and one of the value propositions for using a service provider like CloudFlare is catching and mitigating theses exploits as fast as possible. From the OP, this outage was in relation to handling a nasty RCE.
Lest we forget, they initially rose to prominence by being cheaper than the existing solutions, not better, and I suppose this is a tradeoff a lot of their customers are willing to make.
Today, after the Cloudflare outage, I noticed that almost all upload routes for my applications were being blocked.
After some investigation, I realized that none of these routes passed through Cloudflare OWASP. The reported anomalies total 50, exceeding the pre-configured maximum of 40 (Medium).
Despite being simple image or video uploads, the WAF is generating anomalies that make no sense, such as the following:
Cloudflare OWASP Core Ruleset Score (+5)
933100: PHP Injection Attack: PHP Open Tag Found
Cloudflare OWASP Core Ruleset Score (+5)
933180: PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found
For now, I’ve had to raise the OWASP Anomaly Score Threshold to 60 and enable the JS Challenge, but I believe something is wrong with the WAF after today’s outage.
So Cloudflare:
- Did a last minute, untested change to their change: "turning off our WAF rule testing tool".
- Did an immediate global roll-out, instead of a staged one.
.
Is seems they would have enough leaning-cases now never to do that again...
My understanding, paraphrased: "In order to gradually roll out one change, we had to globally push a different configuration change, which broke everything at once".
But a more important takeaway:
> This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems
That's a bizarre takeaway for them to suggest, when they had exactly the same kind of bug with Rust like three weeks ago. (In both cases they had code implicitly expecting results to be available. When the results weren't available, they terminated processing of the request with an exception-like mechanism. And then they had the upstream services fail closed, despite the failing requests being to optional sidecars rather than on the critical query path.)
In fairness, the previous bug (with the Rust unwrap) should never have happened: someone explicitly called the panicking function, the review didn't catch it and the CI didn't catch it.
It required a significant organizational failure to happen. These happen but they ought to be rarer than your average bug (unless your organization is fundamentally malfunctioning, that is)
It's different to expect somebody to write the correct program every time than to expect somebody not to call the "break_my_system" procedure that was warnings all over it telling people it's there for quick learning-to-use examples or other things you'll never run.
To be precise, the previous problem with Rust was because somebody copped out and used a temporary escape hatch function that absolutely has no place in production code.
It was mostly an amateur mistake. Not Rust's fault. Rust could never gain adoption if it didn't have a few escape hatches.
"Damned if they do, damned if they don't" kind of situation.
There are even lints for the usage of the `unwrap` and `expect` functions.
As the other sibling comment points out, the previous Cloudflare problem was an acute and extensive organizational failure.
You can make an argument that .unwrap() should have no place in production code, but .expect("invariant violated: etc. etc.") very much has its place. When the system is in an unpredicted and not-designed-for state it is supposed to shut down promptly, because this makes it easier to troubleshoot the root cause failure whereas not doing so may have even worse consequences.
It's not remotely the same type of error -- error non-handling is very visible in the Rust code, while the Lua code shows the happy path, with no indication that it could explode at runtime.
Perhaps it's the similar way of not testing the possible error path, which is an organizational problem.
After rolling out a bad ruleset update, they tried a killswitch (rolled out immediately to 100%) which was a code path never executed before:
> However, we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”. When the killswitch was applied, the code correctly skipped the evaluation of the execute action, and didn’t evaluate the sub-ruleset pointed to by it. However, an error was then encountered while processing the overall results of evaluating the ruleset
> a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years
Yeah the example they gave does feel like pretty isolated unit test territory, or at least an integration test on a subset of the system that could be ran in isolation.
It was involved in the previous one, but not in this latest one. All FL2 did was prevent the outage being even wider spread than it was. None of this had anything to do with migration.
If FL2 didn't have the outage, and FL1 did, the pace of the migration did have an impact.
Though this is showing the problem with these things: Migrating faster could have reduced the impact of this outage, while increasing the impact of the last outage. Migrating slower could have reduced the impact of the last outage, while increasing the impact of this outage.
This is a hard problem: How fast do you rip old working infrastructure out and risk finding new problems in the new stack, yet, how long do you tolerate shortcomings of the old stack that caused you to build the new stack?
I'm sure everything slowly falling apart all at the same time is due to some strange coincidence, and not the regular and steady firing of thousands of people.
How hard can it be for a company with 1000 engineers to create a canary region before blasting their centralized changes out to everyone.
Every change is a deployment, even if its config. Treat it as such.
Also you should know that a strongly typed language won't save you from every type of problem. And especially not if you allow things like unwrap().
It is just mind boggling that they very obviously have completely untested code which proxies requests for all their customers. If you don't want to write the tests then at least fuzz it.
I sometimes feel we'd be better off without all the paternalistic kitchensink features. The solid, properly engineered features used intentionally aren't causing these outages.
I’ve been downvoted enough with my comments on this blog post where I’m hesitant to add anything else, but here I agree with you. They’re trying to be everything to everyone, where does the accountability of their customers being responsible for running, you know, up-to-date packages come in? Like, you don’t take just a little bit of pride in your work that you’re continually watching CVE lists and exploits and just have a minimum of effort toward patching your own shit, rather than pawning it off on vendor? I simply can’t understand the mindset.
> provides customers with protection against malicious payloads, allowing them to be detected and blocked. To do this, Cloudflare’s proxy buffers HTTP request body content in memory for analysis.
I have a mixed feeling about this.
On the other hand, I absolutely don't want a CDN to look inside my payloads and decide what's good for me or. Today it's protection, tomorrow it's censorship.
At the same time this is exactly what CloudFlare is good for - to protect sites from malicious requests.
We need a decentralized ddos mitigation network based on incentives. Donate X amount of bandwidth, get Y amount of protection from other peers. Yes, we gotta do TLS inspection on every end for effective L7 mitigation but at least filtering can be done without decrypting any packets
"This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur."
It's starting to sound like a broken record at this point, languages are still seen as equal and as a result, interchangeable.
> This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years. This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur.
Cloudflare deployed code that was literally never tested, not even once, neither manually nor by unit test, otherwise the straightforward error would have been detected immediately, and their implied solution seems to be not testing their code when written, or even adding 100% code coverage after the fact, but rather relying on a programming language to bail them out and cover up their failure to test.
Large scale infrastructure changes are often by nature completely untestable. The system is too large, there are too many moving parts to replicate with any kind of sane testing, so often, you do find out in prod, which is why robust and fast rollback procedures are usually desirable and implemented.
> Large scale infrastructure changes are often by nature completely untestable.
You're changing the subject here and shifting focus from the specific to the vague. The two postmortems after the recent major Cloudflare outages both listed straightforward errors in source code that could have been tested and detected.
Theoretical outages could theoretically have other causes, but these two specific outages had specific causes that we know.
> which is why robust and fast rollback procedures are usually desirable and implemented.
Yes, nobody is arguing against that. It's a red herring with regard to my point about source code testing.
I am not changing any subject. These are glue logic scripts connecting massive pieces of infra together, spanning what is likely several teams and orgs over the course of many years. It is impossible to blurt something out like "well, source code testing" for something like this, when the source code inputs are not possibly testable outside the scale of the larger system. They're often completely unknowable as well.
With all due respect, it sounds like you have not worked on these types of systems, but out of curiosity - what type of test do you think would have prevented this?
With all due respect, it sounds like you have never heard of unit tests.
Cloudflare states that the compiler would prevent the bug in certain programming languages. So it seems ridiculous to suggest that the bug can't be detected outside the scale of a larger system.
Please explain how unit tests stop a problem from propagating across a system that fields 70 million requests a second and I’ll take you more seriously, otherwise I’m done with this particular subthread.
You're completely missing the point. From the blog post:
if rule_result.action == "execute" then
rule_result.execute.results = ruleset_results[tonumber(rule_result.execute.results_index)]
end
"This code expects that, if the ruleset has action=”execute”, the “rule_result.execute” object will exist. However, because the rule had been skipped, the rule_result.execute object did not exist, and Lua returned an error due to attempting to look up a value in a nil value.
This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years. This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur."
The unit tests are for the source code. In this respect, the number of requests a second fielded by the system is irrelevant. Unit tests don't happen in production; that's the point of them.
It's a classic coding mistake, failing to check for nil, and none of your handwaving about "scale" changes that fact.
They don't, akamai has had several outages as well jsut no one notices. Akamai is way way smaller than cloudflare, 20% of internet traffic passes through CF networks, not sure it's even measurable on Akamai.
Quickly Googling about, a commonly repeated figure is that Akamai served 15% - 30% of Internet traffic in the late 2010's. They probably have less of the market today due to others growing, but they're not a minnow.
2024 revenue figures were $1.669 billion for Cloudflare, and $3.99 billion for Akamai, per Wikipedia.
> 20% of internet traffic passes through CF networks
That does not sound right to me. “20 percent of websites” does not mean “20 percent of traffic.”.
There is no public write-up from Cloudflare that proves “we handle 20% of all Internet traffic.” Cloudflare reports around 295,000 paying customers and more than 30 million Internet properties (20% of the web). So most of their users are on the free plan.
agreed, cloudflare says 20% of all websties, which makes sense, digging into it the "20% of all web traffic" seems to have been like a game of telephone in media, social media, and/or AI.
I can't believe they only have 295,000 paying customer, that puts me in a small minority. lol
Apart from Cloudflare config system working too good to propagate failure modes:
the code quality on very mission critical path powering “half the internets” could’ve been better.
I’m not sure if Lua LSP / linting tools would’ve caught the issue (I also never used Lua myself), but tools and methods exist to test mission critical dynamically typed code.
The company with genuinely impressive concentration of talent was expected to think about fuzzing this legacy crap somehow.
As for `.unwrap()` related incident: normally code like this should never pass the review.
You just (almost) never unwrap in production code.
I’d start with code quality tooling but more important - the related processes before even thinking about the architecture changes.
Changing architecture in global sense which, in general has served for years with 99.99(9)% uptime is not obviously smart thing to do.
Architecture is doing great, it’s just impact which has been devastating because of the scale.
Everyone makes errors and it’s fine, but there are ways not to roll shit in prod (reference to famous meme pic where bugs do that).
There's a lot of bad karma in this discussion. It's hard to run large services. Careful when you set a precedent of pillorying after an outage. It could be you next!
Yes, this is the second time in a month. Were folks expecting that to have been enough time for them to have made sweeping technical and organization changes? I say no—this doesn't mean they aren't trying or haven't learned any lessons from the last outage. It's a bit too soon to say that.
I see this event primarily as another example of the #1 class of major outages: bad rapid global configuration change. (The last CloudFlare outage was too, but I'm not just talking about CloudFlare. Google has had many many such outages. There was an inexplicable multi-year gap between recognizing this and having a good, widely available staged config rollout system for teams to drop into their systems.) Stuff like DoS attack configurations needs to roll out globally quickly. But they really need make it not quite this quick. Imagine they deployed to one server for one minute, one region for one minute on success, then everywhere on success. Then this would have been a tiny blip rather than a huge deal.
(It can be a bit hard to define "success" when you're doing something like blocking bad requests that may even be a majority of traffic during a DDoS attack, but noticing 100% 5xx errors for 38% of your users due to a parsing bug is doable!)
As for the specific bug: meh. They should have had 100% branch coverage on something as critical (and likely small) as the parsing for this config. Arguably a statically typed language would have helped (but the `.unwrap()` error in the previous outage is a bit of a counterargument to that). But it just wouldn't have mattered that much if they caught it before global rollout.
This is most likely a strong requisite for such a big scale deployment if DDOS protection and detection - which explains their architectural choices (ClickHouse & co) and the need of a super low latency config changes.
Since attackers might rotate IPs more frequently than once per minute, this effectively means that the whole fleet of servers should be able to quickly react depending on the decisions done centrally.
> As part of our ongoing work to protect customers using React against a critical vulnerability, CVE-2025-55182, we started rolling out an increase to our buffer size to 1MB, the default limit allowed by Next.js applications.
Why would increasing the buffer size help with that security vulnerability? Is it just a performance optimization?
I think the buffer size is the limit on what they check for malicious data, so the old 128k would mean it would be trivial to circumvent by just having 128k ok data and then put the exploit after.
If the request data is larger than the limit it doesn’t get processed by the Cloudflare system. By increasing buffer size they process (and therefore protect) more requests.
> Instead, it was triggered by changes being made to our body parsing logic while attempting to detect and mitigate an industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components.
Doesn't Cloudflare rigorously test their changes before deployment to make sure that this does not happen again? This better not have been used to cover for the fact that they are using AI to fix issues like this one.
Better not be any presence of vibe coders or AI agents being used to be touching such critical pieces of infrastructure at all and I expected Cloudflare to learn from the previous outage very quickly.
But this is quite a pattern but might need to consider putting the unreliability next to GitHub (which goes down every week).
First, what Cloudflare does is hard and I want to start with that.
That being said, I think it’s worth a discussion. How much of the last 3 outages were because of the JGC (the former CTO) retiring and Dane taking over?
Did JGC have a steady hand that’s missing? Or was it just time for outages that would have happened anyway?
Dane has maintained a culture of transparency which is fantastic, but did something get injected in the culture leading towards these issues? Will it become more or less stable since JGC left?
Curious for anyone with some insight or opinions.
(Also, if it wasn’t clear - huge Cloudflare fan and sending lots of good vibes to the team)
Looking at Dane's career history on LinkedIn, it appears that he has only ever been in product and some variety of manager, and his degree is in 'Engineering Management System'. It's an odd choice given that the previous two CTOs (Lee and John) were extremely technical and how core technology is to Cloudflare.
As with any organisation where the CTO is not technical, there will be someone who the 'CTO' has to ask to understand technical situations. In my opinion, that person being asked is the real CTO, for any given situation.
Cloudflare protects against DDOS but also various forms of malicious traffic (bots, low reputation IP users, etc) and often with a DDOS or similar attacks, it's better to have the site go down from time to time than for the attackers to hammer the servers behind cloudflare and waste mass amounts of resources.
i.e. it's the difference between "site goes down for a few hours every few months" and "an attacker slammed your site, and through in on-demand scaling or serverless component cloud fees blew your entire infrastructure budget for the year.
Doubly so when your service is part of a larger platform and attacks on your service risk harming your reputation for the larger platform.
If I'm remembering correctly, there was another outage around 10 days ago.
It still surprises me that there are basically no free alternatives comparable to Cloudflare. Putting everything on CF creates a pretty serious single point of failure.
It's strange that in most industries you have at least two major players, like Coke vs. Pepsi or Nike vs. Adidas. But in the CDN/edge space, there doesn't seem to be a real free competitor that matches Cloudflare's feature set.
It feels very unhealthy for the ecosystem. Does anyone know why this is the case?
Suggestion for Cloudflare: Create an early adopter option for free accounts.
Benefit: Earliest uptake of new features and security patches.
Drawback: Higher risk of outages.
I think this should be possible since they already differentiate between free, pro and enterprise accounts. I do not know how the routing for that works but I bet they could do this. Think crowd-sourced beta testers. Also a perk for anything PCI audit or FEDRAMP security prioritized over uptime.
The interesting aspect of the Cloudflare support, which is not clarified, is how they came to the risk assessment that it is ok to roll out a change non-gradual globally without testing the procedure first. The only justification I can see is that the React/Next.js remote command execution vulnerabilities are actively exploited. But if this is the case they should say so.
I wonder anyone from internal could share the culture a bit. I'm mostly interested in the following part:
If someone messes up royally, is there someone who says "if you break the build/whatever super critical, then your ass is the grass and I'm the lawn mower"?
Not missing working with LUA in proxies. I think this is no big thing. They rolled back the change fairly quickly. Still bad but that outage mid November was worse since it was many bad decisions stacking up and it took too long time to resolve.
They bypassed the gradual rollout system in order to meet a deadline for a cve. They put security above availability, tough tradeoff. Is there a non prod environment where that one off waf testing tool change could have been tested?
The problem that irks me isn’t that Cloudflare is having outages (everyone does and will at some point, no matter how many 9’s your SLA states), it’s that the internet is so damn centralized that a Cloudflare issue can take out a continent-sized chunk of the internet. Kudos to them on their success story, but oh my god that’s way too many eggs in one basket in general.
I notice that this is the kind of thing that solid sociable tests ought to have caught. I am very curious how testable that code is (random procedural if-statements don't inspire high confidence.)
Curious if there isn't a way to ingest the incoming traffic at scale, but route it to a secondary infrastructure to make sure it's resolving correctly, before pushing it to production?
1.1.1.1 domain test server, whether a relay or endpoints including /cdn-cgi/trace is WAF testing error, for 500 HTTP network & Cloudflare managed R-W-X permissions
Ironically, this time around the issue was in the proxy they're going to phase out (and replace with the Rust one).
I truly believe they're really going to make resilience their #1 priority now, and acknowledging the release process errors that they didn't acknowledge for a while (according to other HN comments) is the first step towards this.
HugOps.
Although bad for reputation, I think these incidents will help them shape (and prioritize!) resilience efforts more than ever.
At the same time, I can't think of a company more transparent than CloudFlare when it comes to these kind of things. I also understand the urgency behind this change: CloudFlare acted (too) fast to mitigate the React vulnerability and this is the result.
Say what you want, but I'd prefer to trust CloudFlare who admits and act upon their fuckups, rather than trying to cover them up or downplaying them like some other major cloud providers.
@eastdakota: ignore the negative comments here, transparency is a very good strategy and this article shows a good plan to avoid further problems
> I truly believe they're really going to make resilience their #1 priority now
I hope that was their #1 priority from the very start given the services they sell...
Anyway, people always tend to overthink about those black-swan events. Yes, 2 happened in a quick succession, but what is the average frequency overall? Insignificant.
This is Cloudflare. They've repeatedly broken DNS for years.
Looking across the errors, it points to some underlying practices: a lack of systems metaphors, modularity, testability, and an reliance on super-generic configuration instead of software with enforced semantics.
I think they have to strike a balance between being extremely fast (reacting to vulnerabilities and DDOS attacks) while still being resilient. I don't think it's an easy situation
I would very much like for him not to ignore the negativity, given that, you know, they are breaking the entire fucking Internet every time something like this happens.
This is the kind of comment I wish he would ignore.
You can be angry - but that doesn't help anyone.
They fucked up, yes, they admitted it and they provided plans on how to address that.
I don't think they do these things on purpose. Of course given their good market penetration they end up disrupting a lot of customers - and they should focus on slow rollouts - but I also believe that in a DDOS protection system (or WAF) you don't want or have the luxury to wait for days until your rule is applied.
I hope he doesn't ignore it, the internet has been forgiving enough toward cloudflares string of failures..its getting pretty old, and creates a ton of choas. I work with life saving devices, being impacted in any way in data monitoring has a huge impact in many ways. "sorry ma'am we can't give your child t1d readings on your follow app because our provider decided to break everything in the pursuit of some react bug." has a great ring to it
Cloudflare and other cloud infra providers are only providing primitives to use, in this case WAF. They have target uptimes and it's never 100%. It's up to the people actually making end user services (like your medical devices) to judge whether that is enough and if not to design your service around it.
(and also, rolling your own version of WAF is probably not the right answer if you need better uptime. It's exceedingly unlikely a medical devices company will beat CF at this game.)
Most hospital and healthcare IT teams are extremely under funded, undertrained, overworked, and the software, configurations and platforms are normally not the most resilient things.
I have a friend at one in the North East right now going through a hell of a security breach for multiple months now and I'm flabbergasted no one is dead yet.
When it comes to tech, I get the impression most organizations are not very "healthy" in the durability of systems.
I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents (focusing in tech debt reduction), but instead they get the opposite - blamed when things go wrong.
I think it's human nature (it's hard to realize something is going well until it breaks), but still has a very negative psychological effect. I can barely imagine the stress the team is going through right now.
Depending on the tech debt, the ops team might just be in "survival mode" and not have the time to fix every single issue.
In this particular case, they seem to be doing two things:
- Phasing out the old proxy (Lua based) which is replaced by FL2 (Rust based, the one that caused the previous incident)
- Reacting to an actively exploited vulnerability in React by deploying WAF rules - and they're doing them in a relatively careful way (test rules) to avoid fuckups, which caused this unknown state, which triggered the issue
Is it crazy to anyone else that they deploy every 5 minutes? And that it's not just config updates, but actual code changes with this "execute" action.
Config updates are not so clear cut from code changes.
Once I worked with a team in the anti-abuse space where the policy is that code deployments must happen over 5 days and config updates can take a few minutes. Then an engineer on the team argued that deploying new Python code doesn’t count as a code change because the CPython interpreter did not change; it didn’t even restart. And indeed given how dynamic Python is, it is totally possible to import new Python modules that did not exist when the interpreter process is launched.
Yeah sure. Now tell the people who are designing config languages to make them both powerful and non-Turing-complete. You see, it is a very hard problem for a powerful language to be non-Turing-complete.
A lot of these kind of bugs feel like they could be caught be a simple review bot like Greptile... I wonder if Cloudlare uses an equivalent tool internally?
> we started rolling out an increase to our buffer size to 1MB, the default limit allowed by Next.js applications.
Why is the Next.js limit 1 MB? It's not enough for uploading user generated content (photographs, scanned invoices), but a 1 MB request body for even multiple JSON API calls is ridiculous. There frameworks need to at least provide some pushback to unoptimized development, even if it's just a lower default request body limit. Otherwise all web applications will become as slow as the MS office suite or reddit.
Now. Right now. Seriously, stop using this terrible service. We also need to change the narrative that step 1 in every tutorial is "sign up for Cloudflare". This is partly a culture problem.
before Cloudflare suffered an outage due to React's useEffect, now again trying to mitigate security issues around React Server Pages.
at one point in time - they've to admit this react thing ain't working. & just use classic server rendered pages, since their dashboards are simple toggle controls
Every time they screw up they write an elaborate postmortem and pat themselves on the back.
Don't get me wrong, better have the postmortem than not.
But at this point it seems like the only thing they are good at is writing incident postmortem blog posts.
Is it just me, or should they have just reverted instead of making _another_ change as a result of the first one?
ALSO, very very weird that they had not caught this seemingly obvious bug in proxy buffer size handling. This points to that the change nr 2, done in "reactive" mode to change nr 1 that broke shit, HAD NOT BEEN TESTED AT ALL! Which is the core reason they should never have deployed that, but rather revert to a known good state, then test BOTH changes combined.
Classic. Things always get worse before they get better. I remember when Netflix was going through their annus horribilis, and AWS before that, and Twitter before that, and so on. Everyone goes through this. Good luck to you guys getting to FL2 quickly enough that this class of error reduces.
I’m really sick of constantly seeing cloudflare, and their bullshit captchas. Please, look at how much grief they’re causing trying to be the gateway to the internet. Don’t give them this power
> This change was being rolled out using our gradual deployment system, and, as part of this rollout, we identified an increase in errors in one of our internal tools which we use to test and improve new WAF rules. As this was an internal tool, and the fix being rolled out was a security improvement, we decided to disable the tool for the time being as it was not required to serve or protect customer traffic.
Come on.
This PM raises more questions than it answers, such as why exactly China would have been immune.
You jest, but recently I also felt compelled to stop using the word (planned) outage where I work, because it legitimately creates confusion around the (expected) character of impact.
Outage is the nuclear wasteland situation, which given modern architectural choices, is rather challenging to manifest. To avoid it is face-saving, but also more correct.
From earlier in the very same blog post (emphasis added):
> This system does not perform gradual rollouts, but rather propagates changes within seconds to the entire fleet of servers in our network and is under review following the outage we experienced on November 18.
Some nonsense again. The level of negligence there is astounding. This is frightening because this entity is daily exposed to a large portion of our personal data which goes over the wire. As well as business data. It’s just a matter of time before a disaster is going to occur. Some regulatory body must take control in their hands right now.
The article mentions that this Lua-based proxy is the old generation one, which is going to be replaced by the Rust based one (FL2) and that didn't fail on this scenario.
So, if anything, their efforts towards a typed language were justified. They just didn't manage to migrate everything in time before this incident - which is ironically a good thing since this incident was cause mostly by a rushed change in response to an actively exploited vulnerability.
I think (would love to be corrected) that this is the nature of their service. They probably push multiple config changes per minute to mitigate DDOS attacks. For sure the proxies have a local list of IPs that, for a period of time, are blacklisted.
For DDOS protection you can't really rely on multiple-hours rollouts.
I guess you’re being facetious but for those who didn’t click through:
> This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur.
You're right that you have to "write code well" to prevent this sort of thing. It's also true that Rust's language features, if you use them, can make this sort of mistake a compile-time error rather than something that only blows up at runtime under the wrong conditions. The problem with their last outage was that somebody explicitly opted out of the tool provided by the language. As you say, that's "not writing code well". But I think you're dismissing the value of the language feature in helping you write code well.
Or they're not thoroughly testing changes before pushing them out. As I've seen some others say, CloudFlare at this point should be considered critical infrastructure. Maybe not like power but dang close.
This is architectural problem, the LUA bug, the longer global outage last week, a long list of earlier such outages only uncover the problem with architecture underneath. The original, distributed, decentralized web architecture with heterogeneous endpoints managed by myriad of organisations is much more resistant to this kind of global outages. Homogeneous systems like Cloudflare will continue to cause global outages. Rust won't help, people will always make mistakes, also in Rust. Robust architecture addresses this by not allowing a single mistake to bring down myriad of unrelated services at once.
I’m not sure I share this sentiment.
First, let’s set aside the separate question of whether monopolies are bad. They are not good but that’s not the issue here.
As to architecture:
Cloudflare has had some outages recently. However, what’s their uptime over the longer term? If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
But there’s a more interesting argument in favour of the status quo.
Assuming cloudflare’s uptime is above average, outages affecting everything at once is actually better for the average internet user.
It might not be intuitive but think about it.
How many Internet services does someone depend on to accomplish something such as their work over a given hour? Maybe 10 directly, and another 100 indirectly? (Make up your own answer, but it’s probably quite a few).
If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
It’s not really bad end user experience that every service uses cloudflare. It’s more-so a question of why is cloudflare’s stability seeming to go downhill?
And that’s a fair question. Because if their reliability is below average, then the value prop evaporates.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
The point is that it doesn’t matter. A single site going down has a very small chance of impacting a large number of users. Cloudflare going down breaks an appreciable portion of the internet.
If Jim’s Big Blog only maintains 95% uptime, most people won’t care. If BofA were at 95%.. actually same. Most of the world aren’t BofA customers.
If Cloudflare is at 99.95% then the world suffers
I'm not sure I follow the argument. If literally every individual site had an uncorrelated 99% uptime, that's still less available than a centralized 99.9% uptime. The "entire Internet" is much less available in the former setup.
It's like saying that Chipotle having X% chance of tainted food is worse than local burrito places having 2*X% chance of tainted food. It's true in the lens that each individual event affects more people, but if you removed that Chipotle and replaced with all local, the total amount of illness is still strictly higher, it's just tons of small events that are harder to write news articles about.
No it's like saying if one single point of failure in a global food supply chain fails, nobody's going to eat today. And which is in contrast to if some supplier fails to provide a local food truck today their customers will have to go to the restaurant next door.
Ah ok, it is true that if there's a lot of fungible offerings that worse but uncorrelated uptime can be more robust.
I think the question then is how much of the Internet has fungible alternatives such that uncorrelated downtime can meaningfully be less impact. If you have a "to buy" shopping list, the existence of alternative shopping list products doesn't help you, when the one you use is down it's just down, the substitutes cannot substitute on short notice. Obviously for some things there's clear substitutes though, but actually I think "has fungible alternatives" is mostly correlated with "being down for 30 minutes doesn't matter", it seems that the things where you want the one specific site are the ones where availability matters more.
The restaurant-next-door analogy, representing fungibility, isn't quite right. If BofA is closed and you want to do something in person with them, you can't go to an unrelated bank. If Spotify goes down for an hour, you're not likely to become a YT Music subscriber as a stopgap even though they're somewhat fungible. You'll simply wait, and the question is: can I shuffle my schedule instead of elongating it?
A better analogy is that if the restaurant you'll be going to is unexpectedly closed for a little while, you would do an after-dinner errand before dinner instead and then visit the restaurant a bit later. If the problem affects both businesses (like a utility power outage) you're stuck, but you can simply rearrange your schedule if problems are local and uncorrelated.
If utility power outage is put on the table, then the analogy is almost everyone solely relying on the same grid, in contrast with being wired to a large set of independent providers or even using their own local solar panel or whatever autonomous energy source.
Also what about individual sites having 99% uptime while behind CF with an uncorrelated uptime of 99.9%?
Just because CF is up doesnt mean the site is
Look at it a user (or even operator) of one individual service that isn’t redundant or safety critical: if choice A has 1/2 the downtime of choice B, you can’t justify choosing choice B by virtue of choice A’s instability.
That is exactly why you don't see Windows being used anymore in big corporations. /s
Maybe worlds can just live without the internet for a few hours.
There are likely emergency services dependent on Cloudflare at this point, so I’m only semi serious.
The world dismantled landlines, phone booths, mail order catalogues, fax machines, tens of millions of storefronts, government offices, and entire industries in favor of the Internet.
So at this point no, the world can most definitely not “just live without the Internet”. And emergency services aren’t the only important thing that exists to the extent that anything else can just be handwaved away.
In my opinion, the world actually should be able to live without the internet, but that's another matter.
That’s what I was getting at. There’s a lot of life that can be lived offline.
> Maybe worlds can just live without the internet for a few hours.
The world can also live a few hours without sewers, water supply, food, cars, air travel, etc.
But "can" and "should" are different words.
> A single site going down has a very small chance of impacting a large number of users
How? If Github is down how many people are affected? Google?
> Jim’s Big Blog only maintains 95% uptime, most people won’t care
Yeah, and in the world with Cloudflare people don't care if Jim's Blog is down either. So Cloudflare doesn't make things worse.
Terrible examples, Github and Google aren't just websites that one would place behind Cloudflare to try to improve their uptime (by caching, reducing load on the origin server, shielding from ddos attacks). They're their own big tech companies running complex services at a scale comparable to Cloudflare.
> If Cloudflare is at 99.95% then the world suffers
if the world suffers, those doing the "suffering" needs to push that complaint/cost back up the chain - to the website operator, which would push the complaint/cost up to cloudflare.
The fact that nobody did - or just verbally complained without action - is evidence that they didn't really suffer.
In the mean time, BofA saved cost in making their site 99.95% uptime themselves (presumably cloudflare does it cheaper than they could individually). So the entire system became more efficient as a result.
They didnt really suffer or they dont have choice?
> The fact that nobody did - or just verbally complained without action - is evidence that they didn't really suffer.
What an utterly clueless claim. You're literally posting in a thread with nearly 500 posts of people complaining. Taking action takes time. A business just doesn't switch cloud providers overnight.
I can tell you in no uncertain terms that there are businesses impacted by Cloudflare's frequent outages that started work shedding their dependency on Cloudflare's services. And it's not just because of these outages.
> On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
I think the parent post made a different argument:
- Centralizing most of the dependency on Cloudflare results in a major outage when something happens at Cloudflare, it is fragile because Cloudflare becomes the single point of failure. Like: Oh Cloudflare is down... oh, none of my SaaS services work anymore.
- In a world where this is not the case, we might see more outages, but they would be smaller and more contained. Like: oh, Figma is down? fine, let me pickup another task and come back to Figma once it's back up. It's also easier to work around by having alternative providers as a fallback, as they are less likely to share the same failure point.
As a result, I don't think you'll be blocked 100 hours a year in scenario 2. You may observe 100 non-blocking inconveniences per year, vs a completely blocking Cloudflare outage.
And in observed uptime, I'm not even sure these providers ever won. We're running all our auxiliary services on a decent Hetzner box with a LB. Say what you want, but that uptime is looking pretty good compared to any services relying on AWS (Oct 20, 15 hours), Cloudflare (Dec 5 (half hour), Nov 18 (3 hours)). Easier to reason about as well. Our clients are much more forgiving when we go down due to Azure/GCP/AWS/Cloudflare vs our own setup though...
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year. > On the other hand, if each service experiences the same hour per year of downtime but at different times, then the person is likely to be blocked for closer to 100 hours per year.
Putting Cloudflare in front of a site doesn't mean that site's backend suddenly never goes down. Availability will now be worse - you'll have Cloudflare outages* affecting all the sites they proxy for, along with individual site back-end failures which will of course still happen.
* which are still pretty rare
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
I’m tired of this sentiment. Imagine if people said, why develop your own cloud offering? Can you really do better than VMWare..?
Innovation in technology has only happened because people dared to do better, rather than giving up before they started…
"My architecture depends upon a single point of failure" is a great way to get laughed out of a design meeting. Outsourcing that single point of failure doesn't cure my design of that flaw, especially when that architecture's intended use-case is to provide redundancy and fault-tolerance.
The problem with pursuing efficiency as the primary value prop is that you will necessarily end up with a brittle result.
> "My architecture depends upon a single point of failure" is a great way to get laughed out of a design meeting.
This is a simplistic opinion. Claiming services like Cloudflare are modeled as single points of failure is like complaining that your use of electricity to power servers is a single point of failure. Cloudflare sells a global network of highly reliable edge servers running services like caching, firewall, image processing, etc. And more importas a global firewall that protects services against global distributed attacks. Until a couple of months ago, it was unthinkable to casual observers that Cloudflare was such an utter unreliable mess.
Your electricity to servers IS a single point of failure, if all you do is depend upon the power company to reliably feed power. There is a reason that co-location centers have UPS and generator backups for power.
It may have been unthinkable to some casual observers that creating a giant single point of failure for the internet was a bad idea but it was entirely thinkable to others.
> Your electricity to servers IS a single point of failure, if all you do is depend upon the power company to reliably feed power.
I think you quite didn't got the point. The whole point is that putting together a system architecture that considers Cloudflare is a single point of failure is like designing a system architecture that considers a power supplier a single point of failure. Technically they can be considered that if you really really want to, but not only are things irredeemably broken when those failure modes are triggered but also they themselves are by far expected to be the most reliable components of your systems due to their design and SLAs that is pointless to waste time and resources mitigating such a scenario.
You're arguing from an end-user perspective, I'm pointing out that the Internet wasn't designed to solve easy but fragile problems but instead was intended to be a resilient network capable of surviving failures and route around them.
"I want to use a power tool and simply plug it into a wall" is not the same class of problem as "we're using a heart-lung machine during this bypass operation and power loss results in dead patients."
The widespread dependence upon Cloudflare has resulted in the "heart-lung machine" problem of DNS, among other things, being "solved" by a "power tool" class of solution.
> You're arguing from an end-user perspective,
No.I am arguing from a software engineer's perspective tackling a systems design problem.
> I'm pointing out that the Internet wasn't designed to solve easy but fragile problems but instead was intended to be a resilient network capable of surviving failures and route around them.
Irrelevant. Engineers design systems that remain functioning in spite of their failure modes. Some failure modes are irredeemable. Even structural engineers don't design structures to withstand all conceivable earthquakes, because they understand that mitigating that failure modes is unrealistic.
The same goes for software. You do not build your WebApps to remain working when half of the internet dies. This means scenarios such as AWS, GCP or Cloudflare being out.
You do know that data centers use backup generators because electricity is a single point of failure right? They even have multiple power supplies plugged into different circuits.
> You do know that data centers use backup generators because electricity is a single point of failure right?
How many times do you account for the existence of backup generators in a data center when you design, say, a SPA? How do you expect to be treated if you even suggest such a thing in a design requirements meeting? Do you understand what I am saying?
All of the time? Backup power is table stakes for anyone serious about hosting.
It’s not even clear what you’re trying to say, but redundancy is one of the primary things you are paying for when shopping for a datacenter to use.
Even tiny 1000 sqft data centers for colleges had UPSes with 1-2 generators 20+ years ago.
That's an interesting point, but in many (most?) cases productivity doesn't depend on all services being available at the same time. If one service goes down, you can usually be productive by using an alternative (e.g. if HN is down you go to Reddit, if email isn't working you catch up with Slack).
If HN, Reddit, email, Slack and everything else is down for a day, I think my productivity would actually go up, not down.
During 1st Cloudflare outage StackOverflow was down too.
Many (I’d speculate most) workflows involve moving and referencing data across multiple applications. For example, read from a spreadsheet while writing a notion page, then send a link in Slack. If any one app is down, the task is blocked.
Software development is a rare exception to this. We’re often writing from scratch (same with designers, and some other creatives). But these are definitely the exception compared to the broader workforce.
Same concept applies for any app that’s built on top of multiple third-party vendors (increasingly common for critical dependencies of SaaS)
On the other hand, if one site is down you might have alternatives. Or, you can do something different until the site you needed is up again. Your argument that simultaneous downtime is more efficient than uncoordinated downtime because tasks usually rely on multiple sites being online simultaneously is an interesting one. Whether or not that's true is an empirical question, but I lean toward thinking it's not true. Things failing simultaneously tends to have worse consequences.
Paraphrasing: We are setting aside the actual issue and looking for a different angle.
To me this reads as a form of misdirection, intentional or not. A monopolist has little reason to care about downstream effects, since customers have nowhere else to turn. Framing this as roll your own versus Cloudflare rather than as a monoculture CDN environment versus a diverse CDN ecosystem feels off.
That said, the core problem is not the monopoly itself but its enablers, the collective impulse to align with whatever the group is already doing, the desire to belong and appear to act the "right way", meaning in the way everyone else behaves. There are a gazillion ways of doing CDN, why are we not doing them? Why the focus on one single dominant player?
> Why the focus on one single dominant player?
I don’t the answer to the all questions. But here I think it is just a way to avoid responsibility. If someone choses CDN “number 3” and it goes down, business people *might* put a blame on this person for not choosing “the best”. I am not saying it is a right approach, I just seen it happens too many times.
True. Nobody ever got fired for choosing IBM/Microsoft/Oracle/Cisco/etc. Likely an effect of stakeholder (executives/MBAs) brand recognition.
That’s fine if it’s just some random office workers. What if every airline goes down at the same time because they all rely on the same backend providers? What if every power generator shuts off? “Everything goes down simultaneously” is not, in general, something to aim for.
That is literally how a large fraction of airlines work. It's called Amadeus, and it did have a big global outage not too long ago.
Which should be a good example of why this should be avoided.
CloudFlare doesn’t have a good track record. It’s the third party that caused more outages for us than any other third party service in the last four years.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
I disagree; most people need only a subset of Cloudflare's features. Operating just that subset avoids the risk of the other moving parts (that you don't need anyway) ruining your day.
Cloudflare is also a business and has its own priorities like releasing new features; this is detrimental to you because you won't benefit from said feature if you don't need it, yet still incur the risk of the deployment going wrong like we saw today. Operating your own stack would minimize such changes and allow you to schedule them to a maintenance window to limit the impact should it go wrong.
The only feature Cloudflare (or its competitors) offers that can't be done cost-effectively yourself is volumetric DDoS protection where an attacker just fills your pipe with junk traffic - there's no way out of this beyond just having a bigger pipe, which isn't reasonable for any business short of an ISP or infrastructure provider.
>The only feature Cloudflare (or its competitors) offers that can't be done cost-effectively yourself is volumetric DDoS protection
.... And thanks to AI everyone needs that all the time now since putting a site on the Internet means an eternal DDoS attack.
> If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
That's a wrong way of looking at it though. For 99.99% individual sites, I wouldn't care if they were down for weeks. Even if I use this site, there are very few sites that I need to use daily. For the rest of them, if one of them randomly goes down I probably would never know or notice, because I didn't need it then. However, when single-point-of-failure provider, like Cloudflare, goes down, you bet I notice. I must notice, because my work would be affected, my CI/CD pipelines will start failing, my newsfeeds will stop, I will notice it in dozens of places - because everybody uses it. The aggregated fails-per-unit-of-time may be less but the impact of each fail is way, way more, and the probability of it impacting me is approaching certainty.
So for me, as an average internet user, it would be much better if all the world wouldn't go down at once, even if the instances of particular things going down would be more frequent - provided they are randomly distributed in time and not concentrated. If just one thing goes down, I could do another thing. If everything goes down, I can only sit and twiddle my thumbs until it's back up.
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
This doesn’t guarantee availability of those N services themselves though, surely? N services with a slightly lower availability target than N+1 with a slightly higher value?
More importantly, I’d say that this only works for non-critical infrastructure, and also assumes that the cost of bringing that same infrastructure back is constant or at least linear or less.
The 2025 Iberian Peninsula outage seems to show that’s not always the case.
If you’re using 10 services and 1 goes down, there’s a 9/10 chance you’re not using it and you can switch to work on something else. If all 10 go down you are actually blocked for an hour. Even 5 years ago, I can’t recall ever being actually impacted by an outtage to the extent that I was like “well, might as well just go get something to eat because everything is down”.
> If everything goes offline for one hour per year at the same time, then a person is blocked and unproductive for an hour per year.
The consequence of some services being offline is much, much worse than a person (or a billion) being bored in front of a screen.
Sure, it’s arguably not Cloudflares fault that these services are cloud-dependent in the first place, but even if service just degrades somewhat gracefully in an ideal case, that’s a lot of global clustering of a lot of exceptional system behavior.
Or another analogy: Every person probably passes out for a few minutes in their live at one point or another. Yet I wouldn’t want to imagine what happens if everybody got that over with at the very same time without warning…
Cloudbleed. It’s been a fun time.
> Cloudflare has had some outages recently. However, what’s their uptime over the longer term? If an individual site took on the infra challenges themselves, would they achieve better? I don’t think so.
Why is that the only option? Cloudflare could offer solutions that let people run their software themselves, after paying some license fee. Or there could be many companies people use instead, instead of everyone flocking to one because of cargoculting "You need a CDN like Cloudflare before you launch your startup bro".
What you’re suggesting is not trivial. Otherwise we wouldn’t use various CDNs. To do what Cloudflare does your starting point is “be multiple region/multiple cloud from launch” which is non-trivial especially when you’re finding product-market fit. A better poor man’s CDN is object storage through your cloud of choice serving HTTP traffic. Cloudflare also offers layers of security and other creature comforts. Ignoring the extras they offer, if you build what they offer you have effectively made a startup within a startup.
Cloudflare isn’t the only game in town either. Akamai, Google, AWS, etc all have good solutions. I’ve used all of these at jobs I’ve worked at and the only poor choice has been to not use one at all.
What do you think Cloudflare’s core business is? Because I think it’s two things:
1. DDoS protection
2. Plug n’ Play DNS and TLS (termination)
Neither of those make sense for self-hosted.
Edit: If it’s unclear, #2 doesn’t make sense because if you self-host, it’s no longer plug n’ play. The existing alternatives already serve that case equally well (even better!).
Cloudflare Zero-Trust is also very core to their enterprise business.
When I’m working from home and the internet goes down, I don’t care. My poor private-equity owned corporation, think of the lost productivity!!
But if I was trying to buy insulin at 11 pm before benefits expire, or translate something at a busy train station in a foreign country, or submit my take-home exam, I would be freeeaaaking out.
The cloudflare-supported internet does a whole lot of important, time-critical stuff.
All of my company's hosted web sites have way better uptimes and availability than CF but we are utterly tiny in comparison.
With only some mild blushing, you could describe us as "artisanal" compared to the industrial monstrosities, such as Cloudflare.
Time and time again we get these sorts of issues with the massive cloudy chonks and they are largely due to the sort of tribalism that used to be enshrined in the phrase: "no one ever got fired for buying IBM".
We see the dash to the cloud and the shoddy state of in house corporate IT as a result. "We don't need in-house knowledge, we have "MS copilot 365 office thing" that looks after itself and now its intelligent - yay \o/
Until I can't, I'm keeping it as artisanal as I can for me and my customers.
Sorry for the downvotes but this is true many times with some basic HA you get better uptime than the big cloud boys, yes their stack and tech is fancier but we also need to factor in how much CF messes with it vs self hosted, anyway the self hosted wisdom is RIP these days and I mostly just run cf pages / kv :)
That sounds a bit complicated and rather weird.
I still have my webby assets up with way longer uptimes than the biggies.
I don't need internet points. A satisfied PO is what I want to see as a business owner.
In other words, the consolidation on Cloudflare and AWS makes the web less stable. I agree.
Usually I am allergic to pithy, vaguely dogmatic summaries like this but you're right. We have traded "some sites are down some of the time" for "most sites are down some of the time". Sure the "some" is eliding an order of magnitude or two, but this framing remains directionally correct.
Does relying on larger players result in better overall uptime for smaller players? AWS is providing me better uptime than if I assembled something myself because I am less resourced and less talented than that massive team.
If so, is it a good or bad trade to have more overall uptime but when things go down it all goes down together?
From a societal view it is worse when everything is down at once. Leads to a less resilient society: It is not great if I can't buy essentials from one store because their payment system is down (this happened to one super market chain in Sweden due to a hacker attack some years ago, took weeks to fully fix everything, and then there was that whole Crowdstrike debacle globally more recently).
It is far worse if all of the competitors are down at once. To some extent you can and should have a little bit of stock at home (water, food, medicine, ways to stay warm, etc) but not everything is practical to do so with (gasoline for example, which could have knock on effects on delivery of other goods).
it's not that simple, no?
users want to do things, if their goal depends on a complex chain of functions (provided by various semi-independent services) then the ideal setup would be to have redundant providers and users could simply "load balance" between them and that separate high-level providers' uptime state is clustered (meaning that when Google is unavailable Bing is up, and when Random Site A, goes down their payment provider goes down too, etc..)
So ideally sites would somehow sort themselves nearly to separate availability groups.
Otherwise simply having a lot of uncorrelated downtimes doesn't help (if we count the sum of downtime experienced by people). Though again it gets complicated by the downtime percentage, because likely there's a phase shift between the states when user can mostly complete their goals and when they cannot because too many cascading failures.
> AWS is providing me better uptime than if I assembled something myself because I am less resourced and less talented than that massive team.
Is it? I can’t say that my personal server has been (unplanned) down at any time in the past 10 years, and these global outages have just flown right past it.
Have your ISP never went down? Or did it went down in some night and you just never realized.
When only one thing goes down, it's easier to compensate with something else, even for people who are doing critical work but who can't fix IT problems themselves. It means there are ways the non-technical workforce can figure out to keep working, even if the organization doesn't have on-site IT.
Also, if you need to switchover to backup systems for everything at once, then either the backup has to be the same for everything and very easily implementable remotely - which to me seems unlikely for specialty systems, like hospital systems, or for the old tech that so many organizations still rely on (and remember the CrowdStrike BSODs that had to be fixed individually and in person and so took forever to fix?) - or you're gonna need a LOT of well-trained IT people, paid to be on standby constantly, if you want to fix the problems quickly, on account of they can't be everywhere at once.
If the problems are more spread out over time, then you don't need to have quite so many IT people constantly on standby. Saves a lot of $$$, I'd think.
And if problems are smaller and more spread out over time, then an organization can learn how to deal with them regularly, as opposed to potentially beginning to feel and behave as though the problem will never actually happen. And if they DO fuck up their preparedness/response, the consequences are likely less severe.
AWS and Cloudflare can recover from outages faster because they can bring dozens (hundreds?) of people to help, often the ones who wrote the software and designed the architecture. Outages at smaller companies I've worked for have often lasted multiple days, up to an exchange server outage that lasted 2 weeks.
Would you rather be attacked by 1,000 wasps or 1 dog? A thousand paper cuts or one light stabbing? Global outages are bad but the choice isn’t global pain vs local pleasure. Local and global both bring pain, with different, complicated tradeoffs.
Cloudflare is down and hundreds of well paid engineers spring into action to resolve the issue. Your server goes down and you can’t get ahold of your Server Person because they’re at a cabin deep in the woods.
It's not "1,000 wasps or 1 dog", it's "1,000 dogs at once, or "1 dog at once, 1,000 different times". Rare but huge and coordinated siege, or a steady and predictable background radiation of small issues.
The latter is easier to handle, easier to fix, and much more suvivable if you do fuck it up a bit. It gives you some leeway to learn from mistakes.
If you make a mistake during the 1000 dog siege, or if you don't have enough guards on standby and ready to go just in case of this rare event, you're just cooked.
I don't quite see how this maps onto the situation. The "1000 dog seige" also was resolved very quickly and transparently, so I would say it's actually better than even one of the "1 dog at once"s.
Last week's cloudflare outage was not resolved as quickly...
Perhaps not, but still compared to running your own thing you just sit and wait. No on call rotas to manage and pay for; no root cause analysis meetings after that descend into internal blame.
If you've allowed your Server Person to be a single point of failure out innawoods, that's an organizational problem, not a technological one.
Two is one and one is none.
Why would there be a centralized outage of decentralized services? The proper comparison seems to be attacked by a dog or a single wasp.
In most cases we actually get both local and global pain, since most people are running servers behind Cloudflare.
What you've identified here is a core part of what the banking sector calls the "risk based approach". Risk in that case is defined as the product of the chance of something happening and the impact of it happening. With this understanding we can make the same argument you're making, a little more clearly.
Cloudflare is really good at what they do, they employ good engineering talent, and they understand the problem. That lowers the chance of anything bad happening. On the other hand, they achieve that by unifying the infrastructure for a large part of the internet, raising the impact.
The website operator herself might be worse at implementing and maintaining the system, which would raise the chance of an outage. Conversely, it would also only affect her website, lowering the impact.
I don't think there's anything to dispute in that description. The discussion then is if cloudflares good engineering lowers the chance of an outage happening more than it raises the impact. In other words, the things we can disagree about is the scaling factors, the core of the argument seems reasonable to me.
> Homogeneous systems like Cloudflare will continue to cause global outages
But the distributed system is vulnerable to DDOS.
Is there an architecture that maintains the advantages of both systems? (Distributed resilience with a high-volume failsafe.)
You should really check Cloudflare.
There is not a single company that makes their infrastructure as globally available like Cloudflare.
Additionally, the downtime of Cloudflare seems to be objectively less than the others.
Now, it took 25 minutes for 28% of the network.
While being the only ones to fix a global vulnerability.
There is a reason other clouds wouldn't touch the responsiveness and innovation that Cloudflare brings.
Robust architecture that is serving 80M requests/second worldwide?
My answer would be that no one product should get this big.
On the other hand, as long as the entire internet goes down when Cloudflare goes down, I'll be able to host everything there without ever getting flack from anyone.
Actually, maybe 1 hour downtime for ~ the whole internet every month is a public good provided by Cloudflare. For everyone that doesn’t get paged, that is.
It's not as simple as that. What will result in more downtime, dependency on a single centralized service or not being behind Cloudflare? Clearly it's the latter or companies wouldn't be behind Cloudflare. Sure, the outages are more widespread now than they used to be, but for any given service the total downtime is typically much lower than before centralization towards major cloud providers and CDNs.
> Rust won't help, people will always make mistakes, also in Rust.
They don't just use Rust for "protection", they use it first and foremost for performance. They have ballpark-to-matching C++ performance with a realistic ability to avoid a myriad of default bugs. This isn't new.
You're playing armchair quarterback with nothing to really offer.
They badly need smaller blast radius and to use more chaos engineering tools.
I find this sentiment amusing when I consider the vast outages of the "good ol' days".
What's changed is a) our second-by-second dependency on the Internet and b) news/coverage.
Notwithstanding that most people using Cloudflare aren't even benefiting from what it actually provides. They just use it...because reasons.
Not too long ago, critical avionics were programmed by different software developers and the software was run on different hardware architectures, produced by different manufacturers. These heterogeneous systems produced combined control outputs via a quorum architecture – all in a single airplane.
Now half of the global economy seems to run on same service provider, it seems…
That's a reflect of social organisation. Pushing for hierarchical organisation with a few key centralising nodes will also impact business and technological decisions.
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway%27s_law
Reductionist, but it's a backup problem.
Data matters? Have multiple copies, not all in the same place.
This is really no different, yet we don't have those redundancies in play.
Host, and paths.
Every other take is ultimately just shuffling justification around the least bad for everyone lack of backups for cost saving.
Obviously Rust is the answer to these kind of problems. But if you are cloudflare and have an important company at a global scale, you need to set high standarts for your rust code. Developers should dance and celebrate end of the day if their code compiles in rust.
You're not wrong, but where's the robust architecture you're referring to? The reality of providing reliable services on the internet is far beyond the capabilities of most organizations.
I think it might be a organizational architecture that needs to change.
> However, we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”.
> This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years
So they shipped an untested configuration change that triggered untested code straight to production. This is "tell me you have no tests without telling me you have no tests" level of facepalm. I work on safety-critical software where if we had this type of quality escape both internal auditors and external regulators would be breathing down our necks wondering how our engineering process failed and let this through. They need to rearchitect their org to put greater emphasis on verification and software quality assurance.
Yeah, redundancy and efficiency are opposites. As engineers, we always chase efficiency, but resilience and redundancy are related.
You have a heterogeneous, fault-free architecture for the Cloudflare problem set? Interesting! Tell us more.
Bro, but how do we make shareholder value if we don't monopolize and enshittify everything
Kudos to Cloudflare for clarity and diligence.
When talking of their earlier Lua code:
> we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”.
I was surprised that a rules-based system was not tested completely, perhaps because the Lua code is legacy relative to the newer Rust implementation?
It tracks what I've seen elsewhere: quality engineering can't keep up with the production engineering. It's just that I think of CloudFlare as an infrastructure place, where that shouldn't be true.
I had a manager who came from defense electronics in the 1980's. He said in that context, the quality engineering team was always in charge, and always more skilled. For him, software is backwards.
"Kudos"? This is like the South Park episode in which the oil company guy just excuses himself while the company just continues to fuck up over and over again. There's nothing to praise, this shouldn't happen twice in a month. Its inexcusable.
twice in a month _so far_
We still have two holidays and associated vacations and vacation brain to go. And then the January hangover.
Every company that has ignored my following advice has experienced a day for day slip in first quarter scheduling. And that advice is: not much work gets done between Dec 15 and Jan 15. You can rely on a week worth, more than that is optimistic. People are taking it easy and they need to verify things with someone who is on vacation so they are blocked. And when that person gets back, it’s two days until their vacation so it’s a crap shoot.
NB: there’s work happening on Jan 10, for certain, but it’s not getting finished until the 15th. People are often still cleaning up after bad decisions they made during the holidays and the subsequent hangover.
Those AI agents are coding fast, or am I missing some obvious concept here?
reaching for that _one 9 of uptime_
It's weird reading these reports because they don't seem to test anything at all (or at least there's very little mention of testing).
Canary deployment, testing environments, unit tests, integration tests, anything really?
It sounds like they test by merging directly to production but surely they don't
The problem is that Cloudflare do incremental rollouts and loads of testing for _code_. But they don't do the same thing for configuration - they globally push out changes because they want rapid response.
It's still a bit silly though, their claimed reasoning probably doesn't really stack up for most of their config changes - I don't see it to be that likely that a 0.1->1->10->100 rollout over the period of 10 minutes would be a catastrophically bad idea for them for _most_ changes.
And to their credit, it does seem they want to change that.
Yeah to me it doesn't make any sense - configuration changes are just as likely to break stuff (as they've discovered the hard way) and both of these issues could have been found in a testing environment before being deployed to production
In the post they described that they observed errors happening in their testing env, but decided to ignore because they were rolling out a security fix. I am sure there is more nuance to this, but I don’t know whether that makes it better or worse
> but decided to ignore because they were rolling out a security fix.
A key part of secure systems is availability...
It really looks like vibe-coding.
This is funny, considering that someone that worked on the defense industry (guide missile system) found a memory leak on one of their products, at that time. They told him that they knew about it, but that it's timed just right with the range of the system it would be used, so it doesn't matter.
This paraphrased urban legend has nothing to do with quality engineering though? As described, it's designed to the spec and working as intended.
It tracks with my experience in software quality engineering. Asked to find problems with something already working well in the field. Dutifully find bugs/etc. Get told that it's working though so nobody will change anything. In dysfunctional companies, which is probably most of them, quality engineering exists to cover asses, not to actually guide development.
It is not dysfunctional to ignore unreachable "bugs". A memory leak on a missile which won't be reached because it will explode long before that amount of time has passed is not a bug.
It's a debt though. Because people will forget it's there and then at some point someone changes a counter from milliseconds to microseconds and then the issue happens 1000 times sooner.
It's never right to leave structural issues even if "they don't happen under normal conditions".
In hard real-time software, you have a performance budget otherwise the missile fails.
It might be more maintainable to have leaks instead of elaborate destruction routines, because then you only have to consider the costs of allocations.
Java has a null garbage collector (Sigma GC) for the same reason. If your financial application really needs good performance at any cost and you don't want to rewrite it, you can throw money at the problem to make it go away.
I don't think this argument makes sense. You wouldn't provision a 100GB server for a service where 1GB would do just in case unexpected conditions come up. If the requirements change, then the setup can change, doing it just because is wasteful. What if we forget is not a valid argument to over engineer and over provision.
If a fix is relatively low cost and improves the software in a way that makes it easier to modify in the future, it makes it easier to change the requirements. In aggregate these pay off.
This is all relative though.
If a missile passes the long hurdles and hoops built into modern Defence T&E procurement it will only ever be considered out of spec once it fails.
For a good portion of platforms they will go into service, be used for a decade or longer, and not once will the design be modified before going end of life and replaced.
If you wanted to progressively iterate or improve on these platforms, then yes continual updates and investing in the eradication of tech debt is well worth the cost.
If you're strapping explosives attached to a rocket engine to your vehicle and pointing it at someone, there is merit in knowing it will behave exactly the same way it has done the past 1000 times.
Neither ethos in modifying a system is necessarily wrong, but you do have to choose which you're going with, and what the merits and drawbacks of that are.
Again, when you're building a missile nobody should "forget" a detail.
You have very clearly in the specification, "this missile SHALL not have a run time before reboot of greater than 36 hours ref. donut_count.c:423 integer counter overflows"
Seriously, there's a military standard for pop tarts and they'd get rejected if they had out of spec amounts of frosting on top. It is not the software world you live in.
It's not that they don't ever make mistakes, just an extraordinary amount of effort is put into not making mistakes and oftentimes things are done "wrong" on purpose because of tradeoffs ordinary silicon valley software engineers have no context about.
The way it always seemed to go for me, when I was in that role, is the product is already complete, development is done, you're handed all the tests/etc that the disinterested developers care to give you, and you're told to make those tests presentable and robust, and increase test coverage. The process of doing that inevitably uncovers issues, but nobody cares because the thing is already done and working, so what was the point of any of it? The point was just to check off a box. At companies like this, the role is bullshit work.
Having observed an average of two mgmt rotations at most of the clients our company is working for this comes at absolutely no surprise to me. Engineering is acting perfectly reasonable, optimizing for cost and time within the constraints they were given. Constraints are updated at a (marketing or investor pleasure) whim without consulting engineering, cue disaster. Not even surprising to me anymore...
... until the extended-range version is ordered and no one remembers to fix the leak. :]
Ariane 5 happens.
They will remember, because it'll have been measured and documented, rigorously.
I've found that the real trick with documentation isn't creation, it's discovery. I wonder how that information is easily found afterwards.
>I wonder how that information is easily found afterwards.
Military hardware is produced with engineering design practices that look nothing at all like what most of the HN crowd is used to. There is an extraordinary amount of documentation, requirements, and validation done for everything.
There is a MIL-SPEC for pop tarts which defines all parts sizes, tolerances, etc.
Unlike a lot in the software world military hardware gets DONE with design and then they just manufacture it.
By reading the documentation thoroughly as a compulsory first step to designing the next system that depends on it.
I realise this may probably boggle the mind of the modern software developer.
I used to take this approach when building new integrations. Then I realized (1) most documentation sucks (2) there's far too much to remember (3) much of it is conditional (4) you don't always know what matters until it matters (e.g. using different paths of implementation).
What works much better is having an intentional review step that you come back to.
That is not how this usually works.
Most of the time QA can tell you exactly how the product works, regardless of what the documentation says. But many of us haven’t seen a QA team in five, ten years.
You say this like trivial misstakes did not happen all the time in classical engineering as well.
If there is a memory leak, them this is a flaw, that might not matter so much for a specific product, but I can also easily see it being forgotten, if it was maybe mentioned somewhere in the documentation, but maybe not clear enough and deadlines and stress to ship are a thing there as well.
Just try harder. And if it still breaks, clearly you weren't trying hard enough!
At some point you have to admit that humans are pretty bad at some things. Keeping documentation up to date and coherent is one of those things, especially in the age of TikTok.
Better to live in the world we have and do the best you can, than to endlessly argue about how things should be but never will become.
> especially in the age of TikTok
Shouldn't grey beards, grizzled by years of practicing rigorous engineering, be passing this knowledge on to the next generation? How did they learn it when just starting out? They weren't born with it. Maybe engineering has actually improved so much that we only need to experience outages this frequently, and such feelings of nostalgia are born from never having to deal with systems having such high degrees of complexity and, realistically, 100% availability expectations on a global scale.
They may not have learned it but being thorough in general was more of a thing. These days things are far more rushed. And I say that as a relatively young engineer.
The amount of dedication and meticulous and concentrated work I know from older engineers when I started work and that I remember from my grand fathers is something I very rarely observe these days. Neither in engineering specific fields nor in general.
We were talking about making a missile (v2) with an extended range, and ensuring that the developers who work on it understand the assumption of the prior model: that it doesn't use free because it's expected to blow up before that would become an issue (a perfectly valid approach, I might add). And to ensure that this assumption still holds in the v2 extended range model. The analogy to Ariane 5 is very apt.
Now, there can be tens of thousands of similar considerations to document. And keeping up that documentation with the actual state of the world is a full time job in itself.
You can argue all you want that folks "should" do this or that, but all I've seen in my entire career is that documentation is almost universally: out of date, and not worth relying on because it's actively steering you in the wrong direction. And I actually disagree (as someone with some gray in my beard) with your premise that this is part of "rigorous engineering" as is practiced today. I wish it was, but the reality is you have to read the code, read it again, see what it does on your desk, see what it does in the wild, and still not trust it.
We "should" be nice to each other, I "should" make more money, and it "should" be sunny more often. And we "should" have well written, accurate and reliable docs, but I'm too old to be waiting around for that day to come, especially in the age of zero attention and AI generated shite.
For the new system to be approved, you need to document the properties of the software component that are deemed relevant. The software system uses dynamic allocation, so "what do the allocation patterns look like? are there leaks, risks of fragmentation, etc, and how do we characterise those?" is on the checklist. The new developer could try to figure this all out from scratch, but if they're copying the old system's code, they're most likely just going to copy the existing paperwork, with a cursory check to verify that their modifications haven't changed the properties.
They're going to see "oh, it leaks 3MiB per minute… and this system runs for twice as long as the old system", and then they're going to think for five seconds, copy-paste the appropriate paragraph, double the memory requirements in the new system's paperwork, and call it a day.
Checklists work.
If ownerless code doesn’t result in discoverability efforts then the whole thing goes off the rails.
I won’t remember this block of code because five other people have touched it. So I need to be able to see what has changed and what it talks to so I can quickly verify if my old assumptions still hold true
When people don't read the documentation, discovery is a real problem. When people do read the documentation, things are different. Many software engineers do not read the documentation, and then complain to you if they break something in a documented way. If you compare to hardware engineers, whose vendors put out tens of thousands of pages of documentation for single parts, they have a lot of skill at reading documentation (and the vendors at writing it).
Was this one measured and documented rigorously?
Well obviously not, because the front fell off. That’s a dead giveaway.
My hunch is that we do the same with memory leaks or other bugs in web applications where the time of a request is short.
I've noticed that in recent months, even apart from these outages, cloudflare has been contributing to a general degradation and shittification of the internet. I'm seeing a lot more "prove you're human", "checking to make sure you're human", and there is normally at the very least a delay of a few seconds before the site loads.
I don't think this is really helping the site owners. I suspect it's mainly about AI extortion:
https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-pay-per-crawl/
You call it extortion of the AI companies, but isn’t stealing/crawling/hammering a site to scrape their content to resell just as nefarious? I would say Cloudflare is giving these site owners an option to protect their content and as a byproduct, reduce their own costs of subsidizing their thieves. They can choose to turn off the crawl protection. If they aren't, that tells you that they want it, doesn’t it?
>You call it extortion of the AI companies, but isn’t stealing/crawling/hammering a site to scrape their content to resell just as nefarious?
You can easily block ChatGPT and most other AI scrapers if you want:
https://habeasdata.neocities.org/ai-bots
This is just using robots.txt and asking "pretty please, don’t scrape me".
Here is an article (from TODAY) about the case where Perplexity is being accused of ignoring robots.txt: https://www.theverge.com/news/839006/new-york-times-perplexi...
If you think a robots.txt is the answer to stopping the billion-dollar AI machine from scraping you, I don’t know what to say.
If someone has a robots.txt, and I want to request their page, but I want to do that in an automated way, should I open the browser to do it instead of issue a curl request? How about if I am going to ask claude to fetch the page for me?
Respect the robots.txt and don’t do it?
Yes, I was referring to legitimate companies, and Perplexity doesn't seem to be one of those.
Oh for sure. When he wrote of the AI companies that are "stealing/crawling/hammering", you thought he meant the legitimate ones that do honor robots.txt. That makes sense.
Actually, it looks like all the major ones do honour robots.txt including perplexity. They seemingly get around it using google serps, so theyre not actually crawling or hammering the site servers (or even cloudflare).
https://www.ailawandpolicy.com/2025/10/anti-circumvention-re...
I'm guessing you don't manage any production web servers?
robots.txt isn't even respected by all of the American companies. Chinese ones (which often also use what are essentially botnets in Latin American and the rest of the world to evade detection) certainly don't care about anything short of dropping their packets.
I have been managing production commercial web servers for 28 years.
Yes, there are various bots, and some of the large US companies such as Perplexity do indeed seem to be ignoring robots.txt.
Is that a problem? It's certainly not a problem with cpu or network bandwidth (it's very minimal). Yes, it may be an issue if you are concerned with scraping (which I'm not).
Cloudflare's "solution" is a much bigger problem that affects me multiple times daily (as a user of sites that use it), and those sites don't seem to need protection against scraping.
It is rather disingenuous to backpedal from "you can easily block them" to "is that a problem? who even cares" when someone points out that you cannot in fact easily block them.
I was referring to legitimate ones, which you can easily block. Obviously there are scammy ones as well, and yes it is an issue, but for most sites I would say the cloudflare cure is worse than the problem it's trying to cure.
No true scotsman needs Cloudflare, as any true scotsman can block AI bots themselves is not a strong argument.
But is there any actual evidence that any major AI bots are bypassing robots.txt? It looked as if Perplexity was doing this, but after looking into it further it seems that likely isn't the case. Quite often people believe single source news stories without doing any due diligence or fact checking.
I haven't been in the weeds in a few months, but last time I was there we did have a lot of traffic from bots that didn't care about robots. Bytedance is one that comes to mind.
Security almost always brings inconvenience (to everyone involved, including end users). That is part of its cost.
What security issue is actually being solved here though?
[dead]
No you cannot! I blocked all of the user agents on a community wiki I run, and the traffic came back hours later masquerading as Firefox and Chrome. They just fucking lie to you and continue vacuuming your CPU.
There shouldn't be any noticeable hit on your cpu from bots from a site like that. Are you sure it's not a DDoS?
Obviously it depends on the bot, and you can't block the scammy ones. I was really just referring to the major legitimate companies (which might not include Perplexity).
There is a noticeable hit, there's also a noticeable cost, and it's not a ddos.
Not all sites can have full caching, we've tried.
I was referring to the community wiki.
How are you this naive? Do you really think scrapers give a damn about your robots.txt?
The legitimate ones do, which is what I was referring to. Obviously there are bastard ones as well.
this is the equivalent of asking people not to speed on your street.
Tell me you don't run a site without telling me you don't run a site
Tell me you make incorrect assumptions without specifically saying so. (Yes, you're incorrect).
Ive been seeing more of those prove your human pages as well, but I generally assume they are there to combat a DDOS or other type of attack (or maybe ai/bot). I remember how annoying it was combating DDOS attacks, or hacked sites before Cloudflare existed. I also remember how annoying capcha s were, everywhere. Cloudflare is not perfect but net, I think it’s been a great improvement.
Ovh provides ddos protection without that nonsense, for free. Aws does it too, for a fee.
More and more sites I can't even visit because of this "prove you're human" because it's not compatible with older web browsers, even though the website it's blocking is.
the two things are unrelated...
The pay-per-crawl thing, is about them thinking ahead about post-AI business/revenue models.
The way AI happened, it removed a big chunk of revenue from news companies, blogs, etc. Because lots of people go to AI instead of reaching the actual 3rd party website.
AI currently gets the content for free from the 3rd party websites, but they have revenue from their users.
So Cloudflare is proposing that AI companies should be paying for their crawling. Cloudflare's solution would give the lost revenue back where it belongs, just through a different mechanism.
The ugly side of the story is that this was already an existing solution, and open source, called L402.org.
Cloudflare wants to be the first to take a piece of the pie, but also instead of using the open source version, they forked it internally and published it as their own service, which is cloudflare specific.
To be completely fair, the l402 requires you to solve the payment mechanism itself, which for Cloudflare is easy because they already deal with payments.
> I've noticed that in recent months, even apart from these outages, cloudflare has been contributing to a general degradation and shittification of the internet. I'm seeing a lot more "prove you're human", "checking to make sure you're human", and there is normally at the very least a delay of a few seconds before the site loads.
Good to know I'm not the only one
Feel like that’s the fault of LLMs, not cloudflare
Looking into this more, it does indeed seem to be a cloudflare problem. It looks like cloudflare made a significant error in their bot fingerprinting, and Perplexity wasn't actually bypassing robots.txt.
https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/blog/agents-or-bots-making-sen...
To be honest I find cloudflare a much more scammy company than Perplexity. I had a DDoS attack a few years ago which originated from their network, and they had zero interest in it.
In my experience it's been in recent years, not months.
it can't even spy on us silently, damn
I noticed this outage last night (Cloudflare 500s on a few unrelated websites). As usual, when I went to Cloudflare's status page, nothing about the outage was present; the only thing there was a notice about the pre-planned maintenance work they were doing for the security issue, reporting that everything was being routed around it successfully.
This is the case with just about every status page I’ve ever seen. It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page. One day these things will be automated, but until then, I wouldn’t expect more of Cloudflare than any other provider.
What’s more concerning to me is that now we’ve had AWS, Azure, and CloudFlare (and CliudFlare twice) go down recently. My gut says:
1. developers and IT are using LLMs in some part of the process, which will not be 100% reliable.
2. Current culture of I have (some personal activity or problem) or we don’t have staff, AI will replace me, f-this.
3. Pandemic after effects.
4. Political climate / war / drugs; all are intermingled.
Management doesn't like when things like this are automated. They want to "manage" the outage/production/etc numbers before letting them out.
There's no sweet spot I've found. I don't work for Cloudflare but when I did have a status indicator to maintain, you could never please everyone. Users would complain when our system was up but a dependent system was down, saying that our status indicator was a lie. "Fixing" that by marking our system as down or degraded whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius). The juice no longer seemed worth the squeeze and we gave up on automated status indicators.
> "Fixing" that by marking our system as down or degraded whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius).
This seems like an issue with the design of your status page. If the broken dependencies truly had a limited blast radius, that should've been able to be communicated in your indicators and statistics. If not, then the unreliable reputation was deserved, and all you did by removing the status page was hide it.
> all you did by removing the status page was hide it
True, but everyone that actually made the company work was much happier for it.
> whenever a dependent system was down led to the status indicator being not green regularly, causing us to unfairly develop a reputation as unreliable (most broken dependencies had limited blast radius)
You are responsible of your dependencies, unless they are specific integrations. Either switch to more reliable dependencies or add redundancy so that you can switch between providers when any is down.
The headline status doesn't have to be "worst of all systems". Pick a key indicator, and as long as it doesn't look like it's all green regardless of whether you're up or down, users will imagine that "green headline, red subsystems" means whatever they're observing, even if that makes the status display utterly uninterpretable from an outside perspective.
100% — will never be automated :)
Still room for someone to claim the niche of the Porsche horsepower method in outage reporting - underpromise, overdeliver.
Thing is, these things are automated... Internally.
Which makes it feel that much more special when a service provides open access to all of the infrastructure diagnostics, like e.g. https://status.ppy.sh/
Nice! Didn't know you could make a Datadog dashboard public like that!
>It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page.
Not really, they're just lying. I mean yes of course they aren't oracles who discover complex problems in instant of the first failure, but naw they know when well there are problems and significantly underreport them to the extent they are are less "smoke alarms" and more "your house has burned down and the ashes are still smoldering" alarms. Incidents are intentionally underreported. It's bad enough that there ought to be legislation and civil penalties for the large providers who fail to report known issues promptly.
Those are complex and tenuous explanations for events that have occurred since long before all of your reasons came into existence.
Only way to change that it to shame them for it: "Cloudflare is so incompetent at detecting and managing outages that even their simple status page is unable to be accurate"
If enough high-ranked customers report this feedback...
The status page was updated 6 minutes after the first internal alert was triggered (8:50 -> 8:56:26 UTC), I wouldn't say this is too long.
> Disabling this was done using our global configuration system. This system does not use gradual rollouts but rather propagates changes within seconds to the entire network and is under review following the outage we recently experienced on November 18.
> As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception:
They really need to figure out a way to correlate global configuration changes to the errors they trigger as fast as possible.
> as part of this rollout, we identified an increase in errors in one of our internal tools which we use to test and improve new WAF rules
Warning signs like this are how you know that something might be wrong!
> They really need to figure out a way to correlate global configuration changes to the errors they trigger as fast as possible.
This is what jumped out at me as the biggest problem. A wild west deployment process is a valid (but questionable) business decision, but if you do that then you need smart people in place to troubleshoot and make quick rollback decisions.
Their timeline:
> 08:47: Configuration change deployed and propagated to the network
> 08:48: Change fully propagated
> 08:50: Automated alerts
> 09:11: Configuration change reverted and propagation start
> 09:12: Revert fully propagated, all traffic restored
2 minutes for their automated alerts to fire is terrible. For a system that is expected to have no downtime, they should have been alerted to the spike in 500 errors within seconds before the changes even fully propagated. Ideally the rollback would have been automated, but even if it is manual, the dude pressing the deploy button should have had realtime metrics on a second display with his finger hovering over the rollback button.
Ok, so they want to take the approach of roll forward instead of immediate rollback. Again, that's a valid approach, but you need to be prepared. At 08:48, they would have had tens of millions of "init.lua:314: attempt to index field 'execute'" messages being logged per second. Exact line of code. Not a complex issue. They should have had engineers reading that code and piecing this together by 08:49. The change you just deployed was to disable an "execute" rule. Put two and two together. Initiate rollback by 08:50.
How disconnected are the teams that do deployments vs the teams that understand the code? How many minutes were they scratching their butts wondering "what is init.lua"? Are they deploying while their best engineers are sleeping?
> 2 minutes for their automated alerts to fire is terrible
I take exception to that, to be honest. It's not desirable or ideal, but calling it "terrible" is a bit ... well, sorry to use the word ... entitled. For context, I have experience running a betting exchange. A system where it's common for a notable fraction of transactions in a medium-volume event to take place within a window of less than 30 seconds.
Vast majority of current monitoring systems are built on Prometheus. (Well okay, these days it's more likely something Prom-compatible but more reliable.) That implies collection via recurring scrapes. A supposedly "high" frequency online service monitoring system does a scrape every 30 seconds. Well known reliability engineering practices state that you need a minimum of two consecutive telemetry points to detect any given event - because we're talking about a distributed system and network is not a reliable transport. That in turn means that with near-perfect reliability the maximum time window before you can detect something failing is the time it takes to perform three scrapes: thing A might have failed a second after the last scrape, so two consecutive failures will show up only after a delay of just-a-hair-shy-of-three scraping cycle windows.
At Cloudflare's scale, I would not be surprised if they require three consecutive events to trigger an alert.
As for my history? The betting exchange monitoring was tuned to run scrapes at 10-second intervals. That still meant that the first an alert fired for something failing could have been effectively 30 seconds after the failures manifested.
Two minutes for something that does not run primarily financial transactions is a pretty decent alerting window.
Prometheus compatible but more reliable? Sell it to me!
VictoriaMetrics. The answer to the question "could I get Prometheus, but with ClickHouse architecture?"
I'll be looking into that, thank you.
While we're here, any other Prometheus or Grafana advice is welcome.
Critical high-level stats such as errors should be scraped more frequently than 30 seconds. It’s important to have multiple time granularity scraping intervals, a small set of most critical stats should be scraped closer to 10s or 15s.
Prometheus has as an unaddressed flaw [0], where rate functions must be at least 2x the scrape interval. This means that if you scrape at 30s intervals, your rate charts won’t reflect the change until a minute after.
[0] - https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus/issues/3746
"Scrape" intervals (and the plumbing through to analysis intervals) are chosen precisely because of the denoising function aggregation provides.
Most scaled analysis systems provide precise control over the type of aggregation used within the analyzed time slices. There are many possibilities, and different purposes for each.
High frequency events are often collected into distributions and the individual timestamps are thrown away.
> At Cloudflare's scale, I would not be surprised if they require three consecutive events to trigger an alert.
Sorry but that’s a method you use if you serve 100 requests per second, not when you are at Cloudflare scale. Cloudflare easily have big enough volume that this problem would trigger an instant change in a monitorable failure rate.
Let's say you have 10 million servers. No matter what you are deploying, some of those servers are going to be in a bad state. Some are going to be in hw ops/repair. Some are going to be mid-deployment for something else. A regional issue may be happening. You may have inconsistencies in network performance. Bad workloads somewhere/anywhere can be causing a constant level of error traffic.
At scale there's no such thing as "instant". There is distribution of progress over time.
The failure is an event. Collection of events takes times (at scale, going through store and forward layers). Your "monitorable failure rate" is over an interval. You must measure for that interval. And then you are going to emit another event.
Global config systems are a tradeoff. They're not inherently bad; they have both strengths and weaknesses. Really bad: non-zero possibility for system collapse. Bad: Can progress very quickly to towards global outages. Good: Faults are detected quickly, response decision making is easy, and mitigation is fast.
Hyperscale is not just "a very large number of small simple systems".
Denoising alerts is a fact of life for SRE...and is a survival skill.
I see lots of people complaining about this down time but in actuality is it really that big a deal to have 30 minutes of down time or whatever. It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake. In many developed countries the electric power service has local down times on occasion. That's more important than not being able to load a website. I agree if CF is offering a certain standard of reliability and not meeting it then they should offer prorated refunds for the unexpected down time but otherwise I am not seeing what the big deal is here.
> It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake.
This is far too dismissive of how disruptive the downtime can be and it sets the bar way too low for a company so deeply entangled in global internet infrastructure.
I don’t think you can make such an assertion with any degree of credibility.
> It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake.
Yes, there are lots of mission critical systems that use cloudflare and lives and huge amounts of money are at stake.
Can you provide an example of lives being at stake because of a cloud flare outage?
https://creators.spotify.com/pod/profile/epicompliance/episo...
30 minutes of downtime is fine for most things, including Amazon.
30 minutes of unplanned downtime for infrastructure is unacceptable; but we’re tending to accept it. AWS or Cloudflare have positioned themselves as The Internet so they need to be held to a higher standard.
I am confident there is at least a few hospitals, gp offices or ticketing systems that interact directly or indirectly with Cloud flare. They've sold themselves as a major defence in security.
> about this down time but in actuality is it really that big a deal to have 30 minutes of down time or whatever. It's not like anything behind cloudflare is "mission critical" in the sense that lives are at stake or even a huge amount of money is at stake.
This reads like sarcasm. But I guess it is not. Yes, you are a CDN, a major one at that. 30 minutes of downtime or "whatever" is not acceptable. I worked at traffic teams of social networks that looked at themselves as that mission critical. CF is absolutely that critical and it is definitely lives at stake.
> Warning signs like this are how you know that something might be wrong!
Yes, as they explain it's the rollback that was triggered due to seeing these errors that broke stuff.
They saw errors and decided to do a second rollout to disable the component generating errors, causing a major outage.
That was their first mistake, if your deployment does not behave the way you expect to (or even give you bad smell) roll back, that how it used to be... when I was a kid...lol Or I don't know, maybe load test before you deploy.....?
Would be nice if the outage dashboards are directly linked to this instead of whatever they have now.
“ Uh...it's probably not a problem...probably...but I'm showing a small discrepancy in...well, no, it's well within acceptable bounds again. Sustaining sequence. Nothing you need to worry about, Gordon. Go ahead.“
"Hey, this change is making the 'check engine' light turn on all the time. No problem; I just grabbed some pliers and crushed the bulb."
they arent a panacea though, internal tools like that can be super noisy on errors, and be broken more often than theyre working
Cloudflare is now below 99.9% uptime, for anyone keeping track. I reckon my home PC is at least 99.9%.
Indeed. AWS too.
I feel like the cloud hosting companies have lost the plot. "They can provide better uptime than us" is the entire rationale that a lot of small companies have when choosing to run everything in the cloud.
If they cost more AND they're less reliable, what exactly is the reason to not self host?
> If they cost more AND they're less reliable, what exactly is the reason to not self host?
Shifting liability. You're paying someone else for it to be their problem, and if everyone does it, no one will take flak for continuing to do so. What is the average tenure of a CIO or decision maker electing to move to or remain at a cloud provider? This is why you get picked to talk on stage at cloud provider conferences.
(have been in the meetings where these decisions are made)
Plus, when you self-host, you can likely fix the issue yourself in a couple of hours max, instead of waiting indefinitely for a fix or support that might never come.
These global cloud outages aren’t the real issue; they affect everyone and get fixed.
What is killer is when there is a KNOWN issue that affects YOU but basically only you so why bother fixing it!
I mean, I still prefer to have the ability to fix it myself, because I know I can probably do it in 1h max. I know this doesn't apply to most people, especially those outside of HN though.
Even if resolution times are equal, there is some comfort in being able to see the problem and make progress on it to feel like you're actively doing something. I work in a large enterprise and we have a team dedicated to managing critical incidents and getting everyone together for a resolution. When a 3rd party vendor is the reason for the outage, those calls are really awkward. It's a bunch of people sitting around pressing F5, all frantically trying to make it look like they are actively helping, when no one is actually doing anything, because they can't.
I equate it to driving. I'd rather be moving at a normal speed on side streets than sitting in traffic on the expressway, even if the expressway is technically faster.
Today a client is having some issue with Zoom because of some artificial rate limits they impose. Their support is not responding, the account can't be used, courses can not be held and there's not much we can do.
We already started looking into moving away from Zoom, I suggested self-hosting http://jitsi.org Based on their docs, self-hosting is well supported, and probably a $50-$100 server is more than enough, so a lot cheaper than Zoom.
Artifical limits because they are on the free plan?
Artifical limits, because they have 40 paid licenses that they can not use, because of a non-disclosed assignment limit that is NOT mentioned in the pricing page nor in the ToS.
A lot of people are angry about this, and I think it's borderline illegal: https://devforum.zoom.us/t/you-have-exceeded-the-limit-of-li...
You pay for something, and you can't use it.
If a company doesn't respond to this it tells you they likely only respond to lawsuits. As a paying customer whose business operations are impacted, you should have standing to sue. Your company could potentially extract from Zoom the entirety of the money that their dumb decision made your company lose. Consult a lawyer for actual advice and next steps.
Of course, it's also possible you signed a contract that basically says "we can just decide not to work and you can't do anything about it" in which case, sucks, and fire whoever negotiates your B2B contracts. But also, those clauses can be void if the violation is serious enough.
Probably not worth the effort, for a couple days of downtime, we'll just move somewhere else.
But I agree, I recognize the silence in that forum thread that was locked without a resolution: some boss said "let they complain or pay, we don't care about them otherwise".
This is why we never changed the licenses, we just made long-running identical ID meetings that everyone can join.
But we’re moving away as it’s only going to get worse.
That's a cool work-around.
What I don't like, is that whenever you contact Zoom, their representatives are taught to say one thing: buy more licenses.
Not only that, but their API/pricing is specifically designed to cover edge-cases that will force you to buy a license.
For example, they don't expose an API to assign a co-host. You can do that via the UI, manually, but not via the API.
Can you share which solution are you moving to?
It's interesting to see Comcast is using that. I would have expected them to go with the mainstream vendors.
Are you always available to react within 1h?
Capex vs Opex and scale-out.
For a start-up it's much easier to just pay the Cloud tax than it is to hire people with the appropriate skill sets to manage hardware or to front the cost.
Larger companies on the other hand? Yeah, I don't see the reason to not self host.
TBF, it depends on the number of outages locally. In my area it is one outage every thunderstorm/snow storm, so unfortunately the up time of my laptop, even with the help of a large, portable battery charging station (which can charge multiple laptops at the same time), is not optimistic.
I sometimes fancy that I could just take cash, go into the wood, build a small solar array, collect & cleanse river water, and buy a starlink console.
Costco had a deal on solid-state UPS & solar panels a while back that I was happy to partake of
Yeah, I'd guess I average a power drop once a month or so at home. Never calculated the nines of uptime average, but it's not that infrequent.
I know when I need to reset the clock on my microwave oven.
99.9 is like 9 hours of downtime a year.
Far more achievable pricing and logistics than even ten years ago.
When a piece of hardware goes or a careless backup process fails, downtime of a self-hosted service can be measured in days or weeks.
Have 2 of them and your users only see correlated failures.
Where/how are you keeping track of this? What is their current uptime percentage?
1 - downtime/period. I suspect period is 1 year. 99.9% is 8.76 hours of downtime a year.
Exactly this. Just keep a note every time they have a big outage, and then take the last year and see if its over 9 hours, is a good measure.
Do they include uptime guarantees in any contracts?
See 1.1 and 1.2; you get some credit back for when they fail to deliver.
https://www.cloudflare.com/business-sla/
That's a pretty silly comparison though.
Yes, but it should also never happen that CF drops below 99.99, that's extremely doable for them (and it is literally the point of using a CDN).
What I'm missing here is a test environment. Gradual or not; why are they deploying straight to prod? At Cloudflare's scale, there should be a dedicated room in Cloudflare HQ with a full isolated model-scale deployment of their entire system. All changes should go there first, with tests run for every possible scenario.
Only after that do you use gradual deployment, with a big red oopsie button which immediately rolls the changes back. Languages with strong type systems won't save you, good procedure will.
This is kinda what I'm thinking. We're absolutely not at the scale Cloudflare is at.
But we run software and configuration changes through three tiers - first stage for the dev-team only, second stage with internal customers and other teams depending on it for integration and internal usage -- and finally production. Some teams have also split production into different rings depending on the criticality of the customers and the number of customers.
This has lead to a bunch of discussions early on, because teams with simpler software and very good testing usually push through dev and testing with no or little problem. And that's fine. If you have a track record of good changes, there is little reason to artificially prolong deployment in dev and test just because. If you want to, just go through it in minutes.
But after a few spicy production incidents, even the better and faster teams understood and accepted that once technical velocity exists, actual velocity is a choice, or a throttle if you want an analogy.
If you do good, by all means, promote from test to prod within minutes. If you fuck up production several times in a row and start threatening SLAs, slow down, spend more resources on manual testing and improving automated testing, give changes time to simmer in the internally productive environment, spend more time between promotions from production ring to production ring.
And this is on top of considerations of e.g. change risk. Some frontend-only application can move much faster than the PostgreSQL team, because one rollback is a container restart, and the other could be a multi-hour recovery from backups.
They have millions of “free” subscribers; said subscribers should be the test pigs for rollouts; paying (read: big) subscribers can get the breaking changes later.
This feels like such a valid solution and is how past $dayjobs released things: send to the free users, rollout to Paying Users once that's proven to not blow up.
If your target is availability, that's correct.
If your target is security, then _assuming your patch is actually valid_ you're giving better security coverage for free customers than to your paying ones.
Cloudflare is both, and their tradeoffs seem to be set on maximizing security at cost of availability. And it makes sense. A fully unavailable system is perfectly secure.
Free tier doesn’t get WAF. We kept working.
Their December 3rd blog about React states:
"These new protections are included in both the Cloudflare Free Managed Ruleset (available to all Free customers) ..... "
having some burn in time in free tier before it hits the whole network would have been good?!
I am sure they have this. What tends to happen is that the gradual rollout system becomes too slow for some rare, low latency rollout requirements, so a config system is introduced that fulfills the requirements. For example, let’s say you have a gradual rollout for binaries (slow) and configuration (fast). Over time, the fast rollout of the configuration system will cause outages, so it’s slowed down. Then a requirement pops up for which the config system is too slow and someone identifies a global system with no gradual rollout (e.g. a database) to be used as the solution. That solution will be compliant with all the processes that have been introduced to the letter, because so far nobody has thought of using a single database row for global configuration yet. Add new processes whenever this happens and at some point everything will be too slow and taking on more risk becomes necessary to stay competitive. So processes are adjusted. Repeat forever.
> Languages with strong type systems won't save you, good procedure will.
One of the items in the list of procedures is to use types to encode rules of your system.
> Languages with strong type systems won't save you
Neither will seatbelts if you drive into the ocean, or helmets if you drink poison. I'm not sure what your point is.
I think you strengthened their point.
I don't think I did. The implication is that using languages with strong types (as discussed in the article) is not a solution. That's rubbish. It's at least part of the solution.
Internet packet switching based architecture was originally design to withstand this type of outages [1].
Some people even go further by speculating that the original military DARPA network precursor to the modern Internet was originally designed to ensure the continuity of command and control (C&C) of the US military operation in the potential event of all out nuclear attack during the Cold War.
This the time when Internet researchers need to redefine the Internet application and operation. The local-first paradigm is the first step in the right direction (pardon the pun) [2].
[1] The Real Internet Architecture: Past, Present, and Future Evolution:
https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691255804/th...
[2] Local-first software You own your data, in spite of the cloud:
https://www.inkandswitch.com/essay/local-first/
The lesson presented by the last few big outages is that entropy is, in fact, inescapable. The comprehensibility of a system cannot keep up with its growing and aging complexity forever. The rate of unknown unknowns will increase.
The good news is that a more decentralized internet with human brain scoped components is better for innovation, progress, and freedom anyway.
yet my dedicated server has been up since 2015 with zero downtimes
i dont think this is an entropy issue its human error bubbling up and cloudflare charges a premium for it
my faith in cloudflare is shoook for sure two major outages weeks apart ad this wont be the last
Which 2015 kernel are you running?
Why is the stability of your dedicated server a counterpoint that cloud behemoths can't keep up with their increasing entropy? Seems more like a supporting argument of OP at best, a non sequitur at worst.
Yeah, because it's not complex. It's 1 server. Get back to us when your 100k servers homelab data center that does a million different things has 10 years of uptime.
With all due respect, your dedicated server is not quite as complex as Cloudflare...
Eppur si muove. A random server serving things is exactly what the internet was supposed to be: a decentralized network of nodes.
I agree, I was just commenting that your single server being simpler is less affected by entropy :)
I'm not sure how decentralization helps though. People in a bazzar are going to care even less about sharing shadow knowledge. Linux IMO succeeds not because of the bazaar but because of Linus.
Decentralization is resilience; that's why the internet even works at all. That was the entire point of it, in fact.
You don't keep a bazaar running with shadow knowledge. Either the important things are published or it doesn't run.
What is the shadow knowledge in this case?
Also curious, since the bazaar seems to be where one acquires shadow knowledge (grey market items, support structures for unregistered people etc.). See Chungking Mansions in Hong Kong for a practical example.
Whats going on with cloudflare's software team?
I have seen similar bugs in cloudflare API recently as well.
There is an endpoint for a feature that is available only to enterprise users, but the check for whether the user is on an enterprise plan is done at the last step.
I recently ran into an issue with the Cloudflare API feature that if you want to roll back requires contacting the support team because there's no way to roll it back with the API or GUI. Even when the exact issue was pointed out, it took multiple days to change the setting and to my knowledge there's still no API fix available.
https://www.answeroverflow.com/m/1234405297787764816
My guess? Code written by AI
TBF they are still hiring a lot of eng people from US/UK/EU:
https://www.cloudflare.com/careers/jobs/?department=Engineer...
No, the original author left long time ago. And nobody understands some uncovered parts anymore.
100%. Upper managements try to cut costs and hire remote bullshitters.
Agreed in re cost cutting, but there's no need to disparage those of us who don't want to be traffic for two hours every day.
I work remotely 100% too. I don't go to any office. That doesn't change the fact that most remote people are just using AI and bullshitting. Yes they are bullshitters. Don't need to be super soft about it, it is not like an LGBTQ+ subject. Many remote workers are shitty. There, I said it again. Most remote workers are shitty.
Can you elaborate? I'm not sure what you mean by "at the last step"
I'm not sure which endpoint gp meant, but as I understood it, as an example, imagine a three-way handshake that's only available to enterprise users. Instead of failing a regular user on the first step, they allow steps one and two, but then do the check on step three and fail there.
The API endpoint I am talking about needs a external verification. they allow to do the external verification before checking if the user is on the enterprise plan or not.
The feature is only available to enterprise plans, it should not even allow external verification.
What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety?
They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead?
Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment system that caused their 11/18 outage.
Pure speculation, but to me that sounds like there's more to the story, this sounds like the sort of cowboy decision a team makes when they've either already broken all the rules or weren't following them in the first place
One thing to keep in mind when judging what's 'appropriate' is that Cloudflare was effectively responding to an ongoing security incident outside of their control (the React Server RCE vulnerability). Part of Cloudlfare's value proposition is being quick to react to such threats. That changes the equation a bit: any hour you wait longer to deploy, your customers are actively getting hacked through a known high-severity vulnerability.
In this case it's not just a matter of 'hold back for another day to make sure it's done right', like when adding a new feature to a normal SaaS application. In Cloudflare's case moving slower also comes with a real cost.
That isn't to say it didn't work out badly this time, just that the calculation is a bit different.
To clarify, I'm not trying to imply that I definitely wouldn't have made the same decision, or that cowboy decisions aren't ever the right call.
However, this preliminary report doesn't really justify the decision to use the same deployment system responsible for the 11/18 outage. Deployment safety should have been the focus of this report, not the technical details. My question that I want answered isn't "are there bugs in Cloudflare's systems" it's "has Cloudflare learned from it's recent mistakes to respond appropriately to events"
> doesn't really justify the decision to use the same deployment system responsible for the 11/18 outage
There’s no other deployment system available. There’s a single system for config deployment and it’s all that was available as they haven’t yet done the progressive roll out implementation yet.
> There’s no other deployment system available.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but I don't know how that sort of oversight could happen in an organization whose business model rides on reliability. Small shops understand the importance of safeguards such as progressive deployments or one-box-style deployments with a baking period, so why not the likes of Cloudflare? Don't they have anyone on their payroll who warns about the risks of global deployments without safeguards?
There was another deployment system available. The progressive one used to roll out the initial change, which presumably rolls back sanely too.
Ok. Sure But shouldn't they have some beta/staging/test area they could deploy to, run tests for an hour then do the global blast?
Config changes are distinctly more difficult to have that set up for and as the blog says they’re working on it. They just don’t have it ready yet and are pausing any more config changes until it’s set up. They just did this one in response to try to mitigate an ongoing security vulnerability and missed the mark.
I’m happy to see they’re changing their systems to fail open which is one of the things I mentioned in the conversation about their last outage.
The 11/18 outage was 2.5 weeks ago. Any learning & changes they made as a result for that probably didn't make its way yet to production.
Particularly if we're asking them to be careful & deliberate about deployments, hard to ask them fast-track this.
the cve isn't a zero day though how come cloudflare werent at the table for early disclosure?
Do you have a public source about an embargo period for this one? I wasn't able to find one
https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/03/critical-security-vulnerab...
Privately Disclosed: Nov 29 Fix pushed: Dec 1 Publicly disclosed: Dec 3
Then even in the worst case scenario, they were addressing this issue two days after it was publicly disclosed. So this wasn't a "rush to fix the zero day ASAP" scenario, which makes it harder to justify ignoring errors that started occuring in a small scale rollout.
Considering there were patched libraries at the time of disclosure, those libraries' authors must have been informed ahead of time.
Cloudflare did have early access, and had mitigation in place from the start. The changes that were being rolled out were in response to ongoing attempts to bypass those.
Disclosure: I work at Cloudflare, but not on the WAF
Cloudflare had already decided this was a rule that could be rolled out using their gradual deployment system. They did not view it as being so urgent that it required immediate global roll out.
[flagged]
Indeed, but it is what it is. Cloudflare comes out of my budget, and even with downtime, its better than not paying them. Do I want to deal with what Cloudflare offers? I do not, I have higher value work to focus on. I want to pay someone else to deal with this, and just like when cloud providers are down, it'll be back up eventually. Grab a coffee or beer and hang; we aren't savings lives, we're just building websites. This is not laziness or nihilism, but simply being rational and pragmatic.
> Do I want to deal with what Cloudflare offers? I do not, I have higher value work to focus on. I want to pay someone else to deal with this, and just like when cloud providers are down, it'll be back up eventually.
This is specious reasoning. How come I had to endure a total outage due to the rollout of a mitigation of a Nextjs vulnerability when my organization doesn't even own any React app, let alone a Nextjs one?
Also specious reasoning #2, not wanting to maintain a service does not justify blindly rolling out config changes globally without any safeguards.
If you are a customer of Cloudflare, and not happy, I encourage you to evaluate other providers more to your liking. Perhaps you'll find someone more fitting to your use case and operational preferences, but perhaps not. My day job org pays Cloudflare hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, and am satisfied with how they operate. Everyone has choice, exercise it if you choose. I'm sure your account exec would be happy to take the feedback. Feedback, including yours, is valuable and important to attempt to improve the product and customer experience (imho; i of course do not speak for Cloudflare, only myself).
As a recovering devops/infra person from a lifetime ago (who has, much to my heartbreak, broken prod more than once), perhaps that is where my grace in this regard comes from. Systems and their components break, systems and processes are imperfect, and urgency can lead to unexpected failure. Sometimes its Cloudflare, other times it's Azure, GCP, Github, etc. You can always use something else, but most of us continue to pick the happy path of "it works most of the time, and sometimes it does not." Hopefully the post mortem has action items to improve the safeguards you mention. If there are no process and technical improvements from the outage, certainly, that is where the failure lies (imho).
China-nexus cyber threat groups rapidly exploit React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182) - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/china-nexus-cyber-thre... - December 4th, 2025
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&que...
> you are a customer of Cloudflare, and not happy, I encourage you to evaluate other providers more to your liking.
I think your take is terribly simplistic. In a professional setting, virtually all engineers have no say on whether the company switches platforms or providers. Their responsibility is to maintain and develop services that support business. The call to switch a provider is ultimately a business and strategic call, and is a subject that has extremely high inertia. You hired people specialized in technologies, and now you're just dumping all that investment? Not to mention contracts. Think about the problem this creates.
Some of you sound like amateurs toying with pet projects, where today it's framework A on cloud provider X whereas tomorrow it's framework B on cloud provider Y. Come the next day, rinse and repeat. This is unthinkable in any remotely professional setting.
> Some of you sound like amateurs toying with pet projects, where today it's framework A on cloud provider X whereas tomorrow it's framework B on cloud provider Y. Come the next day, rinse and repeat. This is unthinkable in any remotely professional setting.
Vendor contracts have 1-3 year terms. We (a financial services firm) re-evaluate tech vendors every year for potential replacement and technologists have direct input into these processes. I understand others may operate under a different vendor strategy. As a vendor customer, your choices are to remain a customer or to leave and find another vendor. These are not feelings, these are facts. If you are unhappy but choose not to leave a vendor, that is a choice, but it is your choice to make, and unless you are a large enough customer that you have leverage over the vendor, these are your only options.
Rollback is a reliable strategy when the rollback process is well understood. If a rollback process is not well known and well experienced, then it is a risk in itself.
I'm not sure of the nature of the rollback process in this case, but leaning on ill-founded assumptions is a bad practice. I do agree that a global rollout is a problem.
Rollback carries with it the contextual understanding of complete atomicity; otherwise it's slightly better than a yeet. It's similar to backups that are untested.
Complete atomicity carries with it the idea that the world is frozen, and any data only needs to change when you allow it to.
That's to say, it's an incredibly good idea when you can physically implement it. It's not something that everybody can do.
No, complete atomicity doesn't require a frozen state, it requires common sense and fail-proof, fool-proof guarantees derived from assurances gained from testing.
There is another name for rolling forward, it's called tripping up.
Global rollout of security code on a timeframe of seconds is part of Cloudflare's value proposition.
In this case they got unlucky with an incident before they finished work on planned changes from the last incident.
That's entirely incorrect. For starters, they didn't get unlucky. They made a choice to use the same system they knew was sketchy (which they almost certainly knew was sketchy even before 11/18)
And on top of that, Cloudflare's value proposition is "we're smart enough to know that instantaneous global deployments are a bad idea, so trust us to manage services for you so you don't have to rely on in house folks who might not know better"
> They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead?
Note that the two deployments were of different components.
Basically, imagine the following scenario: A patch for a critical vulnerability gets released, during rollout you get a few reports of it causing the screensaver to show a corrupt video buffer instead, you roll out a GPO to use a blank screensaver instead of the intended corporate branding, a crash in a script parsing the GPOs on this new value prevents users from logging in.
There's no direct technical link between the two issues. A mitigation of the first one merely exposed a latent bug in the second one. In hindsight it is easy to say that the right approach is obviously to roll back, but in practice a roll forward is often the better choice - both from an ops perspective and from a safety perspective.
Given the above scenario, how many people are genuinely willing to do a full rollback, file a ticket with Microsoft, and hope they'll get around to fixing it some time soon? I think in practice the vast majority of us will just look for a suitable temporary workaround instead.
Roll back is not always the right answer. I can’t speak to its appropriateness in this particular situation of course, but sometimes “roll forward” is the better solution.
Like the other poster said, roll back should be the right answer the vast majority of the time. But it's also important to recognize that roll forward should be a replacement for the deployment you decided not to roll back, not a parallel deployment through another system.
I won't say never, but a situation where the right answer to avoid a rollback (that it sounds like was technically fine to do, just undesirable from a security/business perspective) is a parallel deployment through a radioactive, global blast radius, near instantaneous deployment system that is under intense scrutiny after another recent outage should be about as probable as a bowl of petunias in orbit
Is a roll back even possible at Cloudflare's size?
With small deployments it usually isn't too difficult to re-deploy a previous commit. But once you get big enough you've got enough developers that half a dozen PRs will have been merged since the start of the incident and now. How viable is it to stop the world, undo everything, and start from scratch any time a deployment causes the tiniest issues?
Realistically the best you're going to get is merging a revert of the problematic changeset - but with the intervening merges that's still going to bring the system in a novel state. You're rolling forwards, not backwards.
Disclosure: Former Cloudflare SRE.
The short answer is "yes" due to the way the configuration management works. Other infrastructure changes or service upgrades might get undone, but it's possible. Or otherwise revert the commit that introduced the package bump with the new code and force that to rollout everywhere rather than waiting for progressive rollout.
There shouldn't be much chance of bringing the system to a novel state because configuration management will largely put things into the correct state. (Where that doesn't work is if CM previously created files, it won't delete them unless explicitly told to do so.)
> service upgrades might get undone, but it's possible.
But who knows what issues might reverting other team's stuff bring?
If companies like Cloudflare haven't figured out how to do reliable rollbacks, there seems little hope for any of us.
I'd presume they have the ability to deploy a previous artifact vs only tip-of-master.
That will depend on how you structure your deployments, on some large tech companies, while thousands of changes little are made every hour, and deployments are mande in n-day cycles. A cut-off point in time is made where the first 'green' commit after that is picked for the current deployment, and if that fails in an unexpected way you just deploy the last binary back, fix (and test) whatever broke and either try again or just abandon the release if the next cut is already close-by.
You want to build a world where roll back is 95% the right thing to do. So that it almost always works and you don't even have to think about it.
During an incident, the incident lead should be able to say to your team's on call: "can you roll back? If so, roll back" and the oncall engineer should know if it's okay. By default it should be if you're writing code mindfully.
Certain well-understood migrations are the only cases where roll back might not be acceptable.
Always keep your services in "roll back able", "graceful fail", "fail open" state.
This requires tremendous engineering consciousness across the entire org. Every team must be a diligent custodian of this. And even then, it will sometimes break down.
Never make code changes you can't roll back from without reason and without informing the team. Service calls, data write formats, etc.
I've been in the line of billion dollar transaction value services for most of my career. And unfortunately I've been in billion dollar outages.
"Fail open" state would have been improper here, as the system being impacted was a security-critical system: firewall rules.
It is absolutely the wrong approach to "fail open" when you can't run security-critical operations.
Cloudflare is supposed to protect me from occasional ddos, not take my business offline entirely.
This can be architected in such a way that if one rules engine crashes, other systems are not impacted and other rules, cached rules, heuristics, global policies, etc. continue to function and provide shielding.
You can't ask for Cloudflare to turn on a dime and implement this in this manner. Their infra is probably very sensibly architected by great engineers. But there are always holes, especially when moving fast, migrating systems, etc. And there's probably room for more resiliency.
The question is perhaps what the shape and status of their tech stack is. Obviously, they are running at massive scale, and they have grown extremely aggressively over the years. What's more, especially over the last few years, they have been adding new product after new product. How much tech debt have they accumulated with that "move fast" approach that is now starting to rear its head?
I think this is probably a bigger root cause and is going to show up in different ways in future. The mere act of adding new products to an existing architecture/system is bound to create knowledge silos around operations and tech debt. There is a good reason why big companies keep smart people on their payroll to just change couple of lines after a week of debate.
> this sounds like the sort of cowboy decision
Ouch. Harsh given that Cloudflare's being over-honest (to disabling the internal tool) and the outage's relatively limited impact (time wise & no. of customers wise). It was just an unfortunate latent bug: Nov 18 was Rust's Unwrap, Dec 5 its Lua's turn with its dynamic typing.
Now, the real cowboy decision I want to see is Cloudflare [0] running a company-wide Rust/Lua code-review with Codex / Claude...
cf TFA:
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44159166From the post:
“We have spoken directly with hundreds of customers following that incident and shared our plans to make changes to prevent single updates from causing widespread impact like this. We believe these changes would have helped prevent the impact of today’s incident but, unfortunately, we have not finished deploying them yet.
“We know it is disappointing that this work has not been completed yet. It remains our first priority across the organization.”
Where I work, all teams were notified about the React CVE.
Cloudflare made it less of an expedite.
> Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment system that caused their 11/18 outage.
Also there seems to be insufficient testing before deployment with very junior level mistakes.
> As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception:
Where was the testing for this one? If ANY exception happened during the rules checking, the deployment should fail and rollback. Instead, they didn't assess that as a likely risk and pressed on with the deployment "fix".
I guess those at Cloudflare are not learning anything from the previous disaster.
As usual, Cloudflare is the man in the arena.
There are other men in the arena who arent tripping on their own feet
Like who? Which large tech company doesn't have outages?
It's not about outages. It's about the why. Hardware can fail. Bugs can happen. But to continue a roll out despite warning sings and without understanding the cause and impact is on another level. Especially if it is related to the same problem as last time.
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It is healthy for tech companies to have outages, as they will build experience in resolving them. Success breeds complacency.
You don't need outages to build experience in resolving them, if you identify conditions that increase the risk of outages. Airlines can develop a lot of experience resolving issues that would lead to plane crashes, without actually crashing any planes.
Google does pretty good.
Google docs was just down a couple weeks ago almost the whole day.
"tripping on their own feet" == "not rolling back"
> more to the story
From a more tinfoil-wearing angle, it may not even be a regular deployment, given the idea of Cloudflare being "the largest MitM attack in history". ("Maybe not even by Cloudflare but by NSA", would say some conspiracy theorists, which is, of course, completely bonkers: NSA is supposed to employ engineers who never let such blunders blow their cover.)
Ooh ... I want to be on a cowboy decision making team!!!
The deployment pattern from Cloudflare looks insane to me.
I've worked at one of the top fintech firms, whenever we do a config change or deployment, we are supposed to have rollback plan ready and monitor key dashboards for 15-30 minutes.
The dashboards need to be prepared beforehand on systems and key business metrics that would be affected by the deployment and reviewed by teammates.
I've never seen a downtime longer than 1 minute while I was there, because you get a spike on the dashboard immediately when something goes wrong.
For the entire system to be down for 10+ minutes due to a bad config change or deployment is just beyond me.
That is also true at Cloudflare for what it’s worth. However, the company is so big that there’s so many different products all shipping at the same time it can be hard to correlate it to your release, especially since there’s a 5 min lag (if I recall correctly) in the monitoring dashboards to get all the telemetry from thousands of servers worldwide.
Comparing the difficulty of running the world’s internet traffic with hundreds of customer products with your fintech experience is like saying “I can lift 10 pounds. I don’t know why these guys are struggling to lift 500 pounds”.
The fintech company I worked at does handle millions of QPS has has thousands of servers. It is on the same order of magnitude or at least 0.1x scale, not to mention the complexity of business logic involving monetary transactions.
If there’s indeed a 5 min lag in monitoring dashboard in Cloudflare, I honestly think that's a pretty big concern.
For example, a simple curl script on your top 100 customers' homepage that runs every 30 seconds would have given the warning and notifications within a minute. If you stagger deployments at 5 minute intervals, you could have identified the issue and initiated the rollback within 2 minutes and completed it within 3 minutes.
> However, the company is so big that there’s so many different products all shipping at the same time it can be hard to correlate it to your release
This kind of thing would be more understandable for a company without hundreds of billions of dollars, and for one that hasn't centralized so much of the internet. If a company has grown too large and complex to be well managed and effective and it's starting to look like a liability for large numbers of people there are obvious solutions for that.
What "hundreds of billions of dollars"? Cloudflare's annual revenue is around $2 billion, and they are not yet profitable.
Given how well-established cloudflare is, I would've figured they'd be profitable by now. That raises the question: why does so much of the web rely on a company which does not have the means to sustain itself?
given how much of the population relies on Uber for their transportation… ;)
That was admittedly hyperbole, but since we're talking about a company with assets and revenue in the billions I'm not sure it matters. The fact remains that a lack of money/resources is not their problem.
They don't have unlimited resources. They have ~5000 employees. That's not small but it's not huge either. For sake of comparison, Google hit that headcount level literally 20 years ago.
They have enough money to buy anything they need. The CEO alone has billions. He could pay for as many employees as he wants out of his own pocket and not notice. In fact he's good at buying people, even senators.
That doesn't make sense. It would be like saying Twitter, SpaceX, and Tesla all should be incapable of engineering mistakes because their owner is rich. The world doesn't work that way.
Genuinely curious, how to actually implement detection systems for a large scale global infra which that works with < 1 minute SLO ? Given cost is no constraint.
Right now I'd say maybe don't push changes to your entire global infra all at once and certainty not without testing your change first to make sure it doesn't break anything, but it's really not about a specific failure/fix as much as it is about a single company getting too big to do the job well or just plain doing more than it should in the first place.
Honestly we shouldn't have created a system where any single company's failure is able to impact such a huge percentage of the network. The internet was designed for resilience and we abandoned that ideal to put our trust in a single company that maybe isn't up for the job. Maybe no one company ever could do it well enough, but I suspect that no single company should carry that responsibility in the first place.
But then would a customer have to use 10 different vendors to get the same things that Cloudflare currently provides? E.g. protection against various threats online?
Can you name a major cloud provider that doesn’t have major outages?
If this were purely a money problem it would have been solved ages ago. It’s a difficult problem to solve. Also, they’re the youngest of the major cloud providers and have a fraction of the resources that Google, Amazon, and Microsoft have.
> Can you name a major cloud provider that doesn’t have major outages?
That fact that no major cloud provider is actually good is not an argument that cloudflare isn't bad, or even that they couldn't/shouldn't do better than they are. They have fewer resources than Google or Microsoft but they're also in a unique position that makes us differently vulnerable when they fuck up. It's not all their fault, since it was a mistake to centralize the internet to the extent that we have in the first place, but now that they are responsible for so much they have to expect that people will be upset when they fail.
Every major cloud provider (including Cloudflare) is orders of magnitude better at keeping 9s of availability worldwide for thousands of customers than those customers are individually. The very best of those customers might be better and only rely on cloud providers for the scaling or huge amounts of infrastructure they don’t otherwise want to own, but the vast majority are actually less capable at accomplishing whatever uptime the providers already get.
Could cloudflare do better? Sure, that’s a truism for everyone. Did they make mistakes and continue to make mistakes? Also a truism.
Trust me, they are acutely aware of people getting upset when they fail. Why do you think they’re CEO and CTO are writing these blog posts?
With all due respect, engineers in finance can’t allow for outages like this because then you are losing massive amounts of money and potentially going out of business.
Cloudflare is orders of magnitude larger than any fintech. Rollouts likely take much longer, and having a human monitoring a dashboard doesn't scale.
That means they engineered their systems incorrectly then? Precisely because they are much bigger, they should be more resilient. You know who's bigger than Cloudflare? tier-1 ISPs, if they had an outage the whole internet would know about it, and they do have outages except they don't cascade into a global mess like this.
Just speculating based on my experience: It's more likely than not that they likely refused to invest in fail-safe architectures for cost reasons. Control-plane and data-plane should be separate, a react patch shouldn't affect traffic forwarding.
Forget manual rollbacks, there should be automated reversion to a known working state.
> Control-plane and data-plane should be separate
They are separate.
> a react patch shouldn't affect traffic forwarding.
If you can’t even bother to read the blog post maybe you shouldn’t be so confident in your own analysis of what should and shouldn’t have happened?
This was a configuration change to change the buffered size of a body from 256kb to 1mib.
The ability to be so wrong in so few words with such confidence is impressive but you may want to take more of a curiosity first approach rather than reaction first.
You really should take some of your pill.
> Instead, it was triggered by changes being made to our body parsing logic while attempting to detect and mitigate an industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components.
> Unfortunately, in our FL1 version of our proxy, under certain circumstances, the second change of turning off our WAF rule testing tool caused an error state that resulted in 500 HTTP error codes to be served from our network.
The body parsing logic is in react or nextjs, that's my takeaway, is it that incorrect? and the WAF rule testing tool (control plane) was interdependent with the WAF's body parsing logic, is that also incorrect?
> This was a configuration change to change the buffered size of a body from 256kb to 1mib.
Yes, and if it was resilient,the body parsing is done on a discrete forwarding plane. Any config changes should be auto-tested for forwarding failures by the separate control plane and auto-revered when there are errors. If the waf rule testing tool was part of that test then it being down shouldn't have affected data-plane because it would be a separate system.
data/control plane separate means the run time of the two and any dependencies they have are separate. It isn't cheap to do this right, that's why I speculated (I made clear i was speculating) that it was because they wanted to save costs.
> The ability to be so wrong in so few words with such confidence is impressive but you may want to take more of a curiosity first approach rather than reaction first.
Please tone down the rage a bit and leave room for some discussion. You should take your own pill and be curious about what I meant instead of taking a rage-first approach.
To be clear:
1. There is an active vulnerability unrelated to Cloudflare where React/Next.JS can be abused via a malicious payload. The payload could be up to 1MB.
2. Cloudflare had buffer size that wasn't enough to prevent that payload from being sent to the Customer of the Cloudflare.
3. Cloudflare to protect their customers wanted to increase the buffer size to 1MB.
4. Internal Testing Tool wasn't able to handle change to 1MB and started failing.
5. They wanted to stop Internal Testing Tool from failing, but the Internal Testing Tool required disabling a ruleset which an existing system was depending on (due to a long existing bug). This caused the wider incident.
It does seem to be like a mess in the sense that in order to stop internal testing tool from failing they had to endanger things globally in production, yes. It looks like legacy, tech debt mess.
It seems like bad decisions done in the past though.
Maybe they should have focused on fixing the "legacy tech debt mess", rather than pushing out more and more services and trying to be like AWS or Azure.
> The body parsing logic is in react or nextjs, that's my takeaway, is it that incorrect?
The exploit they were trying to protect against is in React services run by their customers.
that makes better sense now, thanks. I feel dumb now that I re-read it, in my mind they patched nextjs/react and the new patch somehow required more buffer size.
> Rollouts likely take much longer
Cloudflare’s own post says the configuration change that resulted in the outage rolled out in seconds.
The blog post said the rollout of the config change took 1 minute.
My guess is that CF has so many external customers that they need to move fast and try not to break things. My hunch is that their culture always favors moving fast. As long as they are not breaking too many things, customers won't leave them.
There is nothing wrong with moving fast and deploying fast.
I'm more talking about how slow it was to detect the issue caused by the config change, and perform the rollback of the config change. It took 20 minutes.
I think everyone favors moving fast. We humans want to see results of our action early.
Same, my time at a F100 ecommerce retailer showed me the same. Every change control board justification needed an explicit back-out/restoration plan with exact steps to be taken, what was being monitored to ensure that was being held to, contacts of prominent groups anticipated to have an effect, emergency numbers/rooms for quick conferences if in fact something did happen.
The process was pretty tight, almost no revenue-affecting outages from what I can remember because it was such a collaborative effort (even though the board presentation seemed a bit spiky and confrontational at the time, everyone was working together).
And you moved at a glacial pace compared to Cloudflare. There are tradeoffs.
Yes, of course, I want the organization that inserted itself into handling 20% of the world's internet traffic to move fast and break things. Like breaking the internet on a bi-weekly basis. Yep, great tradeoff there.
Give me a break.
While you're taking your break, exploits gain traction in the wild and one of the value propositions for using a service provider like CloudFlare is catching and mitigating theses exploits as fast as possible. From the OP, this outage was in relation to handling a nasty RCE.
But if your job is mitigate attacks/issues then things can very broken while you're being slow to mitigate it.
Lest we forget, they initially rose to prominence by being cheaper than the existing solutions, not better, and I suppose this is a tradeoff a lot of their customers are willing to make.
This sounds just as bad as yolo-merges, just on the other end of the spectrum.
Speaking of fintech
https://www.henricodolfing.ch/case-study-4-the-440-million-s...
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Today, after the Cloudflare outage, I noticed that almost all upload routes for my applications were being blocked.
After some investigation, I realized that none of these routes passed through Cloudflare OWASP. The reported anomalies total 50, exceeding the pre-configured maximum of 40 (Medium).
Despite being simple image or video uploads, the WAF is generating anomalies that make no sense, such as the following:
Cloudflare OWASP Core Ruleset Score (+5)
933100: PHP Injection Attack: PHP Open Tag Found
Cloudflare OWASP Core Ruleset Score (+5)
933180: PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found
For now, I’ve had to raise the OWASP Anomaly Score Threshold to 60 and enable the JS Challenge, but I believe something is wrong with the WAF after today’s outage.
This issue was still not solved to this moment.
Time for Cloudflare to start using the BOFH excuse generator. https://bofh.d00t.org/
So Cloudflare: - Did a last minute, untested change to their change: "turning off our WAF rule testing tool". - Did an immediate global roll-out, instead of a staged one. . Is seems they would have enough leaning-cases now never to do that again...
My understanding, paraphrased: "In order to gradually roll out one change, we had to globally push a different configuration change, which broke everything at once".
But a more important takeaway:
> This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems
That's a bizarre takeaway for them to suggest, when they had exactly the same kind of bug with Rust like three weeks ago. (In both cases they had code implicitly expecting results to be available. When the results weren't available, they terminated processing of the request with an exception-like mechanism. And then they had the upstream services fail closed, despite the failing requests being to optional sidecars rather than on the critical query path.)
In fairness, the previous bug (with the Rust unwrap) should never have happened: someone explicitly called the panicking function, the review didn't catch it and the CI didn't catch it.
It required a significant organizational failure to happen. These happen but they ought to be rarer than your average bug (unless your organization is fundamentally malfunctioning, that is)
The issue would also not have happened, if someone did the right code, tests, and the review or CI caught it...
It's different to expect somebody to write the correct program every time than to expect somebody not to call the "break_my_system" procedure that was warnings all over it telling people it's there for quick learning-to-use examples or other things you'll never run.
Yeah, my first thought was that had they used Rust, maybe we would've seen them point out a rule_result.unwrap() as the issue.
To be precise, the previous problem with Rust was because somebody copped out and used a temporary escape hatch function that absolutely has no place in production code.
It was mostly an amateur mistake. Not Rust's fault. Rust could never gain adoption if it didn't have a few escape hatches.
"Damned if they do, damned if they don't" kind of situation.
There are even lints for the usage of the `unwrap` and `expect` functions.
As the other sibling comment points out, the previous Cloudflare problem was an acute and extensive organizational failure.
You can make an argument that .unwrap() should have no place in production code, but .expect("invariant violated: etc. etc.") very much has its place. When the system is in an unpredicted and not-designed-for state it is supposed to shut down promptly, because this makes it easier to troubleshoot the root cause failure whereas not doing so may have even worse consequences.
I don't disagree but you might as well also manually send an error to f.ex. Sentry and just halt processing of the request.
Though that really depends. In companies where k8s is used the app will be brought back up immediately anyway.
Prevented unless they assert the wrong invariant at runtime like they did last time.
This is the exact same type of error that happened in their Rust code last time. Strong type systems don’t protect you from lazy programming.
It's not remotely the same type of error -- error non-handling is very visible in the Rust code, while the Lua code shows the happy path, with no indication that it could explode at runtime.
Perhaps it's the similar way of not testing the possible error path, which is an organizational problem.
The interesting part:
After rolling out a bad ruleset update, they tried a killswitch (rolled out immediately to 100%) which was a code path never executed before:
> However, we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”. When the killswitch was applied, the code correctly skipped the evaluation of the execute action, and didn’t evaluate the sub-ruleset pointed to by it. However, an error was then encountered while processing the overall results of evaluating the ruleset
> a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years
> have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”
One might think a company on the scale of Cloudflare would have a suite of comprehensive tests to cover various scenarios.
I kinda think most companies out there are like that. Moving fast is the motto I heard the most.
They are probably OK with occasional breaks as long as customers don't mind.
Yeah the example they gave does feel like pretty isolated unit test territory, or at least an integration test on a subset of the system that could be ran in isolation.
Is there some underlying factors that resulted in the recent outages (e.g., new processes, layoffs, etc.) or just a series of pure coincidences?
Sounds like their "FL1 -> FL2" transition is involved in both.
It was involved in the previous one, but not in this latest one. All FL2 did was prevent the outage being even wider spread than it was. None of this had anything to do with migration.
If FL2 didn't have the outage, and FL1 did, the pace of the migration did have an impact.
Though this is showing the problem with these things: Migrating faster could have reduced the impact of this outage, while increasing the impact of the last outage. Migrating slower could have reduced the impact of the last outage, while increasing the impact of this outage.
This is a hard problem: How fast do you rip old working infrastructure out and risk finding new problems in the new stack, yet, how long do you tolerate shortcomings of the old stack that caused you to build the new stack?
I'm sure everything slowly falling apart all at the same time is due to some strange coincidence, and not the regular and steady firing of thousands of people.
AI
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How hard can it be for a company with 1000 engineers to create a canary region before blasting their centralized changes out to everyone.
Every change is a deployment, even if its config. Treat it as such.
Also you should know that a strongly typed language won't save you from every type of problem. And especially not if you allow things like unwrap().
It is just mind boggling that they very obviously have completely untested code which proxies requests for all their customers. If you don't want to write the tests then at least fuzz it.
I sometimes feel we'd be better off without all the paternalistic kitchensink features. The solid, properly engineered features used intentionally aren't causing these outages.
Agreed, I don't really like Cloudflare trying to magically fix every web exploit there is in frameworks my site has never used.
Honestly. This feels outside of their domain.
I’ve been downvoted enough with my comments on this blog post where I’m hesitant to add anything else, but here I agree with you. They’re trying to be everything to everyone, where does the accountability of their customers being responsible for running, you know, up-to-date packages come in? Like, you don’t take just a little bit of pride in your work that you’re continually watching CVE lists and exploits and just have a minimum of effort toward patching your own shit, rather than pawning it off on vendor? I simply can’t understand the mindset.
The good news is that you can have that right now. Just don't use Cloudflare.
> provides customers with protection against malicious payloads, allowing them to be detected and blocked. To do this, Cloudflare’s proxy buffers HTTP request body content in memory for analysis.
I have a mixed feeling about this.
On the other hand, I absolutely don't want a CDN to look inside my payloads and decide what's good for me or. Today it's protection, tomorrow it's censorship.
At the same time this is exactly what CloudFlare is good for - to protect sites from malicious requests.
We need a decentralized ddos mitigation network based on incentives. Donate X amount of bandwidth, get Y amount of protection from other peers. Yes, we gotta do TLS inspection on every end for effective L7 mitigation but at least filtering can be done without decrypting any packets
How would that work for latency / reliability of the requests?
"This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur." It's starting to sound like a broken record at this point, languages are still seen as equal and as a result, interchangeable.
> This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years. This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur.
Cloudflare deployed code that was literally never tested, not even once, neither manually nor by unit test, otherwise the straightforward error would have been detected immediately, and their implied solution seems to be not testing their code when written, or even adding 100% code coverage after the fact, but rather relying on a programming language to bail them out and cover up their failure to test.
Large scale infrastructure changes are often by nature completely untestable. The system is too large, there are too many moving parts to replicate with any kind of sane testing, so often, you do find out in prod, which is why robust and fast rollback procedures are usually desirable and implemented.
> Large scale infrastructure changes are often by nature completely untestable.
You're changing the subject here and shifting focus from the specific to the vague. The two postmortems after the recent major Cloudflare outages both listed straightforward errors in source code that could have been tested and detected.
Theoretical outages could theoretically have other causes, but these two specific outages had specific causes that we know.
> which is why robust and fast rollback procedures are usually desirable and implemented.
Yes, nobody is arguing against that. It's a red herring with regard to my point about source code testing.
I am not changing any subject. These are glue logic scripts connecting massive pieces of infra together, spanning what is likely several teams and orgs over the course of many years. It is impossible to blurt something out like "well, source code testing" for something like this, when the source code inputs are not possibly testable outside the scale of the larger system. They're often completely unknowable as well.
With all due respect, it sounds like you have not worked on these types of systems, but out of curiosity - what type of test do you think would have prevented this?
With all due respect, it sounds like you have never heard of unit tests.
Cloudflare states that the compiler would prevent the bug in certain programming languages. So it seems ridiculous to suggest that the bug can't be detected outside the scale of a larger system.
Please explain how unit tests stop a problem from propagating across a system that fields 70 million requests a second and I’ll take you more seriously, otherwise I’m done with this particular subthread.
You're completely missing the point. From the blog post:
"This code expects that, if the ruleset has action=”execute”, the “rule_result.execute” object will exist. However, because the rule had been skipped, the rule_result.execute object did not exist, and Lua returned an error due to attempting to look up a value in a nil value.This is a straightforward error in the code, which had existed undetected for many years. This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur."
The unit tests are for the source code. In this respect, the number of requests a second fielded by the system is irrelevant. Unit tests don't happen in production; that's the point of them.
It's a classic coding mistake, failing to check for nil, and none of your handwaving about "scale" changes that fact.
Akamai manages it.
They don't, akamai has had several outages as well jsut no one notices. Akamai is way way smaller than cloudflare, 20% of internet traffic passes through CF networks, not sure it's even measurable on Akamai.
Quickly Googling about, a commonly repeated figure is that Akamai served 15% - 30% of Internet traffic in the late 2010's. They probably have less of the market today due to others growing, but they're not a minnow.
2024 revenue figures were $1.669 billion for Cloudflare, and $3.99 billion for Akamai, per Wikipedia.
https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/proxy, they are tiny compared to CF, their revenue is high because they focus on large enterprise clients.
> 20% of internet traffic passes through CF networks
That does not sound right to me. “20 percent of websites” does not mean “20 percent of traffic.”.
There is no public write-up from Cloudflare that proves “we handle 20% of all Internet traffic.” Cloudflare reports around 295,000 paying customers and more than 30 million Internet properties (20% of the web). So most of their users are on the free plan.
agreed, cloudflare says 20% of all websties, which makes sense, digging into it the "20% of all web traffic" seems to have been like a game of telephone in media, social media, and/or AI.
I can't believe they only have 295,000 paying customer, that puts me in a small minority. lol
> This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems.
True, as long as you don't call unwrap!
That's a different kind of error. And even then unwrap is opt-in whereas this is opt-out if you're lucky.
Kind of funny that we get something showing the benefits of Rust so soon after everyone was ragging on a out unwrap anyway!
Apart from Cloudflare config system working too good to propagate failure modes:
the code quality on very mission critical path powering “half the internets” could’ve been better.
I’m not sure if Lua LSP / linting tools would’ve caught the issue (I also never used Lua myself), but tools and methods exist to test mission critical dynamically typed code.
The company with genuinely impressive concentration of talent was expected to think about fuzzing this legacy crap somehow.
As for `.unwrap()` related incident: normally code like this should never pass the review.
You just (almost) never unwrap in production code.
I’d start with code quality tooling but more important - the related processes before even thinking about the architecture changes.
Changing architecture in global sense which, in general has served for years with 99.99(9)% uptime is not obviously smart thing to do.
Architecture is doing great, it’s just impact which has been devastating because of the scale.
Everyone makes errors and it’s fine, but there are ways not to roll shit in prod (reference to famous meme pic where bugs do that).
There's a lot of bad karma in this discussion. It's hard to run large services. Careful when you set a precedent of pillorying after an outage. It could be you next!
Yes, this is the second time in a month. Were folks expecting that to have been enough time for them to have made sweeping technical and organization changes? I say no—this doesn't mean they aren't trying or haven't learned any lessons from the last outage. It's a bit too soon to say that.
I see this event primarily as another example of the #1 class of major outages: bad rapid global configuration change. (The last CloudFlare outage was too, but I'm not just talking about CloudFlare. Google has had many many such outages. There was an inexplicable multi-year gap between recognizing this and having a good, widely available staged config rollout system for teams to drop into their systems.) Stuff like DoS attack configurations needs to roll out globally quickly. But they really need make it not quite this quick. Imagine they deployed to one server for one minute, one region for one minute on success, then everywhere on success. Then this would have been a tiny blip rather than a huge deal.
(It can be a bit hard to define "success" when you're doing something like blocking bad requests that may even be a majority of traffic during a DDoS attack, but noticing 100% 5xx errors for 38% of your users due to a parsing bug is doable!)
As for the specific bug: meh. They should have had 100% branch coverage on something as critical (and likely small) as the parsing for this config. Arguably a statically typed language would have helped (but the `.unwrap()` error in the previous outage is a bit of a counterargument to that). But it just wouldn't have mattered that much if they caught it before global rollout.
The most surprising from this article is that CloudFlare handles only around 85M TPS.
it can't really be that small, can it?
that's maybe half a rack of load
Given the number of lua scripts they seem to be running, it has to take more than half a rack.
Having their changes fully propagate within 1 minute is pretty fantastic.
This is most likely a strong requisite for such a big scale deployment if DDOS protection and detection - which explains their architectural choices (ClickHouse & co) and the need of a super low latency config changes.
Since attackers might rotate IPs more frequently than once per minute, this effectively means that the whole fleet of servers should be able to quickly react depending on the decisions done centrally.
The coolest part of Cloudflare’s architecture is that every server is the same… which presumably makes deployment a straightforward task.
The bad change wasn't even a deployment as such, just an entry in the global KV store https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-quicksilver-configur...
Actual deployments take hours to propagate worldwide.
(Disclosure: former Cloudflare SRE)
Why wasn’t the rollback fixed within the second minute after they saw the 500s?
> As part of our ongoing work to protect customers using React against a critical vulnerability, CVE-2025-55182, we started rolling out an increase to our buffer size to 1MB, the default limit allowed by Next.js applications.
Why would increasing the buffer size help with that security vulnerability? Is it just a performance optimization?
I think the buffer size is the limit on what they check for malicious data, so the old 128k would mean it would be trivial to circumvent by just having 128k ok data and then put the exploit after.
I got curious and I checked AWS WAF. Apparently AWS WAF default limit for CloudFront is 16KB and max is 64KB.
If the request data is larger than the limit it doesn’t get processed by the Cloudflare system. By increasing buffer size they process (and therefore protect) more requests.
> Instead, it was triggered by changes being made to our body parsing logic while attempting to detect and mitigate an industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components.
Doesn't Cloudflare rigorously test their changes before deployment to make sure that this does not happen again? This better not have been used to cover for the fact that they are using AI to fix issues like this one.
Better not be any presence of vibe coders or AI agents being used to be touching such critical pieces of infrastructure at all and I expected Cloudflare to learn from the previous outage very quickly.
But this is quite a pattern but might need to consider putting the unreliability next to GitHub (which goes down every week).
> This first change was being rolled out using our gradual deployment system.
So they are aware of some basic mitigation tactics guarding against errors
> This system does not perform gradual rollouts,
They just choose to YOLO
> Typical actions are “block”, “log”, or “skip”. Another type of action is “execute”,
> However, we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”.
Do they do no testing? These isn't even fuzzing with “infinite” variations, but a limited list of actions
> existed undetected for many years. This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems.
So this solution is also well known, just ignored for years, because "if it’s not broken, don’t fix it?", right?
First, what Cloudflare does is hard and I want to start with that.
That being said, I think it’s worth a discussion. How much of the last 3 outages were because of the JGC (the former CTO) retiring and Dane taking over?
Did JGC have a steady hand that’s missing? Or was it just time for outages that would have happened anyway?
Dane has maintained a culture of transparency which is fantastic, but did something get injected in the culture leading towards these issues? Will it become more or less stable since JGC left?
Curious for anyone with some insight or opinions.
(Also, if it wasn’t clear - huge Cloudflare fan and sending lots of good vibes to the team)
Looking at Dane's career history on LinkedIn, it appears that he has only ever been in product and some variety of manager, and his degree is in 'Engineering Management System'. It's an odd choice given that the previous two CTOs (Lee and John) were extremely technical and how core technology is to Cloudflare.
As with any organisation where the CTO is not technical, there will be someone who the 'CTO' has to ask to understand technical situations. In my opinion, that person being asked is the real CTO, for any given situation.
I still don't understand what is cloudflare's business model, yet they manage to make news.
I don't see how their main product is ddos protection, yet cloudflare goes down for some reason.
This company makes zero sense to me.
Cloudflare protects against DDOS but also various forms of malicious traffic (bots, low reputation IP users, etc) and often with a DDOS or similar attacks, it's better to have the site go down from time to time than for the attackers to hammer the servers behind cloudflare and waste mass amounts of resources.
i.e. it's the difference between "site goes down for a few hours every few months" and "an attacker slammed your site, and through in on-demand scaling or serverless component cloud fees blew your entire infrastructure budget for the year.
Doubly so when your service is part of a larger platform and attacks on your service risk harming your reputation for the larger platform.
If I'm remembering correctly, there was another outage around 10 days ago.
It still surprises me that there are basically no free alternatives comparable to Cloudflare. Putting everything on CF creates a pretty serious single point of failure.
It's strange that in most industries you have at least two major players, like Coke vs. Pepsi or Nike vs. Adidas. But in the CDN/edge space, there doesn't seem to be a real free competitor that matches Cloudflare's feature set.
It feels very unhealthy for the ecosystem. Does anyone know why this is the case?
I reckon AWS is "free enough" for most of its users, but it's not as easy nor as safe for the common user.
Totally agree, AWS's free tier is great for many users, but it can definitely be tricky and risky for the average person.
Suggestion for Cloudflare: Create an early adopter option for free accounts.
Benefit: Earliest uptake of new features and security patches.
Drawback: Higher risk of outages.
I think this should be possible since they already differentiate between free, pro and enterprise accounts. I do not know how the routing for that works but I bet they could do this. Think crowd-sourced beta testers. Also a perk for anything PCI audit or FEDRAMP security prioritized over uptime.
I would for sure enable this, my personal server can handle being unreachable for a few hours in exchange for (potentially) interesting features.
They do in some way because the LaLiga blocking problems in Spain don’t affect the paid accounts=large websites.
An other suggestion is to do it along night shift in every country, right now they only take into account EEUU night.
If that meant free tier had WAF then sure, I’d enable that.
The interesting aspect of the Cloudflare support, which is not clarified, is how they came to the risk assessment that it is ok to roll out a change non-gradual globally without testing the procedure first. The only justification I can see is that the React/Next.js remote command execution vulnerabilities are actively exploited. But if this is the case they should say so.
It's (at least) the second time Couldflage gets bitten by React. Last time an useEffect caused an incident.
https://blog.cloudflare.com/deep-dive-into-cloudflares-sept-...
I wonder anyone from internal could share the culture a bit. I'm mostly interested in the following part:
If someone messes up royally, is there someone who says "if you break the build/whatever super critical, then your ass is the grass and I'm the lawn mower"?
So no static compiler checks and apparently no fuzzers used to ensure these rules work as intended?
Such tooling exists for Lua? Didn't know.
They exist if you are worth 70 billion.
From a customer perspective, I think there should be an option:
- prioritize security: get patchs ASAP
- prioritize availability: get patchs after a cooldown period
Because ultimately, it's a tradeoff that cannot be handled by Cloudflare. It depends on your business, your threat model.
Not missing working with LUA in proxies. I think this is no big thing. They rolled back the change fairly quickly. Still bad but that outage mid November was worse since it was many bad decisions stacking up and it took too long time to resolve.
They bypassed the gradual rollout system in order to meet a deadline for a cve. They put security above availability, tough tradeoff. Is there a non prod environment where that one off waf testing tool change could have been tested?
Dang… I don’t even use React and it still brings down my sites. Good beats I guess.
The problem that irks me isn’t that Cloudflare is having outages (everyone does and will at some point, no matter how many 9’s your SLA states), it’s that the internet is so damn centralized that a Cloudflare issue can take out a continent-sized chunk of the internet. Kudos to them on their success story, but oh my god that’s way too many eggs in one basket in general.
I notice that this is the kind of thing that solid sociable tests ought to have caught. I am very curious how testable that code is (random procedural if-statements don't inspire high confidence.)
Curious if there isn't a way to ingest the incoming traffic at scale, but route it to a secondary infrastructure to make sure it's resolving correctly, before pushing it to production?
1.1.1.1 domain test server, whether a relay or endpoints including /cdn-cgi/trace is WAF testing error, for 500 HTTP network & Cloudflare managed R-W-X permissions
Ironically, this time around the issue was in the proxy they're going to phase out (and replace with the Rust one).
I truly believe they're really going to make resilience their #1 priority now, and acknowledging the release process errors that they didn't acknowledge for a while (according to other HN comments) is the first step towards this.
HugOps. Although bad for reputation, I think these incidents will help them shape (and prioritize!) resilience efforts more than ever.
At the same time, I can't think of a company more transparent than CloudFlare when it comes to these kind of things. I also understand the urgency behind this change: CloudFlare acted (too) fast to mitigate the React vulnerability and this is the result.
Say what you want, but I'd prefer to trust CloudFlare who admits and act upon their fuckups, rather than trying to cover them up or downplaying them like some other major cloud providers.
@eastdakota: ignore the negative comments here, transparency is a very good strategy and this article shows a good plan to avoid further problems
> I truly believe they're really going to make resilience their #1 priority now
I hope that was their #1 priority from the very start given the services they sell...
Anyway, people always tend to overthink about those black-swan events. Yes, 2 happened in a quick succession, but what is the average frequency overall? Insignificant.
This is Cloudflare. They've repeatedly broken DNS for years.
Looking across the errors, it points to some underlying practices: a lack of systems metaphors, modularity, testability, and an reliance on super-generic configuration instead of software with enforced semantics.
I think they have to strike a balance between being extremely fast (reacting to vulnerabilities and DDOS attacks) while still being resilient. I don't think it's an easy situation
I would very much like for him not to ignore the negativity, given that, you know, they are breaking the entire fucking Internet every time something like this happens.
This is the kind of comment I wish he would ignore.
You can be angry - but that doesn't help anyone. They fucked up, yes, they admitted it and they provided plans on how to address that.
I don't think they do these things on purpose. Of course given their good market penetration they end up disrupting a lot of customers - and they should focus on slow rollouts - but I also believe that in a DDOS protection system (or WAF) you don't want or have the luxury to wait for days until your rule is applied.
I hope he doesn't ignore it, the internet has been forgiving enough toward cloudflares string of failures..its getting pretty old, and creates a ton of choas. I work with life saving devices, being impacted in any way in data monitoring has a huge impact in many ways. "sorry ma'am we can't give your child t1d readings on your follow app because our provider decided to break everything in the pursuit of some react bug." has a great ring to it
Cloudflare and other cloud infra providers are only providing primitives to use, in this case WAF. They have target uptimes and it's never 100%. It's up to the people actually making end user services (like your medical devices) to judge whether that is enough and if not to design your service around it.
(and also, rolling your own version of WAF is probably not the right answer if you need better uptime. It's exceedingly unlikely a medical devices company will beat CF at this game.)
Half your medical devices are probably opening up data leakage to China.
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3814810/backdoor-in-chines...
Most hospital and healthcare IT teams are extremely under funded, undertrained, overworked, and the software, configurations and platforms are normally not the most resilient things.
I have a friend at one in the North East right now going through a hell of a security breach for multiple months now and I'm flabbergasted no one is dead yet.
When it comes to tech, I get the impression most organizations are not very "healthy" in the durability of systems.
Most of DICOM data sharing is over unencrypted ports. Every sniffer can easily extract super-sensible data. Not only China, everywhere.
Maybe not on purpose but there's such a thing as negligence.
> HugOps
This childish nonsense needs to end.
Ops are heavily rewarded because they're supposed to be responsible. If they're not then the associated rewards for it need to stop as well.
I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents (focusing in tech debt reduction), but instead they get the opposite - blamed when things go wrong.
I think it's human nature (it's hard to realize something is going well until it breaks), but still has a very negative psychological effect. I can barely imagine the stress the team is going through right now.
> I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents
That's why their salaries are so high.
Depending on the tech debt, the ops team might just be in "survival mode" and not have the time to fix every single issue.
In this particular case, they seem to be doing two things: - Phasing out the old proxy (Lua based) which is replaced by FL2 (Rust based, the one that caused the previous incident) - Reacting to an actively exploited vulnerability in React by deploying WAF rules - and they're doing them in a relatively careful way (test rules) to avoid fuckups, which caused this unknown state, which triggered the issue
They deliberately ignored an internal tool that started erroring out at the given deployment and rolled it out anyway without further investigation.
That's not deserving of sympathy.
Ops salaries are high??? Where?!?!
Definitely commands better salaries than us pitty DEs.
news to me.
Ops has never been "rewarded" at any org I've ever been at or heard about, including physical infra companies.
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Wow. The three comments below parent really show how toxic HN has become.
being angry about something doesn't make it toxic, people have a right to be upset
The comment, before the edit, was what I would consider toxic. No wonder it has been edited.
It's fine to be upset, and especially rightfully so after the second outage in less than 30 days, but this doesn't justify toxicity.
Is it crazy to anyone else that they deploy every 5 minutes? And that it's not just config updates, but actual code changes with this "execute" action.
No: I've been at plenty of places where we get to continuous deployment, where any given change is deployed on demand.
What is wild is that they are deploying without first testing in a staging environment.
Config updates are not so clear cut from code changes.
Once I worked with a team in the anti-abuse space where the policy is that code deployments must happen over 5 days and config updates can take a few minutes. Then an engineer on the team argued that deploying new Python code doesn’t count as a code change because the CPython interpreter did not change; it didn’t even restart. And indeed given how dynamic Python is, it is totally possible to import new Python modules that did not exist when the interpreter process is launched.
lol man... If your "config" is Turing-complete, that's a code change. Full stop. Bro's just lazy.
Yeah sure. Now tell the people who are designing config languages to make them both powerful and non-Turing-complete. You see, it is a very hard problem for a powerful language to be non-Turing-complete.
is it me or critical software bugs are more and more common?
A lot of these kind of bugs feel like they could be caught be a simple review bot like Greptile... I wonder if Cloudlare uses an equivalent tool internally?
What makes greptile a better choice compared to claude code or codex, in your opinion?
That has not been my experience with those tools.
Super-procedural code in particular is too complex for humans to follow, much less AI.
Any bot that runs an AI model should not be called "simple".
Make faster websites:
> we started rolling out an increase to our buffer size to 1MB, the default limit allowed by Next.js applications.
Why is the Next.js limit 1 MB? It's not enough for uploading user generated content (photographs, scanned invoices), but a 1 MB request body for even multiple JSON API calls is ridiculous. There frameworks need to at least provide some pushback to unoptimized development, even if it's just a lower default request body limit. Otherwise all web applications will become as slow as the MS office suite or reddit.
The update was to update it to 3MB (paid 10MB)
a) They serialize tons of data into requests b) Headers. Mostly cookies. They are a thing. They are being abused all over the world by newbies.
When should we just give up on Cloudflare? Seems like this just keeps happening. Like some kind of backdoor triggered willy nilly, Hmmm?
Now. Right now. Seriously, stop using this terrible service. We also need to change the narrative that step 1 in every tutorial is "sign up for Cloudflare". This is partly a culture problem.
Is that me, or did CloudFlare outages increase since LLM "engineers" were hired remotely? Do you think there is a correlation?
They've always been flakey. At least these only impacted their own customers instead of taking down the internet.
before Cloudflare suffered an outage due to React's useEffect, now again trying to mitigate security issues around React Server Pages.
at one point in time - they've to admit this react thing ain't working. & just use classic server rendered pages, since their dashboards are simple toggle controls
As a reliability statistician (and web user!), I'd love to see Cloudflare investing in reliability statistics. :)
Messing around on a Friday? Brave.
You don't really want security updates waiting around on a luxury schedule.
Or overworked.
We can deploy on Fridays. We don't, because we aren't donating our time to the shareholders.
If you're afraid of deploying on Friday, you're doing it wrong.
I have to wonder if there is a relation to the rising prevalence of coding LLMs.
If you had a 99.99% availability requirement they will have already cost you a fortune
Every time they screw up they write an elaborate postmortem and pat themselves on the back. Don't get me wrong, better have the postmortem than not. But at this point it seems like the only thing they are good at is writing incident postmortem blog posts.
How come that crumbling, rotten to the core lua is still used? :D
I am not sure if it's just me or there have been too many outages this year to count. Is it the AI slop making into production?
Oh oh, looks like agentzh's code. A living legend
why does this seem oddly familiar (fail-closed logic)
Honestly a lot of these problems are because they don't test a staging environment, like isn't this software engineering basics?
Stop vibe coding on critical infrastructure :)
Is it just me, or should they have just reverted instead of making _another_ change as a result of the first one?
ALSO, very very weird that they had not caught this seemingly obvious bug in proxy buffer size handling. This points to that the change nr 2, done in "reactive" mode to change nr 1 that broke shit, HAD NOT BEEN TESTED AT ALL! Which is the core reason they should never have deployed that, but rather revert to a known good state, then test BOTH changes combined.
No love lost, no love found.
Classic. Things always get worse before they get better. I remember when Netflix was going through their annus horribilis, and AWS before that, and Twitter before that, and so on. Everyone goes through this. Good luck to you guys getting to FL2 quickly enough that this class of error reduces.
I do kind of like who they are blaming React for this.
I’m really sick of constantly seeing cloudflare, and their bullshit captchas. Please, look at how much grief they’re causing trying to be the gateway to the internet. Don’t give them this power
> This change was being rolled out using our gradual deployment system, and, as part of this rollout, we identified an increase in errors in one of our internal tools which we use to test and improve new WAF rules. As this was an internal tool, and the fix being rolled out was a security improvement, we decided to disable the tool for the time being as it was not required to serve or protect customer traffic.
Come on.
This PM raises more questions than it answers, such as why exactly China would have been immune.
China is probably a completely separate partition of their network.
One that doesn't get proactive security rollouts, it would seem.
I assume it was next on the checklist, or assigned to a different ops team.
The deploys are very unlikely to be managed from the same system.
It's not an outage, it's an Availability Incident™.
https://blog.cloudflare.com/5-december-2025-outage/#what-abo...
You jest, but recently I also felt compelled to stop using the word (planned) outage where I work, because it legitimately creates confusion around the (expected) character of impact.
Outage is the nuclear wasteland situation, which given modern architectural choices, is rather challenging to manifest. To avoid it is face-saving, but also more correct.
From earlier in the very same blog post (emphasis added):
> This system does not perform gradual rollouts, but rather propagates changes within seconds to the entire fleet of servers in our network and is under review following the outage we experienced on November 18.
Can't believe one shitty website can take down most of the mainstream web.
"They let the internet down"
amateur level stuff again
This is total amateur shit. Completely unacceptable for something as critical as Cloudflare.
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Some nonsense again. The level of negligence there is astounding. This is frightening because this entity is daily exposed to a large portion of our personal data which goes over the wire. As well as business data. It’s just a matter of time before a disaster is going to occur. Some regulatory body must take control in their hands right now.
Got furiously downvoted but no counter arguments presented. Says it all.
i wonder why they cannot partially rollout. like the other outage they have to do a global rollout.
I really don't see how it would've helped. In go or Rust you'd just get a panic, which is in no way different.
The article mentions that this Lua-based proxy is the old generation one, which is going to be replaced by the Rust based one (FL2) and that didn't fail on this scenario.
So, if anything, their efforts towards a typed language were justified. They just didn't manage to migrate everything in time before this incident - which is ironically a good thing since this incident was cause mostly by a rushed change in response to an actively exploited vulnerability.
yes, but as the article states why are they doing global fast rollouts?
I think (would love to be corrected) that this is the nature of their service. They probably push multiple config changes per minute to mitigate DDOS attacks. For sure the proxies have a local list of IPs that, for a period of time, are blacklisted.
For DDOS protection you can't really rely on multiple-hours rollouts.
> Customers that did not have the configuration above applied were not impacted. Customer traffic served by our China network was also not impacted.
Interesting.
They kinda buried the lede there, 28% failure rate for 100% of customers isn't the same as 100% failure rate for 28% of customers
Unwrap() strikes again
I guess you’re being facetious but for those who didn’t click through:
> This type of code error is prevented by languages with strong type systems. In our replacement for this code in our new FL2 proxy, which is written in Rust, the error did not occur.
That bit may be true, but the underlying error of a null reference that caused a panic was exactly the same in both incidents.
Yep: it is wild for them to claim that a strongly-typed language would have saved them when it didn't.
Relying on language features instead of writing code well will always eventually backfire.
You're right that you have to "write code well" to prevent this sort of thing. It's also true that Rust's language features, if you use them, can make this sort of mistake a compile-time error rather than something that only blows up at runtime under the wrong conditions. The problem with their last outage was that somebody explicitly opted out of the tool provided by the language. As you say, that's "not writing code well". But I think you're dismissing the value of the language feature in helping you write code well.
Relying on code ninja ego backfires way sooner, and way more often.
https://security.googleblog.com/2025/11/rust-in-android-move...
this time in lua. cloudflare can't catch a break
Or they're not thoroughly testing changes before pushing them out. As I've seen some others say, CloudFlare at this point should be considered critical infrastructure. Maybe not like power but dang close.
My power goes out every Wednesday around noon and normally if the weather is bad. In a major US metro.
I hope cloudflare is far more resilient than local power.
The 'rewrite it in lua' crowd are oddly silent now.
How do you know?
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Did you really go through the trouble of creating an account just to spit trash? Damn!
Anyone knows why lua? Or is it perhaps as a redis script in lua?
Figured it, its prob a nginx lua module
Time to use boring languages such as Java and Go.